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PREFACE 
Risk management is a concept and a practice that is relatively new to 
the  f ie ld of road s a f e t y .  Although the systematic analysis of an 
organization's operations to identify risks and select treatments for them 
is common in  the world of business, it has only recently begun to be 
undertaken by road authorities. However, as  increasing insurance 
premiums make it more difficult for road authorities to transfer the risk 
of loss to an insurer, road safety risk management is likely to expand and 
develop. 
The purpose of these two volumes is to provide a background and a 
starting point for road safety risk management programs in Michigan. 
Volume I is intended to provide an introduction to risk management 
theory as it applies to road safety and an introduction to road liability 
law, as a background for the development of a risk management program. 
Volume I1 provides additional legal background in  the form of summaries 
of cases involving road safety in Michigan. 
These volumes have been prepared on the premise that the law of 
road liability plays an essential role in a road safety risk management 
program. There are three ways in  which this is t rue .  F i r s t ,  as a 
practical matter, a concern about liability is often the impetus for safety 
decisions. At the same time, a concern about liability can also inhibit 
the making of safety decisions. Finally, however, legal considerations 
should be neither a driving nor a restraining force in a risk management 
program. Rather, they should be a source of information and a guide for 
decision-making. Lawsuits can inform the road authority of facts or 
conditions that involve risks of injury to users of the road. The reported 
court decisions and the statutes also provide guidelines as to  what 
conduct or results are expected of the road authority in dealing with 
those risks. 
The purpose of these volumes, then,  is to provide a general  
introduction to the law relating to road authorities and their operations. 
They are not intended to provide legal advice. That can only be done by 
counsel as specific legal questions arise. It is hoped that the materials in 
these volumes will  acquaint the reader with general principles of road 
l iabi l i ty  law,  thereby providing a basis for sound road safety risk 
management decisions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE ROAD AUTHORITY 
A risk management program involves both an approach or attitude to 
problem solving and specific procedures and decisions. The att i tude is a 
fundamenta l  par t  of the program, in tha t  it influences and often 
determines the specific procedures and the decisions adopted in a risk 
management program. Therefore ,  i t  is necessary to begin with a 
discussion of some basic risk management concepts before proceeding to 
specific areas of concern. This chapter discusses two main topics-how 
risk management concepts apply to road authorities, and how the law of 
road liability relates to a road authority's risk management program. 
DEFINITION OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
The concept of risk management originated in the business world and 
developed there. As a result, most of the theories and practices of risk 
management relate to the problems of profit-making organizations; many 
of these do not apply to public agency operations. Specifically, the risk 
management  concerns of public agencies (and road authorities in  
particular) differ from traditional risk management in two ways--the types 
of risk to be managed, and the techniques used to manage them. 
The Meaning of "Riskn 
The definition of risk varies from field to field, and from author to 
author. For example, insurance managers at one time distinguished "pure1' 
or "truerf risk--pot en tial losses incurred simply as the result of ownership 
or possession-f rom  speculative^ risk-potential losses incurred in the hope 
of gain (1). Decision theorists and some accident researchers, on the 
other hand, have distinguished tfhazardlf from "riskff--hazard meaning the 
objective probability of a dangerous event's occurring and flrisktf meaning 
one's subjective perception of that probability ( 2 ) .  Depending on the 
context, different features of the risk concept come into focus. 
The most basic features of risk to be distilled from the literature 
appear to be as follows. Future events are uncertain to relative degrees. 
Some of these pot en t i al, but uncertain, events involve losses (or relative 
losses). The type and extent of possible losses a re  also uncertain.  
People are forced to make decisions, and ultimately to act, with respect 
to the uncertain and potentially harmful future, basing their decisions on 
uncertain and incomplete data. Under these circumstances, we experience 
risk. 
Risk Management Defined 
Risk management is an approach to decision-making under risk 
conditions. It emerges from an unawareness that our decisions and 
subsequent acts can affect the probability, the type, and the extent of 
potential losses. The management of risk is based on a comprehensive 
understanding of systems that interact to produce and affect losses, loss 
rates, and loss probabilities. It stresses evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of alternative decisions with respect to their expected effects. 
The goals of risk management as applied to any endeavor appear to be (a) 
the reduction of uncertainty or the reduction of the negative results of 
uncertainty, and (b) the optimization of some set of benefits in the light 
of uncertainty. 
History of the Risk Management Concept Among Insurance Buyers 
The term "risk management" appears to have been coined by corporate 
insurance managers beginning in the 1950s. A search for material under 
that rubric leads one to articles and texts written by these individuals (3 ) .  
For this reason, the insurance area is an appropriate starting place for a 
discussion of risk management. 
The early history of the risk management concept is marked by the 
information of associations of corporate insurance buyers in the 1920s. As 
an example, in Boston, in 1929, an informal conference of corporate 
insurance buyers was held for the purposes of education and information. 
This was followed by the establishment of the Insurance Division of the 
American Management Association in 1931. Subsequently, the  Risk 
Research Institute was established during the next twenty years, resulting 
in the development of the National Insurance Buyers Association and, 
later, the American Society of Insurance Management, Inc. 
During the same period, between 1920 and 1950, there was a trend 
toward the development of separate insurance management and, for 
example, fire prevention departments within corporate structures of the 
railroad, oil, and food industries. 
These trends signaled a change in businessesf attitude toward loss. 
Rather than assuming that losses incurred through fire, accident, and 
injury were inevitable and simply buying enough insurance to cover 
projected losses, company managers responsible for the procurement of 
insurance coverage began to experiment with the idea that a combination 
of tactics might be used to reduce the overall expenditure on losses. 
They began to take a more active role in assessing their risks, their 
insurance costs, and their savings with proper coverage. 
Despite the expanded view, a corporate risk manager's function at this 
time was limited to management of strictly financial risks threatening the 
company's economic position. This meant that in many cases a risk 
analysis began and ended with a consideration of those assets revealed in 
the company balance sheet; personal injuries were relevant risks only to 
the extent of their economic repercussions (4). 
In focusing on the effective use of commercially available insurance 
policies in combination with the risk-retention techniques of noninsurance 
and self- insurance,  managers fur ther  limited their activities to a 
consideration of so-called ninsurableu risks or "pure1' risks, that is, those 
incurred through the ownership or possession of property, those incidental 
to company operations. Excluded were the various 'tbusiness'f or 
  speculative^ risks--potential losses incurred, for example, in entering a 
new market area, or in developing and marketing a new product. Such 
risks, run purely in the hope of gain, were similar to gambling risks and 
could only be assumed as a cost of doing business ( 5 ) .  Insurance 
companies did not make coverage available against these risks. 
Finally, risk abatement and reduction through safety programs and 
procedures continued to be functions separate from those of the risk 
manager and were the special province of the company fire prevention 
department or industrial safety expert. As a result, risk management a t  
this stage was often disjointed or inadequate. 
Development in the Theory of Risk Management 
During the 1960s, the scope of the corporate risk management function 
was expanded through an in tegra t ion  of the insurance and sa fe ty  
management functions. At that time, more formal procedures were 
developed for assessing and managing a wider variety of risks. The new 
approach sought a more holistic view of the company's exposure to risk, 
recognizing the interrelation of relevant factors and acknowledging the 
nebulous risks involved in  a potential loss of time, loss of community 
good will, or an interruption of services. Articles on risk management 
also stressed careful analysis and quantitat ive  evaluation of risks and 
alternative management strategies (6) .  These developments reflect the 
influence of operation research and the increasing use of systems analysis. 
Formal and relatively standardized risk management procedures at  this 
t ime included: (a) analysis or recognition of risks; (b) evaluation of 
exposures; (c) abatement or reduction of hazards; (d )  risk insurance; and 
(e) risk accounting or evaluation of management policies. (7).  
The first of these, analysis or recognition of risks, required a broad 
view of exposure and was to be advanced by free-flowing communications 
among corporate departments. Communication and adequate feedback 
from al l  levels of management was considered the best method of 
ensuring that all risks-due to fire and accidents, threatening com munity 
relations or business reputation, and even potentially stemming from 
product development-would be taken into account. 
The next step, evaluation of exposures, required an examination of the 
qualititative and quantitative features of potential losses. Evaluation was 
first in  terms of the probability of occurrence of a given loss-producing 
events, and second, in terms of the extent and dollar value of possible 
losses. There was some effort during the early sixties to seriously and 
realistically quantify probability of loss through the use of historical 
frequency statistics, but statistics were often poor and managers without 
mathemat ica l  backgrounds continued to use subjective measures of 
probability and assigned degrees of probability to the gross categories of: 
definite, moderate, and slight risk. Nevertheless, some recognized several 
applications of mathematics and statistics to risk analysis in actuarial 
science, statistical decision-making, utility analysis, mathematical models 
and game theory (8). 
In measuring the potent ial  ex tent  of loss, risk managers were 
increasingly aware of different levels or stages of loss including the 
immediate and consequential losses in dollar value, nonmeasureable losses 
whose value can only be estimated, and losses incurred as a result of 
legal liability. A good deal of work has been done in the safety field on 
the estimation of value of ~nonmeasurable" costs such as the loss of 
human life, personal injury, and the expense of travel time (9,lO). There 
appears to be little on the valuation of nonmeasurable costs by insurance 
writers (although one author recently suggested that the nonmeasurable 
costs of a loss-reduction program would generally reach eighty percent of 
the measurable costs) (ll). 
The third step, that of reducing hazards, was thought by some to be 
the activity tha t  distinguished the  l f t ruefl  risk manager from his 
predecessors in insurance management (12). In the third step, the risk 
manager actually tries to reduce the probability and extent of loss from 
certain types of risk, that is, fire, accident, injury, and generally, hazards 
to persons and property, by the adoption of sa fe ty  procedures and 
educational programs, the use of safer equipment, and the elimination of 
hazards. This is the point at which the insurance manager merges with 
the safety engineer to determine what combination of insurance and 
safety will optimize company benefits. The merger indicates a shift in 
focus from the manipulation of insurance techniques to minimize financial 
loss to a concern for prevention and control of the risk itself. It should 
be noted that at this time quantum improvements were made in safe 
equipment design due to developments in the discipline of system safety. 
Risk insurance, the fourth step listed in  our procedure, involves the 
management of the financial effects of loss through "risk transfer," that 
i s ,  t h e  p u r c h a s e  of c o m m e r c i a l  i n s u r a n c e ,  a n d  " r i s k  
retention1'--self-insurance or purposeful noninsurance. There was some 
emphasis on savings through absorption of certain losses as "cost of doing 
businessn ( 5 ) .  
Finally, risk accounting is the step in which policies are reviewed and 
evaluated. Although much lip service is given to the idea that proper 
risk accounting requires accumulation of data on direct and indirect costs 
of losses, insurance premiums, and safety measures, this aspect of the 
procedure seems relatively undeveloped in the mid-1960s. 
Generally speaking, during the s ixt ies  risk management theory 
developed as a relatively comprehensive systematic and objective process 
in the budding "systems philosophy1' tradition. What remained to take 
place was a refinement in the application of theory. 
Insurance Risk Management in the 1970s 
Risk management theory as applied by insurance/safety managers has 
not changed radically during the seventies except possibly in its more 
technical aspect. There is an increased understanding and insistence upon 
the use of a systems approach that takes in all relevant elements of the 
risk situation. 
One apparently new tactic for improving the quality of the initial risk 
analysis stresses llmanagement-by-objectives.ll This method requires risk 
managers to make a careful delineation of organizational objectives, such 
as the functions for which an organization or company was created, or 
spec i f ic  soc ie t a l  goals and personal goals of management are, a t  a 
subsequent level in  the hierarchy, broken down into more spec i f ic  
action-guiding objectives. As an example, if the manager's analysis 
reveals the specific objective of e l iminat ing the possibility of a given 
occurrence, it should indicate the relative amount of time and money to 
be spent preventing that occurrence. The management-by-objectives 
approach has an application to problems beyond those of the insurance 
risk manager. It is clearly of use in the broader range of management 
decisions concerning investments, inventories, work force, and so on. It is 
an error to regard management by objectives (MBO) as a panacea for all 
management problems. MBO is simply a sys t emat i c  tool to  ass i s t  
managers. 
Measurement problems have also been given attention, directed towards 
improving probability assessments (13), valuation of potential losses,  
including those of personal injury and human life (9), and evaluation of 
management decisions in terms of cost-benefitlcost-effectiveness analyses. 
(Much of the literature on the latter form of quantitative analysis, though 
useful to insurance and safety managers, has grown out of aerospace and 
defense work on research and development.) How often these highly 
refined quantitative procedures are used is unclear (14). 
There has also been some use of models, in the insurance area, to 
determine the proper mix of safety measures and commercial insurance 
with respect to a given type of risk. For example, one author developed 
a model to assist in minimizing losses from burglary by estimating the 
proper amount of insurance coverage and investment in a warning system 
required for the target premises, or both (15). 
In  general, insurance managers were the first to approach risk in 
terms of asking: (a) Where are the losses l ikely to occur? (b)  How 
much loss can we absorb? and (c) How do we best reduce losses to an 
acceptable level? Even in the technical fields where quantitative , analysis 
reached a far more sophisticated level, the need for determining an 
appropriate level of risk was for a long time unrecognized. The insurance 
experience is important for focusing our at tention on cost-wise evaluation 
of risk and risk-reduc tion activities. 
There are also some other lessons to be learned from the insurance 
experience. Insurance companies have accepted the transfer of risk from 
their insureds. When faced with claims, they have instituted their own 
risk management approaches, their objective being to minimize their 
losses for their owners. It is not unusual for an insurance company to 
make a decision to settle a claim because the cost of settlement may be 
less than the cost of litigation. This is clearly not done for frivolous 
claims but is more likely to occur in complex cases where actual damages 
are extensive and the outcome of litigation is unknown. 
This practice has contributed to the somewhat uneven state of the law 
on the liability of road authorities, As a road authority assumes more of 
the responsibility for claims management (or loss management), it is likely 
that a more active role will be required. Decisions to litigate strong 
cases  to clar i fy the s t a t e  of the law may be required to reduce 
longer-range risk potentials. In this context, loss management can be 
seen as an integral part of an overall risk management program. One 
manages not only the risk of an event occurring that will produce loss 
but also the magnitude of the loss once the event has occurred. 
Who Manages Risk? 
Risk management as a formal, systematic, and scientific procedure 
designed to reduce or eliminate losses of every type has historically been 
applied by those with the most to lose and with the resources to fund 
staff devoted solely to that function. Risk management has flourished in  
business, under the auspices of corporate insurance managers and 
industrial safety engineers, as well as product reliability and development 
engineers. The concept and its application have experienced tremendous 
growth in the military and aerospace industries through the development 
of operations research, systems analysis, and decision analysis. It is now 
beginning to be applied to the broader concerns of the public sector, the 
social and public policy problems. The greatest developments have been 
in areas that more readily lend themselves to technical analysis--such as 
waste disposal and energy systems-but there has been increasing interest 
in the application of broad, systematic analysis to the amorphous problems 
of urban decay, public education, and highway traffic safety (16). 
The growth, development, and present application of risk management 
theory and procedure in the areas mentioned above have been briefly 
discussed. The limited scope of the discussion should not blind us to the 
wider significance of the risk management concept. There are elements 
of what could be called risk management implicit in much of human 
behavior--in the decision to purchase one product rather than another, in 
a choice of careers, in the act of buckling a safety belt. Behind every 
cost-benefi t  or cost-effectiveness analysis, performed for whatever 
purpose, there is the weighing of probabilities and relative values of given 
alternatives and possible outcomes, which suggest a risk management 
process. 
Risk Management 
Although many of the operat ional  aspec ts  of t rad i t iona l  risk 
management are not directly applicable to road authority activities, the 
six basic elements do apply. These elements consist of the six steps in 
the risk management process, which are: 
1. identification of risk, 
2. establishment of priorities among risks, 
3. determination of allocation of resources, 
4. selection of risk management strategies, 
5 .  implementation of risk management actions, and 
6, evaluation of outcomes in terms of risk reduction. 
The spec i f ic  ac t iv i ty  undertaken in each of these steps will vary 
according to the situation. In some cases a formalized procedure may be 
appropriate; in others, the making of decisions may be fairly simple once 
risks are identified. Whatever form the risk management process takes, 
its purpose is to provide a framework to encourage orderly and productive 
discussion and resolution of problems. 
A point that is implicit in what has been said so far deserves separate. 
mention. It is that risk management is a process. It is not the job of 
any one department, but a part of the job of every department and every 
employee. It is, among other things, an attitude or habit of thought. It 
does not provide answers, but ways of finding answers (or, more precisely, 
of arriving a t  intelligent decisions). The risk management process is 
dynamic; evaluation of the results and of the process itself is an essential 
element. Experience gained as the process moves along may indicate the 
need for changes in the process. Thus, when procedures are suggested 
here, they are intended as starting points. For example, one suggestion is 
that litigation records be kept and reviewed to keep track of the effect 
of the risk management process on litigation experience. A review of 
those records in later years may reveal patterns or trends not foreseen 
today, and thus may suggest the need for new or changed approaches, 
both in other risk management activities and in recordkeeping itself. 
Risk of Litigation or Risk of Loss 
Once it is accepted that risks must be managed instead of transferred 
to an insurer, the definition of risk becomes important. There are two 
choices. The risk to be managed can be the risk of loss to the road 
authority itself, or it can be the risk of injury or damage to those who 
use the roads, whether or not that injury or damage leads to claims 
against the road authority. In the first case, "risk" becomes litigation 
risk, and risk management becomes "litigation management." When risk is 
given the broader definition of loss to the users of the road, the goal of 
risk management becomes making the roads as safe as possible. The 
traditional approach of risk management is to take the narrower view and 
consider only losses to the organization. This is true of risk management 
generally and is especially true where the risk involves the possibility of 
litigation. However, when the risk involves extensive exposure to personal 
injury litigation based on claims of unsafe roads, the other approach 
deserves serious consideration, Several observations are in order. 
First, the two approaches do not always conflict. In fact,  the risk 
management and the litigation management approaches are usually in 
agreement. This is an important point, because the risk of being sued is 
of ten--and incorrectly-seen as interfering with road safety decisions. The 
relationship between law and risk management will be discussed more 
fully below; a t  this point it is sufficient to observe that concerns about 
liability and concerns about safety much more often work in harmony 
than i n  conflict. At the most basic level, the best way to avoid being 
sued is to build a safe road. On a more practical level, for example, a 
good system of inspections and records can be useful both in defending 
lawsuits and in keeping roads in good repair. 
Second, when the two approaches are not consistent, it is often 
possible to make adjustments that wi l l  accommodate both. Thus, if the 
concern is tha t  recording decisions regarding the need for road 
improvements will create harmful evidence, any adverse effects can be 
minimized by attention to the supporting documentation and the way in 
which the record is written. 
Third, if the two approaches do conf l ic t ,  and both cannot be 
accommodated, it becomes necessary to assess the precise nature of the 
conflict and determine how serious it is, so that an intelligent choice can 
be made. For example, if the concern is that inspecting the roads and 
keeping records of that inspection will produce evidence harmful to the 
road authority, it is necessary first to determine how great that litigation 
risk is in f a c t  and then weigh it against the safety (and therefore 
long-term litigation) benefits. 
On balance, giving "riskv the broader definition, thus making safety the 
first priority, is clearly preferable. The "litigation managementff approach 
puts safety second. Because risk management is a process and involves 
an attitude toward problem solving, focusing on litigation as the primary 
concern can lead to decisions that detract from the total of safety. This 
is especially true if law is seen as an obstacle to safety decisions, rather 
than a guide to them. As an example, a concern with litigation might 
lead to a decision not to inspect the roads a t  all, so as to improve the 
legal defense that the road commission did not have knowledge of the 
defect. The result of such as approach might well be an increase in 
l i t i g a t i o n  as problems go unnoticed. Thus, because " l i t igat ion 
managementv tends to be concerned with specific lawsuits as opposed to 
the actual operation of the road system as a whole, it could tend to 
favor short-term solutions at the expense of long-term goals. In the long 
run, such an approach could be very costly. 
Far from inhibiting a broadly defined risk management program, the 
law actively encourages it. A road authority's liability is defined by a 
single standard: whether the road was reasonably safe. It does not 
matter whether a road is as safe as, or maintained as well as, other 
roads, but only whether it is in fact  reasonably safe. If a road is not 
reasonably sa fe ,  there  a r e  few defenses left to a road authority, 
Actively working toward safe roads is therefore in a very real sense the 
best approach to litigation management. On the other hand, a policy that 
puts the authority's liability exposure ahead of safety is not only likely to 
lead to bad road-management decisions; it is also a policy that could 
prove embarassing in court. 
Summary 
Risk management,  as applied to a road authority, is concerned 
primarily with controlling the risk of injury to users of the road. 
Especially when the road authority is self-insured, the risk is managed 
rather than transferred. Therefore,  the purpose of a road-safety 
risk-management program is to reduce the actual risk of a loss occurring. 
Risk management is a process based on six steps: (1) identification of the 
risk; ( 2 )  establishment of priorities among the risks; (3) determination of 
allocation of resources; (4) selection of risk management strategies and 
tactics; ( 5 )  implementation of risk management actions; and (6) evaluation 
of outcomes in terms of risk reduction. 
A road author i ty ' s  risk management program should use a broad 
definition of risk, that is, the risk of loss to the public rather than the 
risk of litigation loss to the organization. While this is a departure from 
the traditional risk management approach, there are sound and compelling 
reasons for it. Road authorities provide services to the public, and their 
liability is defined by the statutory duty to provide reasonably safe roads; 
therefore, their best litigation defense, in the long and the short run, is 
to do what is necessary to achieve that condition. The d i f fe rence  
between a "litigation managementn approach and a "risk managementTf 
approach is largely one of attitude, because law and safety concerns are 
almost always in agreement. This difference of attitude is an important 
one, however, because an unwarranted concern about liability exposure can 
distort safety decisions. Therefore the risk management process should be 
pursued with the attitude that law is not an impediment but a guide. 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE LAW 
The preceding sections advocate a broad definition of risk and argue 
that making safety rather than liability the primary concern is consistent 
with what the law requires of road authorities. The suggestion that the 
goal of safety take precedence over liability concerns should not be taken 
as suggesting that law has no part in a risk management program. On 
the contrary, the fact  that the legal duty to provide reasonably safe  
roads is an expression of the goal of a risk management program 
indicates that law has a very important part to play in such programs. It 
is t he re fo re  important to understand how law can be used in  a risk 
management program as a source of information and when law can act  as 
a constraint on the program. 
Law as a Source of Information 
Because of the close similarity between the risk management program's 
goal (safer roads) and the legal  duty imposed on road author i t ies  
(reasonably sa fe  roads), litigation-management concerns are usually 
consistent with risk management concerns. Therefore, the law should be 
seen not just as a system for finding fault and awarding damages, but as 
a source of information. This information can be of two types. 
First, the law can provide information on standards of conduct and 
performance applicable to road authority activities. The engineering 
profession has a collection of detailed standards relating to such matters 
as traffic control and road design, construction, and maintenance. In law 
there is only one standard (that the road be lfreasonably safef7), but it has 
many specific applications. Some of these applications are expressed in 
statutes (such as the one requiring signs on narrow bridges), but most are 
expressed in court decisions. Decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court 
and Court of Appeals are regularly 17reported1' (published), and they 
provide a useful source of information on how the  concept  of a 
reasonably safe road has been applied. For example, some cases discuss 
the question of what is required in winter maintenance. Other cases shed 
some light on the importance of published engineering standards and how 
they relate to the excercise of engineering judgment in making road 
safety decisions. Thus, case law is a form of public evaluation of a road 
authority's performance, and this measure of performance is especially 
important for a public agency. Because the 17reasonably safef1 standard is 
applied in the specific factual situations of individual cases as they arise, 
the information available is not comprehensive. Not every question about 
the application of the duty will have a definite answer. Nevertheless, 
when there is a case or statute on point, it can be very useful, and 
because the duty to provide reasonably safe roads goes back to 1879, 
there is a large number of such cases. 
In addition to providing information that can be useful in explaining 
standards of conduct and performance, cases can also help in identifying 
specific factual areas of concern. Besides clarifying what the legal duty 
requires in specific situations, an analysis of the cases can help identify 
where problems exist .  They might, for example, indicate whether 
maintenance activities give rise to more claims than engineering or 
traffic control activities or whether barricades give rise to more problems 
than road surface condition. The reported cases can be of some use 
here. More important than the reported cases is the road authority's own 
claims experience. The usefulness of reported cases is limited by the 
presence of fac tors  peculiar to particular lawsuits that influence a 
decision to take an appeal. Reported cases cover all of the state,  rather 
than just the road authority's jurisdiction. They also represent a small 
percentage of claims made against road authorities, since they do not 
include cases that were settled before trial, or tried but not appealed. 
Therefore, a road authority should consider whether and how to establish 
a system for keeping track of its own claims experience. 
Thus, the primary role of law (in the form of claims and litigation 
experience) in a risk management program is that of an information 
source. Along with other information-gathering ac t iv i t i e s ,  such as  
accident  data analysis and road inspections, it helps provide a more 
complete picture of the condition of the road system. 
Law as  a Constraint on Risk Management 
Although the law's role in a risk management program is mostly 
positive, the road authority should also be alert for situations in which 
law can be a constraint on the risk management program. 
When a risk management proposal appears to raise the possibility of 
increased exposure to liability it is first necessary to determine the  
amount of the increase in liability exposure. It may happen that if the 
increase is known, it is then possible to weigh it against the proposal and 
determine the severity of the conflict between the two. The next step is 
to  consider whether the  proposal and the liability concerns can be 
reconciled. It may be possible, by modifying the proposal, to achieve the 
desired results while eliminating or reducing the conflict. If it is not 
possible to eliminate the conflict, it then becomes necessary to weigh the 
benefits and detriments of the proposal. In doing that, it is necessary to 
consider whether the worth of the proposal's long-range safety benefits 
makes the acceptance of certain litigation risks worthwhile. 
In some si tuat ions,  the  law may impose cont ra in ts  on a risk 
management program, if the safety benefits of a proposal are outweighed 
by increased liability exposure. Such conflicts, however, are not likely to 
be common, and most of them can be reduced or eliminated. For the 
most part, the law is an important aid to a risk management program. 
The law supplies important information, both as to the standards by which 
the road authority's activities in specific factual situations will be judged, 
and as to what activities or conditions are frequent sources of trouble. 
SUMMARY 
For a road author i ty ,  especially one tha t  is self-insured, risk 
management involves taking steps to reduce the actual risk of loss arising 
out of its operations. Because a road authority is a public agency, and 
because statutory law imposes on it a public duty to provide reasonably 
safe roads, a road authority's risk management activity should seek to 
control the risk of loss to the public, ra ther  than i t s  own risk of 
litigation, Because the requirements of the law are themselves directed 
toward the goal of safety, making safety the first priority does not 
usually present an increased risk of liability exposure on the part of the 
road authority. To the contrary, the law plays an important part in a 
risk management program by providing information on what is expected of 
the road authority in particular fac tua l  s i tuat ions and on whether 
particular activities or road conditions often give rise to safety problems. 
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COURTS AND PROCEDURE 
Law is an important factor in any risk management program. It can 
assist a program by providing information as a standard of performance, 
and i t  can impose constraints on a program if the program presents 
increased risks of litigation. A better understanding of the law can 
therefore improve a road authority risk manager's ability to use it in 
making decisions. It is neither necessary nor practical for the risk 
m a n a g e r  t o  have a complete  understanding of the law, but an 
understanding of some of the basics of the legal system would enhance 
the risk manager's ability to make use of legal principles, and should also 
improve communication between the risk manager and the legal staff. 
Although the road authority's legal responsibilities originate in statutes, 
they are defined by court decisions. Because the law cannot anticipate 
a l l  f a c t  s i tua t ions ,  the statutory statement of the road authority's 
obligation is a general one: to provide roads that are llreasonably safe 
and convenient." While this statement of the road authority's duty is the 
basis for almost all court decisions, it is the decisions themselves that 
give meaning to i t ,  by deciding whether and how it applies in specific 
cases. Since court decisions are the primary source of information on the 
legal duties of road authorities, it will be useful to know something of 
the court system and how it operates. 
MICHIGAN'S COURT SYSTEM 
Michigan's courts are organized into four levels. The two lower levels 
are trial courts; their primary concern is hearing and deciding claims. 
The two upper levels are appellate courts; their primary function is to 
hear appeals from decisions of the lower courts. This hierarchy can be 
illustrated as follows: 
SUPREME COURT 





There a re  some variations to this otherwise simple arrangement. 
There is, for example, a probate court that hears matters relating to 
wills, mental incompetence, and juveniles; because the probate court is 
not likely to become involved in a matter involving a road authority, it 
will not be discussed here. There are also some municipal courts and a 
court of claims; each of these will be discussed below. The remaining 
four courts will be discussed separately. 
District Courts 
The District Courts are the base of the judicial hierarchy. They are a 
statewide system of courts, each with jurisdiction over a "district.ft A 
district is usually a subdivision of a county, although in the northern part 
of the state a district can include an entire county or even more than 
one county. 
A d i s t r i c t  court  can t ry cr iminal  cases where the offense is a 
misdemeanor (i.e., when the punishment cannot exceed one year 's  
imprisonment). District courts can also try civil cases (claims for money 
damages) up to $10,000. Because its authority (jurisdiction) is limited, the 
district court is called a "court of limited jurisdi~tion.~' 
District courts were created to replace justices of the peace and 
municipal courts. However, the statute creating the district court system 
permitted cities to elect to keep their municipal courts. A few cities did 
so, and there are still some municipal courts left, although they are being 
phased out. For the most part, however, the district court system is 
statewide, with a uniform system of procedures. An important exception 
is the court in Detroit, known as the common pleas court; its jurisdiction 
in civil cases is similar to that of the district courts, but its procedures 
are different. 
Circuit Courts 
The next level above district courts is the circuit courts. Like the 
district courts, these are trial courts. The circuit courts are organized in 
general on a county basis, although a "circuit" often includes more than 
one county in the northern part of the state. 
The circuit court is a "court of general jurisdiction," which means that 
it has jurisdiction over all types of cases that a r e  not specif ical ly  
designated as belonging to other courts. One such designation has already 
been described: misdemeanors and civil cases involving less than $10,0 0 0 
are handled in district courts. Some other types of cases, as described 
earlier, belong to probate courts. The jurisdiction left  to the circuit 
cour ts  is extensive; it includes all felony criminal cases (where the 
penalty can include imprisonment for more than one year), all civil cases 
where more than $10,000 is c laimed,  and all civil cases involving 
"equitableu (i.e., special) relief--such as injunctions (orders compelling 
someone to do or stop doing some specific act). Because of its broad 
jurisdiction, the circuit court is very much the center of the judicial 
system i n  Michigan; most cases of general significance begin in the 
circuit courts. 
Like the district court, the circuit court is a trial court. It tries 
(either with or without a jury) and decides claims presented to it in the 
form of lawsuits. The circuit court also has some "appellate jurisdi~tion,~' 
that is, it hears appeals from decisions of the district courts. This 
however, is a very small part of a circuit court's business; it is primarily 
a trial court. 
Although circuit courts exist statewide, and their procedure is for the 
most part uniform, there is one significant exception to this uniformity. 
One of the basic rules of law is that a state cannot be sued without its 
consent. It follows from this that it can impose conditions on any 
consent it gives. In Michigan, the state requires that any suits against it 
be brought in a f'court of claims." The court of claims was in fact much 
like a c i rcui t  cour t ,  except  tha t  jury t r i a l s  were not permitted. 
Beginning in 1979, the court of claims was made a division of the lngham 
County Circuit Court. 
Court of Appeals 
The next step in  the hierarchy is the court of appeals. As its name 
implies, it is not a trial court, but an appellate court, hearing appeals 
from decisions of circuit courts, and from district courts. The function 
of an appellate court is to promote uniformity among legal decisions and 
to correct errors of law made by the lower courts. 
The appeal process is described in more detail below, but two points 
deserve mention here. First, the law grants an automatic right to one 
appeal. Any additional appeals must be granted by the appropr ia te  
appellate court. Thus, the court of appeals must hear an appeal from a 
circuit court decision, but the supreme court can decide whether to hear 
a further appeal, Similarly, a circuit court must hear an appeal from a 
district court decision, but the court of appeals can decide whether i t  
wishes to grant a second appeal. 
Second, an appeal is an appeal "on the rec~rd.~ '  This means that the 
case does not get a second trial. Instead, the written record of the trial 
is sent to the appellate court for review. 
The s tate  is divided into three court of appeals d i s t r i c t s ,  each  
consisting of three or more counties and each having its own set of 
judges. The judges sit in groups of three to hear and decide cases.  
Decisions are reached by majority vote, and are expressed in written 
"opinions," which are ftreportedfl (pr inted and bound in book form) 
periodically. These reported opinions then become the "precedentsv on 
which future court decisions are based. 
Supreme Court 
The supreme court is a t  the top of Michigan's judicial system. I t  
hears appeals from decisions of the court of appeals. As noted above, 
the supreme court selects the cases it will decide. It consists of seven 
justices, who decide questions by majority vote. These decisions are 
usually expressed in written opinions, which are reported. Because only 
decisions of the courts of appeals and the supreme court a re  reported, i t  
is these courts that make the law for the state. 
Federal  Courts 
The preceding discussion has covered only the s t a t e  court system. 
There is a parallel system of federal  courts, but they a r e  not  very  
important in the context  of road liability law. The federal courts have 
jurisdiction only in two situations: where the plaintiff is not a resident 
of the s t a t e ,  and where a "federal question" (arising out of a federal 
statute or the United States Constitution) is involved. When a federal  
court hears a federal  question case,  then it follows the federal law; a 
road liability case is not likely to c rea te  a federal  question. However, 
when a federal  court hears a case because the plaintiff is a nonresident, 
it generally applies the s ta te ' s  law. Thus, if an Ohio resident were to 
sue a Michigan road authority in a federal court, that court would apply 
the law as set down by the Michigan appellate courts. Therefore, while a 
federal  court might hear a case against a road authority, it is ultimately 
the state courts that define the law in the area. 
As f a r  as  c iv i l  l i ab i l i t y  is concerned, there is no federal  court 
equivalent to the state district courts. The federal trial court equivalent 
to the circuit court is called a district court. There are federal courts 
of appeals and a Supreme Court of the United Sta tes ,  and these operate  
in a way that is similar to the Michigan appellate courts. 
COURT PROCEDURE 
To understand the reported opinions of Michigan's appellate courts, it 
is helpful to understand the procedures that  lead to them. It is not 
necessary to understand the intricacies of trial and appellate procedure or 
strategy, but some basic concepts should be kept in mind. The purpose 
of  the following discussion, therefore,  is to provide an explanation of 
some of the fundamentals of t r i a l  and a p p e l l a t e  p rocedu re s .  The 
discussion is of the s t a t e  court system, but the principles apply to the 
federal courts as well. 
Trial Court Procedure 
Procedure in the two trial courts (circuit and district) is very similar. 
Each of them can best be described in terms of the  s t a g e s  of t h e  
proceedings. 
Start ing the Case .  A lawsuit is started by filing a complaint. The 
complaint contains a written statement of the plaintiff's claim; it must 
describe the facts  that the plaintiff says make the defendant liable to 
him. Apart from the payment of a modest fee ,  a written complaint is 
t he  only procedural requirement for start ing a lawsuit. There is no 
procedure at  this stage for screening out claims that  lack merit. When 
t h e  complaint is filed and the fee paid, the court clerk will issue a 
summons. The summons and complaint are  served on the defendant,  
thereby notifying him that he has been sued (and the reasons for it) and 
that he must respond within a certain period of time (usually twenty days). 
Dismissing the  Case  Before  Trial.  If the defendant believes that 
there is no basis for the case to go to trial,  he may respond to the  
summons and complaint by asking the court to dismiss the case (grant 
summary or accelerated judgment). There are two types of reasons for a 
cou r t  to  dismiss a case without trial. One involves certain special 
defenses. For example, if a government is sued and is immune, or i f  the 
plaintiff has waited too long (so that the statute of limitations has run 
out), the defendant would usually ask the court to dismiss the case. 
The second reason for dismissing a case involves the claim itself. It 
may be that even if everything the plaintiff says is true, the defendant is 
not legally responsible. For example, if the only basis for the plaintiff's 
claim is that a road authority failed to prevent "preferential icing" on a 
bridge, the case should be dismissed because under Michigan law a road 
authority is not liable for preferential icing. Two important factors come 
into play when a court is considering a request (motion) to dismiss a case 
on this basis. First, all of the facts that the plaintiff alleges are  treated 
as true; second, any doubt is resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, if 
the plaintiff's complaint in the example above could be interpreted as 
claiming that the defendant failed to give warning of the possibility of 
icing, the court would not dismiss the case. 
In summary, the purpose of the motion to dismiss is to screen out 
cases that do not merit a full trial, It is not intended to settle disputed 
questions of fact; when facts are in dispute, the case is sent on for trial. 
Prepara t ion  for  Trial. If the defendant's motion to dismiss is not 
successful, both parties must prepare for trial. Each will conduct its own 
investigation of the facts and prepare its own witnesses. In addition, each 
party has the right of lldiscovery.ll As the term implies, discovery is a 
process that permits each party to learn the evidence that the other has 
accumulated, Each party must inform the other of the witnesses i t  
intends to call. Each party is entitled to interrogate the other party and 
his witnesses in a "depo~ition,~' where the witness must answer questions 
under oath and in the presence of a stenographer (who makes a record of 
the testimony). Each party can also require the other to answer written 
questions (''interrogatoriesU), and finally, each party is entitled to inspect 
the relevant records in the possession of the other. The scope of these 
discovery procedures is broad, although there are some things that are 
protected from discovery (such as an attorney's impressions and tactics, or 
settlement or trial strategy). 
Trial .  Most cases are settled before they reach trial. For those that 
are not, the trial provides the parties with their "day in  court." In most 
cases, the parties have a right to a trial by jury (except in the court of 
claims). If there is a jury, the judge decides ma t t e r s  of law and 
instructs the jury on the law and the jury then decides (by a five-sixths 
vote) quesions of fact. If the parties have not asked for a jury, the 
judge decides both matters of fact and of law and states his decision in 
written opinion. 
The relationship between the judge's and the jury's functions at a trial 
is a common source of confusion. The judge decides questions of law and 
instructs the jury. During the trial itself, the judge decides such legal 
mat ters  as what evidence must be excluded. When the testimony is 
complete and the jury is about to begin its deliberations, the judge will 
instruct them, that is, he will explain for them what the law is and how 
it relates to the case. For example, in a case involving a flooded road, 
he might tell the jury that the road authority is not liable for unusual 
flooding, but that it must design roads so as to be able to accommodate 
ordinary rainfalls. Questions of fact are decided by the jury. In the 
flooding case, the jury would decide whether the road had been designed 
with adequate drainage and whether the flooding was unusual. 
Occasionally, the judge will believe that the facts are sufficiently 
clear  that only one conclusion is possible. He may then decide, for 
example, that "as a matter of lawu the defendant was not negligent. He 
would then decide in  favor of the plaintiff, either without sending the 
case to the jury or "setting asidefT their decision if they have made one. 
Such decisions are rare. The great majority of cases involve disputes of 
fact, and there is a great reluctance on the part of the judge to take a 
case from the jury, except, of course, when the parties have not asked 
for one. 
Except when the case is decided as a matter of law, the decision of 
the judge or the jury must be based on a "preponderance of the  
evidence," which means that it must be more likely than not that the 
plaintiff is correct in his claim. This standard of proof should be 
contrasted with that in a criminal case, where guilt must be proved by 
the stricter standard, "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
The Appeal Process 
As was said earlier, only a small percentage of the cases filed ever go 
to trial. Likewise, only a small percentage of the cases that go to trial 
a r e  appealed. In  spite of this, the appealed cases are particularly 
important, because they determine the law by applying the road liability 
s ta tute  to specific cases. It is the appellate courts that decide, for 
example, what a safeff road means in terms of snow removal 
or shoulder maintenance or traffic control. To appreciate the significance 
of these decisions, it is necessary to understand the purpose and the 
limits of the appellate process. 
Procedure.  The appeal procedure is fairly simple. Within twenty 
days of the trial court's decision, the party wishing to appeal  ( t h e  
appellant) files a l'claim of appeal." In the usual case, where the trial 
was in the circuit court, the claim of appeal is filed in the court of 
appeals. The next step is for the appellant to prepare and file with the 
court a brief (a written argument of the reasons the appellant believes 
the circuit court's decision was incorrect). The other party (the appellee) 
then files his brief, responding to the appellant's arguments. The case is 
then scheduled for l'oral argumentf1 in which the attorneys for each party 
have an opportunity to summarize their arguments for the court and 
answer any questions the judges may have. After oral argument, the 
judges confer with each other and decide whether to affirm the lower 
court's decision, reverse it, or modify it. The decisions of the court and 
the reasons for it are expressed in a written llopinion,'l which is reported 
(published). 
The party that lost in the court of appeals can ask the supreme court 
to review the case. However, while the court of appeals must hear the 
appeal, the supreme court is not required to do so. If the supreme court 
does grant permission to appeal, the rest of the procedure is like that in 
the court of appeals. 
Appel la te  Court Decisions. The above description of appellate court 
procedure gives some indication of how the court of appeals or the  
supreme court decides a case. Perhaps the most important characteristic 
of appellate decision-making is that it does not involve a trial. A n  
appellate court does not hear testimony to determine what the facts 
were. Instead it decides a case "on the record," that is, it reviews a 
written record of the trial. In reviewing that record, the appellate court 
is mostly interested in determing whether any mistakes of law were made 
a t  trial. I f ,  for example, evidence that should have been admitted was 
excluded, or if the judge incorrectly stated the law to the jury, the  
appellate court would consider whether the error was serious enough to 
merit some remedy. The appellate court also reviews questions of fact, 
but only in a limited way. It gives the benefit of the doubt to the lower 
court, and especially to the jury's decision since they saw the evidence 
firsthand and were therefore better able to assess the reliability of the 
witnesses. Thus, an appellate court will reverse a decision of fact made 
by a jury only if it believes the decision was incorrect "as a matter of 
law,ff and will reverse a trial judge's decision of fact (where there was 
not jury trial) only if it is "clearly erroneo~s,'~ 
When the appellate courts apply the law to a case, they generally find 
the applicable law in two places: statutes and court decisions. Often a 
s ta tute  is so clear that i t  alone is sufficient to answer a question; the 
statute requiring that bridges less than seventeen feet wide be posted as 
one lane bridges is an example. Often, though, there is no statute or the 
statute speaks only in general terms (such as the requirement that a road 
be ffreasonably safe"). When that happens, the law is made by the 
appellate courts in the course of deciding individual cases. The written 
opinion becomes a "precedent," to be referred to in deciding later cases. 
As the number of cases in  an area of law grows, the law gradually 
becomes clearer. But determining what the law is on any issue is not a 
mechanical process. The primary purpose of an appellate court decision 
is to decide the case before it; in the course of making that decision the 
court also makes some law. Each case, therefore, contains only a limited 
statement of law, and it is often necessary to consider the facts of a 
case, and how it is related to other cases, in order to determine its 
meaning. The process of making law by court decision tends to leave 
gaps. Estimating how these gaps are likely to be fi l led by fu tu re  
decisions requires the exercise of an attorney's professional judgment. 
This kind of judgment in analyzing precedents is exercised by the 
judges of the appellate courts when they decide a case, as well as by a 
trial court judge in determining the law applicable to the case.  In 
analyzing the precedents, the courts follow the rule of lfstare decisis," 
which requires that earlier decisions of a higher court be followed. Thus, 
the trial court is bound by the decisions of the court of appeals and the 
supreme court. The court of appeals is not required to follow its own 
decisions, but must follow the decisions of the supreme court. The 
supreme court can change a rule of law that it has made i n  an earlier 
case, although such changes are not common. All courts must follow the 
rules created by statute. 
Sometimes, when the law in Michigan is not clear, a court will refer 
to court decisions from another state. If, for example, another s ta te  has 
a statute similar to the one being interpreted by the Michigan court, that 
staters interpretation of its statute may be helpful. However, decisions in 
other states (or in any federal court when the question involves state law) 
have no binding authority as precedent. They may be useful as guides, 
but they are not authoritative. 
In summary, the scope of appellate review is limited. Appellate 
courts review lower courts' decisions primarily to find errors in the law. 
They also review decisions of fact, but give the benefit of the doubt to 
the trial judge or the jury. The appellate courts do not hold trials, but 
base their review entirely on the written record of the trial proceedings 
and the briefs prepared by the attorneys in  the case. Appellate court 
decisions are based on precedents established by earlier cases decided by 
the s tate  courts. Since these precedents are created by individual 
decisions based on the fact situations of specific cases, applying them is 
not a mechanical process but often requires considerable judgement. 
Relief Granted. When an appellate court has decided how the law 
should be applied to a case, it reaches a "decision." As was explained 
earlier, the opinion is the written statement of reasons for the decision; 
the decision itself is a statement, usually at the end of the opinion, of 
what is to be done with the case. 
Although appellate court decisions can take many forms, there are 
basically two types. First, if the appellate court believes the lower 
court's decision was correct, it will 'laffirml' it. In that case, nothing 
more needs be done; the trial court then proceeds to carry out i t s  
decision. If the appellate court finds that the lower court's decision was 
incorrect, it will llreversef' it. When a decision is reversed, the appellate 
court must also decide what must be done to correct it. Generally, there 
are two choices. If it believes the trial was unfair (if, for example, 
improper evidence was used), the appellate court will flremandff the case 
for a new trial. If it concludes that the trial was procedurally correct, 
but that the result was incorrect, the appellate court will itself decide 
the case in favor of the other party; in this situation it will remand the 
case to the trial court with directions that a judgment be entered for the 
other party. 
These three decisions--affirmance, reversal with remand for new trial, 
and reversal with remand for entry of judgment--are the most common. 
However, the appellate court can tailor its decision to fit the needs of 
the case. If it concludes that the trial court was correct in  finding that 
the defendent was liable, but was incorrect as to the amount of damages 
awarded, the appellate court can affirm the decision as to liability and 
remand the case for a new trial limited to the question of damages. The 
appellate court can even increase or decrease the amount of the damages 
awarded,  although it seldom does so. Other variations are possible, 
depending on the needs of the case, but for most cases the decision is a 
simple statement that the case is affirmed, or reversed for new trial or 
for entry of judgment. 
SUMMARY 
To make the best use of legal  materials in a risk management 
program it is necessary for a risk manager to understand how cour t  
decisions are reached and how they are used within the legal system, 
For this purpose, the functioning of the legal system can be discussed in  
terms of trial and appellate courts. 
The primary trial court is the circuit court, which has extensive 
jurisdiction. Circuit court procedure is typical of trial court procedure in 
general. That procedure is intended to preserve an open court system, 
one in which the opportunity to have grievances heard--to have a "day in 
court "--is freely available. Therefore, there is no provision for screening 
a case at the time it is begun. There is a screening procedure by which 
cases can be dismissed before trial, but the case must, at this stage, be 
viewed in  the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Thus, while the 
system is structured so as to screen out frivolous cases, it focuses on the 
trial itself for the settlement of disputes. 
The parties to a lawsuit prepare for the trial through the discovery 
process, by which each pa r ty ,  through wr i t ten  quest ions and ora l  
interrogation of witnesses, learns the strengths and weaknesses of his and 
the other party's case. At the trial itself each party presents his case, 
through the testimony of his own witnesses and by cross-examining the 
opposing witnesses. If the trial is before a jury, the jury decides the 
questions of fact ,  following the judge's instructions as to the law. If 
there is no jury, the judge decides questions both of fact and of law. 
The appellate courts (the court of appeals and the supreme court) 
become involved after the trial. Each case can be appealed, as a matter 
of right, to the next higher court. Beyond that the permission of the 
appellate court is required. 
The appellate court is primarily concerned with questions of law, such 
as whether the lower court applied the law correctly. It also reviews the 
lower court's decisions of fact,  but it gives the benefit of doubt to the 
lower court, since it was better able to assess the reliability of the 
evidence. 
The decision of the appellate court usually takes one of three forms: 
affirmance of the lower court's decision, reversal with remand for new 
trial, or reversal with remand for entry of judgment. The reasons for the 
appellate court's decision are usually explained in a written opinion. The 
opinions of the court of appeals and the supreme court are published on a 
regular basis. Each case then becomes a precedent for later cases .  
Because courts decide cases on the basis of the facts of each case, the 
court's written opinion must be interpreted in  the light of those facts. 
Therefore, applying precedents to new cases requires the exercise of 
considerable professional judgment. 

CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROAD AUTHORITY'S LIABILITY-THE GENERAL RULE 
The road authority's liability for injuries related to use of its roads 
can be stated very simply: the authority is liable for injury to a person 
or property caused by its failure to provide reasonably safe roads. The 
purpose of this and the following chapters is to explore the meaning of 
the concept of ''reasonably safe," and its application to specific situations. 
The starting point for this discussion must be with the law of 
negligence. Although the statutory liability of a road authority is not the 
same as liability for negligence, it is very close to it--so close in fact ,  
that in most cases they are treated as being the same. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the concept  of negligence as a basis for 
understanding statutory liability. 
NEGLIGENCE 
Liability for negligence is much older than the statutory liability of 
road authorities. The legal concept of negligence was originated by the 
courts and has been developed by them over the years. Its development 
continues as new cases involving different conditions come before the 
courts for decision. 
The negligence concept is broad, and is intended to cover widely 
different fact situations. Liability for defective roads is,  for most 
purposes, an application of the law of negligence and the rules applied in 
road liability cases are much the same as those applied in all o ther  
negligence cases. 
In genera l  te rms,  negligence is conduct that falls below a legal 
standard of care for the safety of others or their property. The legal 
theory of negligence is composed of four elements: duty, breach, cause, 
and damage. The duty is to avoid the unreasonable risk of injury to 
o thers .  The duty is breached when the defendant fails to meet the 
standard of care required by the duty. That breach must be a cause of 
loss to a person or property; the loss must be actual--negligent conduct 
that almost causes a loss cannot be the basis of a lawsuit. Each of 
these four elements will be discussed separately. 
Duty 
A duty is a legal obligation to another to do a certain thing or act in 
a certain way. Unless there is a preexisting duty to another, there is no 
liability, even if one's actions are Ifbad." For example, there is no duty 
to come to the aid of a stranger in mortal danger, even if there is no 
risk to oneself. Thus, one who chooses to let an unconscious man drown 
in a shallow puddle, is not liable for the man's death. Therefore, the 
ex is tence  of a legal  duty is the first and most basic element of a 
negligence claim. 
The duty imposed by the law of negligence is often described as a 
duty of reasonable care. It requires that care be taken to avoid an 
unreasonable risk of harm. Obviously the duty rests on the concept of 
ffreasonableness,ff which is quite general. It is sometimes phrased in terms 
of a comparison of the defendant 's  conduct to the conduct of a 
"reasonable man under the same or similar c i r c u m ~ t a n c e s . ~  This is an 
objective standard; that is, it does not view the defendant's actions in the 
light of his own abilities, but with r e fe rence  to  the conduct of a 
hypothetical ffreasonable man." 
For the concept for reasonableness to be useful in individual cases, it 
must be made more specific. For this purpose, a set  of subrules has 
been developed to relate the general duty of care to specific situations. 
Some of these subrules come from statutes, and others are developed by 
the courts themselves. For example, if there is any question whether the 
duty of reasonable care requires special treatment for a bridge eighteen 
feet wide, there is a statute that answers the question by stating that a 
"narrow bridgef1 sign must be posted on any bridge less than nineteen feet 
wide. There are other statutes that discuss a standard of care for such 
activities as signing no passing zones, closing roads for repair, load limits 
on bridges, installation of traffic control devices, and designation of road 
work areas. When a standard of care is established by statute, it has a 
special status. Because the legislature has required certain conduct, 
failure to comply with the requirement will greatly increase the likelihood 
that the defendant will be found liable, It has often been said that 
fa i lure  to  comply with a specif ic  s ta tu tory  duty is automatically 
negligence-"negligence per se." The rule is in fact not that harsh, but is 
still quite strict. Failure to comply with a specific statutory requirement 
creates a presumption of negligence; that is, the defendant will be found 
negligent unless he can justify his failure to comply with the statute. 
This rule applies where the statute requires some specific conduct. The 
general statutory requirement that a road be "reasonably safet1 is merely 
a restatement of the requirement of reasonable care. It does not specify 
any conduct  t h a t  is required, and therefore  can not c r e a t e  any 
presumptions. 
Duties can also be specified by regulations. These are rules or 
guidlines enacted not by the legislature, but by the government agency 
under the authority of a statute. An example of this is the Michigan 
Manual of Uniform. Traffic Control Devices (manual), which is promulgated 
by the Department of Transportation and the Department of State Police. 
Because it is not enacted by the legislature itself, it does not create a 
presumption of negligence. Instead i t  can be used as evidence of 
negligence, that is, the judge in a trial will tell the  jury they can 
consider a road authority's failure to comply with the manual as evidence 
tending to show the authority was negligent. 
W h i l e  s t a t u t e s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s  a r e  s o u r c e s  of  m o r e  
specific--subrules--of the duty of reasonable ca re ,  most specif ic  
s t a t e m e n t s  of duty have been developed by the courts. In a case 
involving a road under repair, for example, the court's instructions to the 
jury might include a statement that the road authority's duty to provide a 
reasonably safe road does not change because the road is under repair, so 
long as it is open. The court might also tell the jury that the plaintiff 
is not necessarily negligent because he drove on a road he knew was 
under repair, but that he is required to take into account any visible 
defects, whether he in fact saw them or not. In a case involving a 
flooded road, the court might tell the jury that the road authority is not 
liable for unusual, unforeseen floods. In each situation, as the case is 
tried, the judge will translate the duty of reasonable care into a set of 
subduties related to the facts of that case, 
The duty of reasonable care can be stated simply. It requires that a 
defendant use reasonable care to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable 
risk of damage. This duty is general, and extends to all forms of 
activity. It is made more specific by statutes and regulations, and more 
often by courts, as they translate the duty into the factual context of 
the case to explain what the duty requires. It is up to the jury then to 
decide whether the defendant's conduct met the requirements of the duty. 
Breach 
The second element of negligence is the breach of the duty. Duty 
establishes an obligation to the injured party. Breach occurs when the 
defendant's conduct falls short of the legal obligation to act reasonably. 
What that obligation requires depends on the circumstances, A breach 
can arise either from acting or failing to act. As was said above, the 
nature of the duty is defined by the judge; whether the  defendant  
breached the duty is decided by the jury, There are a few cases in 
which the judge will believe that the defendant's actions clearly are or 
clearly are not, a breach of his duty. In such cases he will decide the 
case himself as a matter of law, rather than let the jury decide. Those 
cases are rare, however. In most cases whether a defendant was or was 
not negligent will be decided by the jury. 
Proximate Cause 
The third element of a negligence case is causation. It might be that 
the defendant had a duty to use reasonable care and failed to do so, but 
that the plaintiff's injury was caused by something else. For example, 
suppose a person is driving across a bridge that is required by s ta te  law 
to be posted as a narrow bridge. If the bridge has not been posted and 
the driver is killed when his car strikes the side of the bridge because of 
a tie-rod failure, the road authority would not be liable because the 
absence of a sign did not cause the accident. 
The legal requirement is that the breach of duty be in fact a cause of 
the injury and also a proximate cause of the injury. The term proximate 
(which literally means "nearv) is intended to screen out effects t h a t  
society considers too remote from the cause to merit liability. The 
manufacturer of a car is not responsible for a negligent act committed 
with i t ,  even if the negligence could not have happened without it. On 
the other hand, one who provides a car to another knowing it is likely to 
be used negligently may well be liable. Where to draw the line between 
what is near enough and what is too remote can be a difficult question. 
In p rac t i ce ,  however,  problems of proximate cause are rare. The 
relationship of cause to effect in most cases is so clear that it is not 
seriously raised as an issue. 
Damage 
The final element of a negligence case is damage. There must be a 
tangible loss (damage)  in order for the defendent  to be l iab le .  
Carelessness that results only in a near miss is not basis for a negligence 
claim. 
It is useful to distinguish among injury, damage, and damages. The 
'term llinjury,l? in its strict sense, means the infringement of a legal right. 
"Damageft refers to the loss, such as a damaged car or a broken leg, 
caused by the injury. In p rac t i ce  injury and damage a r e  used 
interchangeably, since the distinction between them is seldom important, 
The third term, tTdamages,u is distinguished from the first two. It refers 
to the money awarded to compensate the plaintiff for his injury and 
damage. In a negligence case actual loss--damage--is required before a 
plaintiff can sue to recover damages. Damage can include damage to 
property or to a person, and can also include pain and suffering, expenses 
incurred, and wages lost. 
STATUTORY LIABILITY 
The preceding description of negligence is intended to provide a 
background to the discussion in the remainder of this and in the following 
chapters on road authority liability. That discussion must begin with an 
explanation of why a road authority's liability is not based on negligence. 
Governmental Immunity 
One of the oldest rules of law is the rule that the government can 
not be sued for its wrongful acts. The rule began in England and still 
exists in this country, with various modifications, today. Various reasons 
have been given in support of this rule, including the theoretical one that 
the one who creates the law is not subject to it, and the practical one 
that judgments against the government might impair its financial stability. 
As social conditions have changed, support for governmental immunity has 
waned and the doctrine has receded somewhat.  Today, cour ts  a r e  
generally hostile to the rule, while legislatures seek to preserve it. The 
result is often a general rule that government is immune from suit, with 
certain enumerated exceptions. 
The law in Michigan follows this pattern. In the area of road 
liability, the s ta te  has abolished immunity by statute.  However, the 
s ta tute  abolishing immunity also states the only basis on which a road 
authority can be liable. Although the basis of road authority liability is 
quite similar to negligence, it is not the same. Therefore, the doctrine 
of governmental immunity protects road authorities from being sued for 
negligence, but the statute permits them to be sued for breach of the 
duty imposed on them by the statute. 
Road Authority Liability 
The law of road liability in Michigan is expressed in two statutes. 
One of them relates specifically to county road commissions. It defines 
their duty as follows: 
It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in  
reasonable repair so that they shall be reasonably safe and 
convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges and 
culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care 
and control and which are open to public travel. 
The other  s t a t u t e  is a par t  of the a c t  defining t h e  e x t e n t  of 
governmental immunity. It applies to all road authorities. Its definition 
of their duty is similar to the first statute: 
Each governmental  agency having jurisdiction over any 
highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so 
that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. 
Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property 
by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any 
highway under its jurisdiction i n  reasonable repair, and in 
condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the 
damages suffered by him from such governmental agency, 
The substance of the duty is expressed in  several phrases: reasonable 
repair, reasonably safe and convenient, and reasonably safe and fit. This 
duty is expressed a t  another point in the first statute in a reference to 
liability for "any defective county road, bridge or culvert.11 It might be 
possible to interpret the phrase "reasonable repair1' in each of these 
statutes as creating only a maintenance duty, so that there would be no 
liability for a design defect. However, it has been clear for a long time 
that courts have treated the llreasonably safef1 concept as the test. 
It is the nature of the statutory duty that makes a road authority's 
liability different from negligence liability. The negligence duty is to use 
reasonable care to avoid unreasonable risk of injury to another. In terms 
of road operations, this would be a duty to use reasonable care to make 
the roads safe. The statutory duty is more direct. It requires that the 
roads in fact be reasonably safe. The difference betweeen the two duties 
is that one inquires into conduct, while the other looks at a condition. 
The negligence test is whether the road authority's activity showed the 
use of reasonable care; the statutory test is whether the result of its 
activity is a "reasonably safen road. The road need not be perfectly safe; 
that would be an impossible standard. Therefore, not every defect in a 
road will make a road authority liable. It is liable only when the defect 
makes the road not "reasonably safe." 
Although the distinction between the negligence duty and the statutory 
duty is clear, in most cases it is not significant. In most cases, if a 
road is in  fact unsafe, the road authority could be shown not to have 
used reasonable care. If, for example, a stop sign is knocked down and 
the road authority, having been told it is down, does not replace it for a 
week, it is as easy to say the authority was negligent as to say the road 
was unsafe. Because negligence and statutory liability are so similar and 
because they overlap in so many cases, courts tend to treat them as 
being the same. Most cases in fact describe the liability in terms of 
negligence. 
However, there are some cases where the distinction is important, and 
in those cases courts are careful to preserve it. For the most part these 
are cases where the road authority seeks to raise certain defenses. One 
is the "state of the art" defense, that a road was safe when built and 
that the authority would not be liable merely because changing conditions 
have made it unsafe. The o ther  is a "lack of funds" or "lack of 
personnel" defense, which argues that the road authority in fact was 
unable, for reasons beyond its control, to take c a r e  of the road in 
question. Another version of this defense is the vallocation of resourcesn 
defense, which argues that the authority has a well-thought out system 
for making the best use of its limited resources in funds and personnel. 
Each of these defenses will be discussed in more detail i n  Chapter Five 
below. In brief, however, the fact that the statutory duty focuses on the 
condition of the road rather than the conduct of the defendant makes 
these defenses difficult to sustain. 
This discussion of a road authority's statutory duty may give the 
impression that a road authority's liability is greater under the s tatutes  
than under the rules of negligence. This is true--it  is in f a c t  
greater-although the difference in most cases is theoretical rather than 
practical. 
Because the statutes make a road authority liable for a defective 
road, another statutory provision becomes especially important. This is 
the provision that a road authority must have either known, or had reason 
to know, of a defect and have had a reasonable time to repair  t he  
defect. Without this provision, a road authority would in effect be liable 
as an insurer of its roads; i t  would, for example,  be required to  
compensate  someone injured by a de fec t  that had just come into 
existence and of which the authority could not have known. The notice 
provision mitigates that problem and, in a sense, brings a road authority's 
liability closer to ordinary negligence. Its mitigating effect  is limited by 
a modifying provision that  the road authority will be considered to have 
had knowledge of the defect and time to repair it if it has existed for a t  
least  thirty days. Still, despite i ts  limitations, the thirty-day rule does 
provide significant relief from the otherwise strict standard by giving the 
road authority an opportunity to discover and remedy unsafe conditions. 
Because the lack of knowledge of a particular defect would be used as a 
defense by a road authority, it is discussed more fully below. 
The road liability s ta tu tes  also impose a procedural requirement on 
anyone seeking to sue a road authority, The claimant must notify the 
authority within 120 days of the injury of: the occurrence of the injury, 
the exact  location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained, and the 
names of witnesses known at  the time by the claimant. Because failure 
to comply with this requirement can be used as a defense, i t  will be 
discussed in more detail below. At this point it is sufficient to note that  
the claimant's failure to comply with this requirement will defeat his 
claim only if the road authority is "p r e jud i~ed ,~~  that  is, if i t s  ability to  
defend itself is impaired. 
Another limit on a road authority's liability is a part of the statement 
of duty itself. Road authorities a re  liable for defects  in roads under 
their jurisdiction. For road commissions, the rule is that they are liable 
for all "roads, bridges and culverts that a re  within their jurisdiction and 
under their care and control and which are open to public travel." Thus 
any road authority's liability is limited to certain roads. Because these 
limitations serve as defenses, they are also discussed below. 
Finally, the s t a tu te  provides, as to the s ta te  and the county road 
commissions, that their liability extends "only to the improved portion of 
the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, 
crosswalks or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the 
highway designed for vehicular travel." This limitation (and especially the 
part referring to the 'rimproved portion of the highway") has been used by 
the state and the county road commissions in an attempt to exclude some 
of their activities from the statutory duty. While these attempts enjoyed 
some success in earlier cases, the courts have come to the view that 
anything that affects the safety of the highway is within the scope of the 
duty to provide safe roads. Thus, while the exclusion of sidewalks still 
stands, the courts have held that road authorities cannot avoid liability 
for  defects in the shoulder, and for improper traffic control, on the 
theory that each is outside the "improved portiontf of the  highway 
designed for vehicular travel. 
SUMMARY 
In summary, the statutory duty to provide t7reasonably safeff roads is 
similar to the duty that is the basis of negligence. I t  differs in that i t  
requires a certain condition (reasonably safe roads) rather than certain 
conduct (reasonable care), but in most cases the  d i f fe rence  is not 
significant. The difference does, however, mean that certain defenses 
that might be available in a negligence action are not available under the 
statute.  The road authority's liability is subject to some limitations that 
provide it with defenses in certain cases. These include the opportunity 
t o  learn  of and co r rec t  the  de fec t  within a reasonable time; the 
requirement that the authority be notified of the accident within 120 
days; the requirement that the road be open, within its jurisdiction, and 
under its care and control; and the exclusion of sidewalks and crosswalks. 
Despite these limitations the basic duty of a road authority remains 
intact-to provide reasonably safe roads. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ROAD LIABILITY LAW-SPECIFIC SITUATIONS 
The road authority's statutory duty to provide reasonably safe roads 
applies to all of its road-related activities. It provides a consistent 
theoretical basis for courts to use in deciding cases arising across the 
broad range of a road authori ty 's  operations.  Occasionally,  the  
requirements of the statutory duty are clarified by another statute, such 
as the one requiring signs on narrow bridges (1). Most of the t ime,  
though, the general statutory duty is given meaning by the courts in 
individual cases as they arise. 
For most of a road authority's activities, the cases do not go beyond 
the general rule. Perhaps the best example is guardrail installation and 
maintenance. Although there has been a substantial number of cases 
involving guardrails (21, all but two of them simply reaffirm the principle 
that whether a guardrail was necessary or sufficient to make a road 
reasonably safe is a question of fact to be decided by the jury. The two 
cases in which the courts have said as a matter of law that a guardrail 
was not required, do not state any principles that can be used by a road 
authority in deciding whether to install guardrails. In addition, they are 
relatively old; they are therefore of doubtful validity today, when courts 
seem to tend more strongly to permit cases to go to the jury for decision 
(3). Therefore all that can be said of the law of guardrails today is that 
the question whether a guardrail was needed or was sufficient to make a 
road reasonably safe will almost always be a question of fact to  be 
decided by the jury. 
The area of road design and construction is another example of how 
courts often use general rules of law, Whether a road was designed and 
built so as to be reasonably safe is generally a question of fact, and 
there are few cases that elaborate on this. It has been held that a road 
authority must, when it designs a road, consider seasonal problems such as 
flooding (41, and perhaps snow and ice ( 5 ) .  Road authorities are also 
required to anticipate that vehicles and pedestrians might depart from the 
travelled way (6). Apart from these principles, however, design cases 
tend to be submitted to the jury as questions of fact to be decided by 
reference to the general statutory duty to provide reasonably safe roads. 
There are, however, some areas where the cases, and occasionally 
some spec i f ic  s t a t u t e s ,  c r e a t e  some relatively detailed and useful 
principles of law. Those areas are discussed in this chapter. One of 
them-problems of winter maintenance-is unique in that it creates what 
is in e f f e c t  an excep t ion  to  t h e  s t a t u t o r y  d u t y .  The  o t h e r  
t w o--construe tion zones and signing decisions-involve applications of the 
general rule, but with the addition of some specific statutes and rules. 
As each of these three topics is discussed in this chapter, it is 
important to keep in mind that the discussions are limited by the nature 
of case law. Each case involves a decision based on a specific set of 
facts, A comprehensive treatment of the law in any area requires that 
each of these cases be analyzed and blended with the others and with any 
statutes to form a coherent whole. It sometimes happens that two or 
more cases are in conflict on a question, or that a particular question is 
not addressed by any cases. When that happens, the law on that point is 
less clear, and predicting the result if the question were raised today 
becomes a matter of judgment. 
The point was made in  Chapter Two, and bears repeating here, that 
most of the cases on any question hold that whether the defendant was 
liable is a question of fact for the jury. In terms of road liability law, 
it is for the judge to decide whether a condition might be a defect and 
for the jury to decide whether i t  is in fact a defect. Therefore, the 
statement that a certain condition was found to be in  fact  a defect in  
one case does not mean that it would be found a defect by another jury 
in another case. Nevertheless, the cases do give a good indication of the 
types of road condition that can give rise to liability. 
LIABILITY FOR SNOW AND ICE 
A substantial part of a road authority's budget is devoted to treatment 
of problems caused by snow and ice. Because a road author i ty  in 
Michigan can be sure there will be snow, but cannot be sure when it will 
come or how much there will  be, winter weather presents a particularly 
difficult problem for road maintenance. Because road safety problems 
involving snow and ice can occur so frequently,  i t  is impor tant  to  
understand the road authority's liability exposure in this area. 
The appellate cases indicate that the courts are very much aware of 
the practical problems road authorities face in dealing with snow and ice. 
In the first case in Michigan involving snow and ice, the court said: 
It would be a great hardship and involve ruinous expense if all 
of the multitudinous ways that are subject to be affected by 
winter storms are to be constantly watched and diligently 
kept in thoroughly good condition. Most communities may be 
rel ied on to  do what is necessary and feasible. But no 
amount of dil igence can supply an adequate  fo rce  and 
adequate means to detect the inevitable accumulations of 
snow trampled into hardness on every cross-walk and in  every 
roadway. (7) 
The court's awareness of the practical problems of winter maintenance 
led to the rule tha t  road author i t ies  a re  not l iable for  "na tura l  
accumulations" of snow and ice. That rule remains in force today. The 
rule applies both to sidewalks and to roads (8). 
The "natural accumulations'' rule creates a standard that is different 
from the one usually applied to road authorities. Courts usually interpret 
the statutory language--to provide safen roads-fairly strictly. 
Thus, it is not a defense for a road authority to show that it lacked the 
resources to c o r r e c t  a problem (9). In addition, when there is an 
obstruction in a road, it is not usually a defense tha t  i t  occurred 
7rnaturallyn (10). In the area of winter maintenance, however, the courts 
have recognized the general difficulty of snow and ice control, and have 
created the rule that a road authority is not liable for injuries caused by 
natural accumulations of snow and ice. 
The exclusion from liability extends only to natural accumulations. 
The road authority's general liability--for a defect of which it has or 
should have knowledge and tha t  makes a road n o t  " r e a s o n a b l y  
safew--applies when the accumulation is unnatural. This distinction 
between natural and unnatural accumulations has come before the courts 
on several occasions, and, while the distinction is not entirely clear, some 
principles do emerge from the cases. 
It is clear that the normal falling of snow and rain on a sidewalk or 
road creates a natural accumulation. The normal flow of water, which 
later freezes, also gives rise to a natural accumulation. This is true 
whether the water comes from normal runoff from land (ll), from a 
building (12), from a road onto a sidewalk (13), or from snow shoveled into 
a pile next to a sidewalk (14). "Preferential ice," which forms on bridges 
under certain conditions, is also a natural accumulation (15). The fact 
that snow becomes ice by the passage of traffic over it does not make 
the ice an unnatural accumulation (16). In addition, if a plow removes 
some, but not all, snow, so that what remains is a slippery ridge, the 
ridge is not an unnatural accumulation and the road authority is not liable 
(17). 
As to accumulations of ice, when some condition other than the mere 
flow of water is involved, the law is not as clear. The fact that water 
accumulates because of a backup in a catch basin does not make the road 
authority liable, at least where there is no proof that the catch basin was 
defective (18). In addition, the accumulation of snow and ice at a point 
where the sidewalk is inclined is not a basis for liability, since inclines 
are unavoidable (19). Similarly, it has been held that the accumulation of 
ice in a depression in a sidewalk does not make the road authority liable, 
when the depression itself was not a defect (20). 
On the other hand, where there was an upheaval in a sidewalk (which 
the  cour t  did consider a defect) and it became slippery when water 
flowed over it and froze, the road authority was liable (21). Also, when 
the water came from a leaking tank (which the city could require the 
owner to fix) and the normal flow of water was diverted onto the  
sidewalk by a depression in i t ,  so that ice was formed in "unusual 
quantities," the road authority was liable ( 2 2 ) .  It is not possible t o  
extract a completely clear principle from these cases. The rule seems to 
be that since there is no liability simply for ice and snow, l iabili ty 
depends on persuading the court that there was an independent defect, so 
that the ice or snow merely increased the danger ( 2 3 ) .  What will 
constitute a defect is not clear. It is easy to understand why an incline, 
as a road or sidewalk crosses a hill, is not a defect. It is not as easy to 
explain why an tlupheavalfl is a defect and a depression is not, or why one 
depression is a defect and another is not. Still, the principle is that 
unless there is a defect apart from the ice and snow, the road authority 
is not liable. 
Another set of cases involves the moving of ice and snow by the road 
authority or by other persons. As we have seen, most cases base liability 
on the existence of a defect separate from ice and snow, In other cases, 
the ice or snow itself is the only defect, and liability is based on how i t  
got where it was. In some cases, the road authority itself is responsible 
for the accumulation, usually by plowing. Most cases hold tha t  the 
accumulation resulting from the road authority's moving of snow or ice is 
an unnatural accumulation. Thus, it was held that the road authority was 
liable when its employees, in digging a trench, piled snow and ice in a 
crosswalk (24). Liability was also found when a road authority plowed 
snow from a road onto a sidewalk (25).  It has been said, as a general 
principle, that the authority is liable for an accumulation which it is an 
"active agent" in  creating, that is, one which it puts on a road, or one 
which is put there by its "express authority" (26). On the other hand, i t  
has been held that ridges of snow along the side of a road, resulting from 
plowing, are not "~nna tu ra l~~  accumulations and do not create liability in 
the road authority (26) .  Thus, ordinary roadway plowing does not appear 
to present any liability problems. 
When the snow or ice is placed on the road by someone other than 
the road authority,  the rule is not c l ea r .  The case r e fe r red  to  
above-basing liability on "active agencyf' (26)--suggests that the road 
authority is not liable when others create the hazard. However, two 
later cases seem to disagree with this. In one, the authority was found 
liable for an accident caused by a pile of snow created when snow was 
shoveled from railroad tracks onto a s t ree t  (27) .  In another, a broken 
water main created a barrier of ice across a road, and the road authority 
was held liable to the driver of a car that struck the barrier (28). 
The cases discussed above deal with the operation of the "natural 
 accumulation^^ rule. In those cases, the courts reached their decisions by 
interpretation of the rule. There are three cases, however, tha t  seem to  
c rea te  exceptions to the rule. While the exceptions are limited in their 
scope, they are nonetheless significant. One of them is a recent  decision 
of the court of appeals involving "preferential icingTf on a bridge. The 
court held that such icing was a natural accumulation, but that  the road 
authori ty would be liable, not for the ice itself but  for failure to warn of 
its possible existence (29). The other two cases t r ea t  snow as a fac tor  
t o  be considered in determining whether there was a design defect. One 
is a re la t ively  ea r l y  c a s e  a r i s ing  ou t  of an a c c i d e n t  in which a 
horse-drawn sleigh slid off a narrow, crowned road that had no guardrails 
and was covered with ice. The court observed that  the road authority 
was not liable for  natural  accumulations, but said that it could be liable 
for building it in such a way that it was safe only when free of snow and 
ice,  and was flunsafe whenever it is covered with a natural accumulation 
of eitherv (30). The other, more recent case involved the failure to erect  
a snow fence along a highway. The court held that failing to erect snow 
fences could be negligence (31). These two cases are similar to the cases 
involving flooding, in which the rule is that road authorities are not liable 
for unusual floods, but must design roads so as to accomodate normal 
rainfall and seasonal floods (32). 
In summary, the road authority's liability for ice and snow is generally 
restricted to unnatural accumulations. This means that  i t  is not liable 
for hazards caused by the normal fall and flow of snow and ice, nor is it 
liable for the effects of traffic on them, for snow and ice l e f t  behind by 
plowing, or for snow piled alongside a road by plowing. The authority is 
not liable when snow or ice becomes a hazard when combined with 
another condition (such as an incline or depression) unless that condition 
is itself a defect. The road authority can be liable when an accumulation 
of snow or ice is placed in a public way by the authority itself or at  its 
express authorization, or if the accumulation becomes a hazard because of 
a defect created by the road authority or within its power to correct 
(such as a leak or a defective drain). Road authorities can probably be 
liable for accumulations placed in  a public way by others, although the 
law is not entirely clear on this point. Finally, road authorities can be 
liable, even when the accumulation is natural, if they fail to warn of a 
hazard or fail to consider ordinary snowfall in designing a road. In each 
of the situations where a road authority can be liable, the general rule of 
liability applies, so that the authority will be liable if the jury decides 
that the condition made the road not reasonably s a f e  and tha t  the 
au thor i ty  knew or should have known of the condition and had an 
opportunity to correct it, 
Because winter maintenance is such an important part of road safety, 
and because the cases involving winter maintenance a re  not always 
entirely consistent with each other, it is important to consider whether 
the cases in  this area provide any indications of how the law might 
develop in the future. 
The distinction between natural and unnatural accumulations is not as 
clear as the words themselves may suggest. Many of the cases in this 
area seem, in fact ,  to be concerned with whether the accumulation was 
in  some way attributable to the fault of the road author i ty .  This 
approach is consistent with the main principle that no liability exists 
where the accumulation is natural, because that principle i t s e l f ,  an 
exception to the statutory duty to maintain reasonably safe roads, is 
based on what it is reasonable to expect of road authorities. If the 
concept of "reasonably safe" has any objective meaning, it cannot be said 
that a road covered with glare ice is reasonably safe; yet that is, in a 
sense, what the cases have said since the first case involving with snow 
and ice. In the beginning, it was easier to f ind  a road authority not 
liable, because the statutory duty itself was interpreted to be one of 
reasonable repair; since road authorities then did not have the means to 
repair all icy or snow-covered roads, it made sense to limit their liability. 
However, very early in the law of road liability, the courts began to 
consider the duty to be the stricter one of keeping the roads "reasonably 
safe" (33) .  Yet, the special rule for snow and ice was continued, and is 
still in force today as an exception to the general statutory duty. 
The point of this is not to suggest that the rule is a bad one. On the 
contrary, it was a sensible response to a real problem. It is, however, an 
exception to the statutory duty, and not really consistent with it; this 
fact may be significant in assessing the future of the rule. 
It is also worth noting that, while the rule seems in fact to be based 
on a consideration of what it is reasonable to expect of a road authority, 
the cases themselves seldom say that. The early cases, in which the rule 
was developed, speak of the reasons for i t ,  but after that courts have 
tended to try to apply the rule more or less mechanically. This has led, 
as mechanical rules often will, to some cases tha t  seem not to be 
consistent with each other, but (except for one early case) not until 
recently have courts begun to find new approaches to winter maintenance 
liability questions. 
The snow removal statutes also deserve mention. There are two of 
them. One merely defines the method by which snow removal funds are 
allocated to counties (34) .  The other is more direct. It provides that 
the "maintaining of s ta te  trunk line highways shall include . . .snow 
removall1 (35).  Curiously, there are no reported cases in which plaintiffs 
have tried to use either of these statutes as a basis for establishing a 
duty to use reasonable care in winter maintenance. 
All of these factors suggest that the law cannot be safely treated as 
settled in this area. The rule originated long ago; it was appropriate to 
its time, but the road authorities7 abilities to cope with snow and ice 
have improved since. The rule tends to be mechanical in its application, 
in a time when the tendency to allow more cases to be decided by the 
jury makes courts uncomfortable with mechanical rules. This tendency 
has been manifested in two ways. First, working within the rule itself, a 
recent decision has taken the position that when ice accumulates in a 
depression, whether that depression is a defect is a question of fact for 
the jury (36).  This has the effect of  preserving the rule (that unless a 
depression is a defect itself, the road authority is not liable fo r  an 
accumulation in it),  in theory, while seriously weakening it as a defense, 
since the case will in fact  go to the jury. Perhaps more important, two 
exceptions to the natural accumulations rule itself have been created.  
One of them is that  failure to install a snow fence can be a design 
defect (37). While there was an early case that  said a road authority 
must take winter conditions into account in designing a road (38), it may 
be significant that the snow fence case is the only recent  case to base 
liability for snow and ice on a design defect. The other exception is the 
"preferential icing" case, in which t he  cou r t  r epea t ed  t he  ru l e  of 
nonliabili ty for natural accumulations, but added a rule that failing to 
warn of a possible accumulation could be the basis for liability (39). 
Again the rule remains theoretically intact, but in fact there is now an 
additional situation in which a road authority can be liable when the 
accumulation is natural. 
Another indication of a change in the courts1 attitude toward winter 
maintenance is in a case in which some residents of a county sued for a 
court order to require the county to maintain a certain street. The court 
granted the order, saying that one should not have to wait for an injury 
to occur before being able to enforce the statutory duty to maintain 
roads in reasonable repair. The court also observed in passing t h a t  
"reasonable maintenance and safety require regular snow plowing" (40). 
This statement is hard to reconcile with the long line of cases holding 
that  road authorities are not liable for natural accumulations of snow and 
ice. Certainly it does not overrule them, but it does seem to indicate a 
change in the judicial attitude toward winter maintenance. 
The courts1 change in a t t i tude toward winter maintenance can be 
i l l u s t r a t e d  by asking whether a road authority would be liable i f  it 
elected not to plow a t  all. If the natural accumulations rule is taken 
literally, it would mean that the road authority would not be liable, even 
if it makes no attempt to keep the road clear,  since the accumulations 
would be natural. Although there are  no cases directly on point, it is 
hard to believe that  this would in fac t  be the case. If there are  no 
cases basing liability on a failure to plow any roads, it is almost certainly 
because in fact winter maintenance is routinely carried out. The case 
discussed above, i n  which the court specifically ordered that a road be 
maintained, clearly indicates that some plowing is expected. It is not a 
large step from requiring some winter maintenance to requiring reasonable 
care in winter maintenance. 
I f  the cases  do indicate the beginning of a trend away from the 
special rule regarding snow and ice, the theoretical basis for a more 
complete departure already exists. First, there are the more recent 
statutes regarding winter maintenance; while they do not require a court 
to find a duty to use reasonable care in removing snow and ice, they do 
permit it. Second, the road liability statutes themselves have long since 
been interpreted, in all other areas of road authority activities, to require 
that roads in fact be reasonably safe. In addition, there is a general rule 
in law tha t  when someone undertakes some activity, he must use 
reasonable care in doing it ,  even though he had no duty to act at  all. 
This rule has not yet been applied to winter maintenance activities, but it 
could be. Finally, even the first case to consider the question--the one 
t h a t  created the natural accumulations rule--laid a foundation for a 
change in that rule: ''where it is customary to treat the removal of snow 
and ice as a regular part of highway management, the failure to look 
after it may be properly regarded as wrongful and negligentr1 (41). 
If a change in the rule does come about, the new rule would most 
likely take the form of a reasonable care s tandard .  Under such a 
standard, liability would not be quite as strict as it is under the current 
general rule (reasonably safe). The reasonably safe rule looks only at  the 
condition of the road and not the reasonableness of the road authority's 
activities. Liability under the reasonable care standard would depend on 
the  genera l  road s i tua t ion  a t  the time and on the road authority's 
response to it. Such a standard could be established under the current 
road liability statutes by relying on the statutory provision that the road 
authority will not be liable unless it has a "reasonable time to repair the 
defect," ( 4 2 )  since what is a reasonable time will depend on all of the 
circumstances. A change of this sort would be more significant on the 
theoretical level than on the practical level, and would probably not 
greatly increase the liability of the road authority. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that the natural 
accumulations rule is in  imminent danger of being overruled. On the 
contrary, it is still the general rule and the exceptions to it are few, so 
that it still provides considerable protection to the road authority. If the 
cases discussed above do indicate a trend toward weakening the rule, the 
trend is still in the early stages. The rule remains that a road authority 
is not liable for injuries caused by natural accumulations of snow and ice. 
Sti l l ,  the rule should not be taken for granted as providing a broad, 
inclusive protection for road authorities, and the possibility of future 
changes in the rule should not be dismissed. 
CONSTRUCTION ZONES AND CLOSED ROADS 
The Road Authority's Duty and Liability 
A road authority's construction ac t iv i ty  spans a wide range of 
complexity, from the layout and construction of a new road system to 
relatively minor patching operations. Most of these activities involve the 
performance of work on a road while traffic continues to flow over it; 
this raises the possibility of injury to someone using the road, which could 
lead to a claim against the road authority. 
The general rule on road authority liability applies to construction 
zones. The rule is that as long as a road remains open, it must be 
llreasonably safef1 (43). The road authority's liability extends not only to 
work tha t  i t  performs i tself ,  but also any work performed for the 
authority by a contractor (44). Whether the road was reasonably safe in 
any particular case will usually be a question of fact for the jury (45). 
When a road is closed because of repairs, the situation is different. 
The general road liability law provides that a road authority is liable only 
for injuries on roads that are "open to public travelf1 ( 4 6 ) .  A separate 
s ta tute  specifically authorizes the closing of roads for construction or 
repair (47). However, it is clear that it is not sufficient that a road be 
"legally1' closed. It must also in fact be physically closed to traffic. The 
statute authorizing closure of a road requires that flsuitable detours1' be 
arranged and posted with "plainly legible signs'' (48). It also requires that 
"suitable barriersr1 be erected at  the end of the road or the point a t  
which it is closed and at  its intersection with other roads. The statute 
goes on to specify that the barriers must conform to the Michigan Manual 
of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (manual) (49). 
The cases involving construction area barricades and closed roads 
follow the rules created by the statute.  In one case, a road had been 
discontinued and a quarry dug across it by a private contractor. Two 
men were killed when their car fell into it. The court said that it was 
the road authority's duty to lteffectually exclude public travel from that 
particular portiontt of the road. Whether its barricades were sufficient to 
do that, the court said was for the jury to decide (50). In another case 
involving an excavation for a drain, the court said the sufficiency of the 
barricades was a question of fact, and noted that the driver was entitled 
to assume that the road was reasonably safe (51). A road is "closedtt 
when traffic is diverted from it. Thus, when traffic was detoured from a 
bridge that had been washed out to a temporary one next to it, the road 
is closed at the point of the detour (52). 
Although the sufficiency of a road closing is usually a question of 
fact, if the barriers do not conform to the requirements of the manual, 
the rule is somewhat different, Ordinarily, failure to comply with the 
manual is evidence of negligence (because the manual is a regulation 
promulgated under a statute). However, the statute that permits road 
closures specifically states that the barricades must conform to the 
manual. This raises the possibility that failure to comply with the 
manual, in this situation as a violation of the statute itself, creates a 
presumption of negligence. In an earlier version, the statute required 
that red lights be placed on barriers, In a case interpreting that statute,  
the court held that the failure to use lights on a barricade where a 
bridge was out "was negligencett (52).  The rule today is that failure to 
comply with a s ta tute  is not automatically negligence, but creates a 
tlpresumption of negligence," so that the defendant must justify its actions 
(53). Therefore, it is especially important that barricades conform to the 
manual, unless there are clear and compelling reasons for departing from 
Summary 
The road authority's duty with regard to construction zones is the 
same as for ordinary roads. As long as the road is open, it must be 
reasonably safe. If a road is closed, the road authority is not liable for 
injuries occurring on it. However, to close a road, the authority must 
provide detour signing and must provide barricades sufficient to close the 
road in fact. By statute, the barricades must comply with the Michigan 
Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Failure to comply with the 
manual may create a presumption that the road authority was negligent, 
so that it would be required to justify its failure to comply with the 
statute. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to construction 
zone barricades, and the manual should be followed unless there are clear 
and compelling reasons not to do so. 
SIGNING DECISIONS 
Introduction 
A road authority's decisions to install or not to install signs are an 
important part of its road maintenance activities. Signing decisions can 
ra i se  questions in two areas.  The first consideration is practical: 
whether the signs are in fac t  effective. On one level, the question is 
whether a specific sign will in fact make an intersection or a roadway 
segment safer. Related to this is the broader question, whether the 
generalized use of warning signs, especially where the danger is apparent, 
leads to disrespect for all signs. 
Signing decisions also raise legal questions, specifically whether 
installing warning signs will improve the position of the road commission 
as a defendant in a lawsuit. 
Effectiveness of Warning Signs 
The Michigan Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (manual) 
contains standards for the design, construction, and use of traffic control 
devices .  Among these devices are warning signs. The introductory 
paragraph to the chapter on warning signs contains the following 
statement: "Ths use of warning signs should be kept to a minimum, since 
their unnecessary use to warn of conditions which are apparent tends to 
breed disrespect for all signs" (54).  If this statement is valid, it can 
have a significant effect on a road commission~s signing decisions. 
A review of the literature dealing with the validity of this statement 
has failed to identify empirical support for it (55). While there has been 
considerable research on warning signs, there appears to be no research 
on the specific question of the effect of overuse of warning signs. 
As one would expect,  much research deals with effectiveness of 
certain types of signs. Thus, there has been considerable research into 
such considerations as the most effective shape, size, color, lettering or 
symbols, and location for signs (56). 
There has also been substantial research into the effectiveness of 
specific warning signs in specific highway situations. This research has 
produced considerable support for the proposition that warning signs alone 
do not produce safer driving. Thus, one study concluded that a driver's 
"response to signs along the roadway is conditioned by what else he sees 
of the roadway (now and in the past), by his estimate of his vehicle's 
roadworthiness,  and by many fac to r s  which r e l a t e  to h i m  as an 
experienced driver" (57). With respect to the speed a driver selects for a 
curve,  another  study found tha t  i t  was the result of "a complex 
interrelation between personal, vehicle, and roadway variables1' (58). An 
analysis of uslow" signs produced two conclusions: 
1. Slow signs are, in themselves, generally not effective. 
2 .  Slow signs should not be used without additional signs 
stating the nature of the danger involved. Even then, slow 
signs a re  probably not warranted unless the need to 
decrease speed is extremely great (59). 
One study went beyond the question of the effectiveness of signs in 
general and investigated their effectiveness over a period of time. The 
study involved school zone speed limit signs with flashing yellow lights. 
It concluded that "excessive flashing periods may cause disrespect for the 
flashers" (60). 
None of the s tudies  addressed the question of the effect of the 
overuse of warning signs on a driver's respect for signs in general. There 
are, however, two published reports which s tate  that overuse of signs 
breeds disrespect. One said: 
Information calling for specific responses which the driver is 
not actually required to make should be removed. If not, the 
driver will learn to ignore these items and this attitude will 
carry over to situations where they should not be ignored, and 
an unsafe condition will exist. (61) 
The other said: "Signs should be installed only where the information is 
needed. Overuse of signs breeds disrespect" ( 6 2 ) .  Neither of these 
-reports, however, is based on a study or refers to any other studies in 
support of its statements about sign overuse. The second report, in fact, 
appears to base its statement on the manual itself. 
The absence of studies to confirm or deny a link between excessive 
use of warning signs and disrespect for all signs does not prove that the 
statement is false. While it is fairly easy to establish that a certain sign 
was ignored, it is more difficult to design a test that will establish a link 
bet ween general  disrespect and the excessive use of warning signs. 
Therefore, all that can be said is that the proposition that the overuse of 
warning signs breeds disrespect for all signs is at  least plausible and 
generally believed by practitioners i n  highway safety, but is nei ther  
proved nor disproved by objective evidence. 
The absence of evidence to support or refute the proposition that 
overuse of signs breeds disrespect underscores the importance of making 
signing decisions on an individual basis. Whether a particular sign should 
be installed largely depends on whether it will be effective; whether it 
will be effective is a matter of engineering judgment based on the 
criteria contained in the manual. 
Legal Effect of Signing Decisions 
For the most part, the law treats signing decisions like any other road 
authority activity. The law requires that a road authori ty  provide 
reasonably safe roads (63) and the presence or absence of a sign is one 
factor the jury will consider in deciding whether a road was reasonably 
safe (64). Thus, a road authority's signing decisions will, for the most 
part, be treated the same as any other road authority activity. There 
are, however, some special provisions of the law that relate more directly 
to signing decisions. These are the manual, and certain specific signing 
statutes. 
Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices. The manual establishes 
standards for the design, construction, and use of traffic control devices, 
including warning signs. These standards are adopted for use throughout 
the state by the statutory authority of the Director of the Department of 
State Police and the Department of Transportation (65). 
Failure to comply with the manual does not establish that a road 
authority was negligent. Likewise, even a strict compliance with the 
manual will not disprove negligence. For example, when a city was sued 
for negligence in failing to properly adjust the timing of a traffic signal, 
it replied that it had set the timing within the limits contained in the 
manual. The court noted that there was heavy truck traffic at  the 
intersection and that the city had not taken this into account, and said 
that "mere complianceTT with the manual was not sufficient, where no 
attention was paid to "the particularities of the intersection involved1T (66). 
Although the manual cannot be used as proof of negligence or lack of 
it, it can be used as evidence of negligence or of reasonable care. This 
is so not because it is a regulation but because it expresses standards of 
the profession. Thus, when a road authority was sued for negligence in 
locating a speed sign incorrectly, the court held that its failure to comply 
with the manual was evidence of negligence (67). Similarly, compliance 
with the manual is evidence that tends to show that an authority was not 
negligent. For example, when the state was sued for injuries caused 
when a driver entered a freeway by way of the exit ramp, the court, in 
finding that the state had not been negligent, noted tha t  the s t a t e  
"complied with the adopted manualv (68). 
The manual therefore plays an important part in  a road authority's 
liability for its signing decisions. Compliance with it does not eliminate 
l iabi l i ty ,  nor does failure to comply with it establish liability, but 
compliance and noncompliance can be used as evidence. Therefore, the 
manual should be used as a guide and whenever the peculiarities of an 
intersection or a road segment require a departure from the standards 
contained in the manual, the reasons for the departure should be 
docum en t ed. 
S p e c i f i c  S ign ing  S t a t u t e s .  A road authority's general duty to 
maintain safe roads is not affected only by the provisions of the manual. 
There a r e  also some statutes  that require that signs be erected in 
specific situations. 
Because the manual has the status of a regulation, the failure to 
comply with its provisions is evidence of negligence. In contrast, the 
failure to comply with a specific statute creates a ffpresumptionfl of 
negligence (69). The difference is that evidence of negligence merely 
permits the judge or jury to find that there was negligence, while a 
presumption of negligence requires the jury to find negligence unless the 
defendant shows a justification for failing to comply with the statute. 
Thus, once the plaintiff shows that a road commission failed to comply 
with a specific signing statute, the commission must justify its departure 
from the statutory standard. 
There are two types of specific signing statutes. One type requires 
that signs be erected in  certain well defined areas. For example, one 
s tatute  requires that every bridge that has less than nineteen feet of 
clear roadway width be posted as a narrow bridge, and that every bridge 
with less than seventeen feet of clear roadway width be posted as a 
onelane bridge (70). Another such statute requires that stop signs or 
t ra f f ic  signals be installed on every highway or street where it intersects 
a state trunkline highway (?I), unless the decision not to erect a sign is 
made after conducting an engineering study. Thus, this first type of 
statute imposes specific duties that can, for the most part, be carried out 
without the exercise of engineering judgment. Because these statutes 
require specific actions and do not require much, if any, judgment, failure 
to comply with them would be very difficult to justify. 
The second type of statute requires that the road commission exercise 
its judgment in deciding whether to erect a sign. One such s t a t u t e  
permits the appropriate road authority to investigate the structure of 
bridges and, based on that investigation, establish reduced speed and load 
limits (72) .  This statute does not require that the road authority make 
the investigation, nor does it establish standards by which the decision to 
reduce the speed or load limit is made. Only when the road authority, in 
the exercise of its judgment, decides to take such action is it required to 
post the appropriate signs, 
Another statute that requires the exercise of judgment by the road 
authority in erecting signs relates to no-passing zones. This s ta tute  
requires that the road authority conduct a traffic survey and engineering 
study to determine those portions of highways where i t  would be 
"especially hazardousn to pass, and to mark the beginning and end of 
these zones by "appropriate signs or markings on the roadway" ( 7 3 ) .  Any 
t r a f f i c  control devices used to mark the zones must conform to the 
manual, but the statute requires t h a t  the road author i ty  exerc ise  
engineering judgment in identifying the "especially hazardous" areas, and 
also gives the road authority discretion in deciding whether to use signs 
or roadway markings, and whether to use no-passing penannts, This 
statute does not require that signs be installed on every curve or h i l l ,  but 
only in those places tha t  the road author i ty ,  i n  the  exercise of 
engineering judgment, considers especially hazardous. 
As was said earlier, when a road authority fails to comply with a 
specific statutory duty, its failure to comply will create a presumption 
that the authority was negligent. This rule applies to any statutory duty, 
but its operation is different where the statute requires the exercise of 
judgment. The statutory requirement that a sign be posted when a bridge 
has a roadway width less than seventeen feet imposes a specific standard 
of care .  On the other hand, the requirement that a road authority 
determine hazardous zones by traffic surveys and engineering studies and 
instal l  "appropriate  signs and markingft, establishes a more general 
standard of care. This standard of ca re  is similar to the genera l  
statutory duty to provide tlreasonably safe1? roads (74 ) .  The statute is 
specific and nondiscretionary in requiring that the road authority conduct 
the survey and study and make the determination based on them, but, 
unlike the narrow bridge statute,  it does not prescribe any standards by 
which to make the determination. The s t a t u t e  also leaves to  the 
discretion of the road authority the decision whether to use signs or 
roadway markings, so long as those used conform to the standards of the 
manual. Therefore, the road authority's liability under this statute and 
other statutes that impose a general duty requiring the  exercise  of 
judgment is similar to i ts  general liability when the roads are not 
reasonably safe. 
Signing Decisions and Liability. It is important to keep signing 
decisions in perspective, so that they are not treated as having some 
special significance from the point of view of liability. In part, this may 
happen because signs appear to be an inexpensive safety device; clearly it 
is cheaper to post a no-passing zone sign than to flatten a hill. More 
fundamentally, the importance attached to signing decisions also seems to 
be based on a belief that the presence or absence of a sign is of special 
importance to litigation. 
There can be no doubt that there have been cases where a road 
authority, as defendant in a lawsuit, wished it had put up a sign in a 
particular location. There will continue to be such cases. However, it 
does not follow that a road authority's funds are best spent erecting and 
maintaining signs. There are two reasons for this. First, and most 
fundamentally, to allow litigation concerns to dominate risk management 
dec is ions  misses the point of the goal of the risk management 
program-to make a safer road system. Second, even if l i t igat ion 
concerns were paramount, signing decisions do not merit special treatment. 
From the point of view of a defendant in a lawsuit, signing decisions 
raise two general thoughts. First, if a sign is absent, it will either make 
the road authority liable, or significantly increase the chance that it will 
be found liable (by giving the plaintiff an additional arguing point). 
Second, if a sign were present, it would free the road authority from 
liability (by making the road "reasonably safe"), or would significantly 
improve its position (by improving the safety of the road or perhaps by 
allowing the authority to argue that the plaintiff was negligent). Each of 
these points is discussed in turn. 
The absence of a sign does not automatically make the road authority 
liable. There do not appear to be any cases in which a court has said 
tha t  the absence of a sign was negligence as a matter of law. The 
question is always whether the road was reasonably safe. There are 
virtually no shortcuts to the answer to this question. Depending on the 
circumstances, the absence of a sign may be evidence that the road was 
or was not reasonably safe, but it has no greater weight than any other 
piece of evidence--except in those few instances where signs a r e  
specifically required by law. 
O n  the other hand, the presence of a sign does not automatically 
eliminate the road authorityss liability. The question is still whether the 
road was reasonably safe, and the presence of a sign is merely one factor 
for the jury to consider in making that decision. If a curve has been 
constructed so tha t  i t  is unsafe, posting a sign does not eliminate 
liability, for the reason that it does not eliminate the defect, To the 
extent a sign reduces the danger, by conveying useful information, it also 
reduces the liability. Nor does the presence of a sign have any special 
significance in supporting a road authority's argument that the driver was 
negligent. It may provide information to the driver (which it might be 
negligence to ignore) but so do other facts relating to the road's 
condition. It is merely a factor to be considered in deciding whether the 
plaintiff's conduct was reasonable. The law is clear that knowledge that 
a road is defective does not make the driver negligent in useing the road. 
The conduct required by the driver's duty of reasonable care varies 
according to the nature and extent of the danger, but i t  will nearly 
always be a jury question whether his conduct was reasonable. 
There appears to be one small class of cases that is an exception to 
the rule that a sign will not automatically avoid liability. If the failure 
to install a sign was the only defect, then it follows that installing one 
would have avoided liability entirely. Two examples will illustrate this. 
In one case, the plaintiff was injured when she lost control of her car on 
an icy bridge. The court held that the road authority could be liable if, 
as plaintiff claimed, it had failed to warn of the possibility of ice on the 
bridge. The court also noted that the road authority would not be liable 
for the icing itself (75). The other case involved a T-intersection. 
Plaintiff approached it at night, unaware the road did not continue, and 
struck a tree when he passed through the intersection. The court held 
that the defendant could be liable for failure to warn of the fact that 
road ended, even though there was no defect in the intersection itself 
apart from the absence of a sign (76). In each of these examples, there 
was no underlying defect separate from the absence of the sign. These 
two examples are the only cases we have found in which the presence of 
a sign would have avoided liability. In the great majority of cases,  
therefore, the plaintiff will claim a defective condition of which the 
absence of a sign is only a part. As in the case of an unsafe curve, the 
presence or absence of a sign would be one factor among several that the 
jury would consider. 
Once the road authority has exercised its judgment and decided that a 
sign is required, however, i t  is in a different position. A delay in 
carrying out the action that the authority itself has decided is necessary 
will support a finding of negligence. For example, in one case, the  
highway department had conducted a traffic count of an intersection and 
decided that additional traffic control devices were needed. The work 
order was issued one week before the accident, but was not carried out. 
The highway department relied on its statutory discretion regarding traffic 
control devices. The court replied that discretion was not the issue, 
since it had been exercised and work orders issued. The court instead 
found the highway department negligent because it "failed to carry out its 
own work ordersu (77).  Thus, the road authority's exposure to liability is 
particularly great after it has decided that work needs to be done and 
until it is in fact done. This type of work deserves a correspondingly 
high priority. 
The question of the effect of signing decisions on the road authority7s 
liability must be viewed in the context of the general statutory duty, the 
specific signing statutes, and the manual, Where a statute specifically 
requires a sign (as in the .case of narrow bridges), the road authority 
should follow the requirements of the statute unless there  a r e  very 
compelling circumstances requiring that it depart from those requirements. 
Compliance with the manual need not be as strict  as compliance with 
specific signing statutes, but its guidelines should be followed unless it is 
clear that they are inappropriate to the specific situation. Whenever a 
decision is made not to follow a specific s ta tute  or the manual, the 
reasons for that decision should be set out in writing. 
While the specific signing statutes and the manual are intended to 
influence the road authority's judgment, the more general statutes (such 
as  the no-passing zone statute) are not. They require that the road 
authority make a decision, but do not provide any guidelines or impose 
any constraints on its exercise of judgment. The presence or absence of 
a sign in this situation would therefore not have special significance for 
the road authority's liability. 
Liability concerns and safety considerations are not in conflict but in 
harmony in the area of signing decisions. Signing decisions play a part, 
in common with other types of decisions, in determining how safe a road 
will be, just as the presence or absence of a sign may be one factor in 
deter mining liability. Signs have no special significance in liability cases 
beyond that of any other factor that affects the safety of the roads. 
Therefore, the law does not impose any requirements that distort road 
management decisions. Determining the most effective use of available 
funds remains the proper approach, and is entirely consistent with the 
statutory duty of maintaining reasonably safe roads. 
This consistency between litigation and safety concerns applies even in 
those situations where a statute specifically addresses signing questions. 
For example, the requirement that narrow and one-lane bridges be posted 
as a guide for conduct as much as a basis for liability. The basic reason 
for posting narrow bridges-safety-would apply even without the statute. 
Similarly, the requirement that especially hazardous curves be posted 
suggests a sensible use of signs-to warn of points of special danger. It 
does not require that every curve be signed, but only those where passing 
is especially hazardous. 
Just as liability considerations should not lead to a decision to put up 
a sign where safety does not require it,  neither should they prevent a 
decision to put up a sign where one is needed. If studies identify a 
situation where a sign would increase the safety of a road, the fact that 
other similar situations have not yet been located should not prevent 
installation of the sign. 
SUMMARY 
Liability concerns need not distort safety decisions. In fact, in most 
cases liability concerns and safety concerns work in harmony. This is 
true of signing decisions. Apart from a few limited situations, the law 
does not require anything other than the exercise of engineering judgment 
in making signing decisions on the basis of safety considerations. 
The underlying liability concept--reasonably saf e--is a constant. All 
road management decisions are measured against this standard. Signing 
decisions are a part of road safety, and they are an important part. 
However, the law does not give them any special significance or make 
them more important  than any other  road management decision. 
Specifically, this means that, in general: 
the presence of a sign will not eliminate liability, except 
in rare cases; 
the absence of a sign will not guarantee liability; 
if installing a sign w i l l  not in fact improve sa fe ty ,  i t  
should not be installed out of concern for liability exposure; 
if installing a sign will in fact improve safety, the road 
author i ty  should not avoid installing it because of a 
concern for liability exposure. 
In those areas where the manual provides guidelines for signing or 
specific statutes apply, the road authority can take some steps to improve 
signing decisions and consequently improve its litigation position. These 
include: 
any departure from a specific statutory duty should be 
made, if at all, only in the clearest of cases, and the 
reasons for the departure should be set forth in  routinely 
kept records; 
any departure from the standards in the Michigan Manual 
of Uniform Traffic Control Devices should be made only 
where there are specific reasons for doing so, and those 
reasons should be set forth in routinely kept records; 
once a decision is made to do certain work to correct an 
unsafe condition, tha t  work should have the highest 
priority, so as to minimize the length of the increased 
liability exposure; 
continuing or periodic traffic surveys and engineering 
studies of possible no-passing zones should be conducted to 
determine which are especially hazardous. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ROAD LIABILITY LAW-DEFENSES 
The preceding chapters have discussed the legal duties and liabilities 
of road authorities. The general rule-that road authorities are liable for 
roads that are not reasonably safe-has been explained, and its application 
in specific situations has been explored. 
The purpose of this chapter  is to  discuss defenses that a road 
authority might raise. The term defense is used in a broad sense here, 
to include any matter that the road authority might raise in a lawsuit in 
an effort to avoid or reduce its liability. In its strict  legal m eaning, a 
defense is a matter that the defendant is required to claim and prove. 
Disproving matters that the plaintiff has claimed and is required to prove 
(such as the road authority's jurisdiction over the road) is not, strictly 
speaking, a defense. However, because defendants usually devote much 
attention to such matters, and in fact treat them as though they are 
defenses, they are discussed here. However, one such "clef ensel?--in fact,  
the most common one--is not included in this chapter. In most cases, the . 
road authority will argue that the road in question was in fact reasonably 
safe. Because the question of what is reasonably safe has been discussed 
at length in the two preceding chapters, it will not be discussed here. 
The defenses discussed in this chapter can be roughly divided into two 
groups. Some may be thought of as 'legal defensesv and some as 'Ifactual 
defenses." Legal defenses are those that, if established, avoid liability 
whether or not the road was safe,  or the road authority was negligent. 
The first two defenses discussed in this chapter-jurisdiction over the road 
and statute of limitations-are legal defenses. 
Factual defenses usually go to the question of negligence (or defective 
condition) itself. They are essentially arguments of fact presented to the 
jury to persuade it to find the defendant not liable. The rest of the 
defenses discussed in this chapter fall into this category. 
The distinction between factual and legal defenses is not rigid. The 
third defense discussed here, plaintiff's failure to notify the road authority 
of his injury, illustrates this point. Initially, virtually any defect in 
plaintiff's notification was sufficient to defeat his claim, so that failure 
to notify was a legal defense. The rule today, however, is that failure to 
notify will not defeat a claim unless it causes actual prejudice to the 
defendant; thus, it has become more of a factual defense. In spite of its 
lack of precision, the distinction between legal and factual defenses can 
be a useful tool in understanding the various types of defenses available 
to a road authority. 
JURISDICTION 
The term jurisdiction, as it is applied to courts, means rllegal authority 
and power." A court has jurisdiction over a case when i t  has the 
authority to make a decision and the power to enforce it. The meaning 
of jurisdiction in the context of a road authority's activities is similar. A 
road authority has jurisdiction over a road when it has the authority to 
maintain it. 
For a road authority, jurisdiction carries not only the authority to 
maintain a road, but the duty to do so. Jurisdiction also creates liability 
in the road authority for a road that is not reasonably safe. In general, 
it is quite clear that a road authority is not liable for injuries incurred 
on a road over which it has no jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction over 
a road may therefore be raised by a road authority as a defense. Thus, 
it is important to understand how jurisdiction is created and what it 
means in various situations. 
Statutory Basis of Jurisdiction 
Each of the statutes dealing with road liability refers to jurisdiction as 
a basis for liability. The more recent statute,  which applies to road 
liability in general, provides: 
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any 
highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so 
that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. (1) 
This s tatute  goes on to provide that the agency is liable for failure to 
keep a highway under its jurisdiction reasonably safe. The term highway 
is defined to exclude alleys but to include "bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks 
and culverts on any highway" (2). However, sidewalks and crosswalks are 
specifically excluded from the st a t  els and the county road commissionsf 
duty to repair, so that the result is that sidewalks and crosswalks are 
within the jurisdiction of the cities, townships and villages ( 3 ) .  This 
jurisdiction over sidewalks is subject to the paramount jurisdiction of the 
state or county responsible for the road itself. 
The other statute applies specifically to county road commissions and 
makes them liable for all "county roads, bridges and culverts that are 
within their jurisdiction.I1 (4) 
The existence of jurisdiction is clearly basic to any road authority's 
liability. Courts tend to adhere strongly to the concept that only one 
road authority can have jurisdiction over a road. In most cases where 
jurisdiction questions have been raised, courts have proceeded on the 
assumption that only one authority has jurisdiction, while not explicitly 
stating it ( 5 ) .  In one case the  question of dual or fltwo-tieredfl 
jurisdiction over a road was squarely raised and the court said: 
We reject plaintiff's argument . . .of "two-tieredv or lllayeredll 
jurisdiction and liability involving both the city and the 
County Road Commission. (6) 
Thus it is the general rule that only one road authority can be held liable 
for a defective road. 
The rule is also clear that liability is based on jurisdiction rather than 
the performance of work. That is, jurisdiction is not transferred by a 
maintenance contract. This is true whether the contract is with a 
private company (7) or with another road authority. If, for example, a 
county maintains a state road under contract with the state, and someone 
is injured by the county's negligence, the s tate  is liable because it has 
jurisdiction over the road. The county is not liable for its negligence 
because, as a government, it is immune from suit (8). 
When jurisdiction is formally transferred from one road authority to 
another ,  t he  rule  is somewhat different. In general, the authority 
accepting jurisdiction is thereafter liable for the condition of the road (9). 
This is true even if the road continues to be maintained, under contract, 
by the authority that first had jurisdiction over i t  (10). However, one 
case suggests that a different rule applies in certain situations (ll). In 
that case, a bridge was found to be unsafe because of a gap in a 
pedestrian barrier. The bridge had been designed and built by the county 
and jurisdiction had thereafter been transferred to the city. The court 
held that both road authorities could be liable for the defect. The court 
said that they both had a continuing obligation to correct the defective 
design. The court's ruling is not limited to design defects, but extends to 
any "lapse in the performance of the County's statutory duty which 
occurred before jurisdiction was r e l inqu i~hed . '~  This case can be 
interpreted as an exception to the rule that only one road authority can 
have jurisdiction, but is better interpreted as merely providing that a road 
authority's liability for a de fec t  i t  c rea ted  is not te rminated  by  
transferring jurisdiction. It is clear that the authority's liability does not 
extend to defects arising after it transfers jurisdiction. 
Geographical Limits on Jurisdiction 
For county road com missions and any other municipal road authority, 
the question of the geographical limit of its jurisdiction can arise. The 
problem is best expressed by the meandering county line road. Such 
roads are usually maintained by one of the counties in which it  lies, by 
agreement with the other county. This arrangement adds another element 
to the question, because the s tatute  that applies specifically to county 
road commissions makes them responsible for roads within their 
jurisdiction and under their "care and control". A county thus might 
argue that it had no liability for a county line road that was maintained 
entirely by the neighboring county, Two arguments in support of this 
position could be made. First, it might be argued that the s tatute  
imposes liability only when both of two conditions are met: the road 
must be under the defendant's jurisdiction, and it must also be under its 
care and control. Second, it might be argued that "care and contr01'~ is a 
component of jurisdiction, so that jurisdiction exists only when care and 
control also exist, These two arguments are very similar, and can be 
discussed together. 
There are no cases that define jurisdiction where a road is in two 
geographical units, so the answer must be found elsewhere. The rule 
seems to be tha t  jurisdiction is limited strictly to a municipality's 
geographic limits, and that liability is not avoided because the care and 
control of a road have been given to the neighboring municipality. There 
are several reasons for this, which are best expressed in te rms of 
neighboring county road com missions. The statutes concerning relations 
between adjacent counties do not speak directly to  the  question of 
l iabi l i ty  for county line roads. However, the Michigan Constitution 
provides that counties "may take charge and control of any highway 
within the i r  l imi ts f f ,  (12) The phrase "within their limitsff suggests that 
a county's jurisdiction (charge and control) cannot extend beyond i t s  
geographical limits. It follows that a county cannot give up jurisdiction 
over a county line road, because the adjacent county cannot accept it.  
Note that the constitution does not refer to l1careV (maintenance) of a 
r o ~ d ,  but t o  flcharge and controltt (jurisdiction) over it. In the road 
liability statutes, the phrase "care and controlt1 is not defined, but appears 
to be another way of defining jurisdiction. In the two statutes, there are 
six sentences in which liability is discussed. The first contains the phrase 
quoted above ("within their jurisdiction and under their care and con trollf). 
The second simply refers to tlroads under their control.ll The four 
remaining references are simply to jurisdiction (13). Three of these are in 
the more recent statute,  which bases liability solely on jurisdiction and 
makes no reference at all to care and control (14). Thus, 7tcare and 
contr01,~' appears to not have any independent meaning but rather to be 
an aspect of jurisdiction. 
In addition to the constitution and the statutes, the cases must also be 
considered. As described earlier, the law is clear that jurisdiction is not 
transferred from one road authority to another because of a maintenance 
contract (15). Since this is clearly the rule as to a road lying wholly 
within a county, it should also be the rule as to a road lying partially 
within a county. 
If this analysis is correct, then "care and control" has nothing to do 
with establishing liability, and jurisdiction is strictly defined in terms of 
geographic limits. It is then fair to ask what meaning "care and controlu 
has. The phrase appears in the earlier road liability statute, which, in i ts  
present  form, goes back a t  least to 1909. Because of the relative 
informality of road authority operations at  that time, it may be that 
"care and controlf1 was intended as an indicator of whether a county road 
commission had taken jurisdiction over a road. If records are unclear, 
t he  actual maintenance of a road is a good indication that the road 
commission has taken jurisdiction. If for example, the  question is 
whether the state or the county is responsible for a certain road within a 
county, the actual care and control of it would tend to settle the question. 
There is another argument in favor of the proposition that jurisdiction 
is defined geographically and "care and control" is not a separate test. 
Only the older statute,  which relates only to county road commissions, 
contains the phrase. The more recent one, which applies to all road 
author i t ies  (specif ical ly referring to the earlier s tatute  as to road 
commissions), speaks only of jurisdiction. Therefore, any rule that actual 
"care and controlft determines liability must acknowledge that the rule 
applies only to counties, while the liability of the other municipalities is 
l imi ted  to their geographic boundaries, While such a discrepancy is 
possible, it is not likely, particularly in view of the provision in the 
Michigan Constitution, and in view of the cases involving maintenance 
agreements. 
Summary 
A road authority's jurisdiction over a road is one of the elements in 
its liability for injuries caused by a defect in the road. Jurisdiction 
re fe r s  to  the  road authority's legal authority to maintain the road. 
Jurisdiction is limited to the geographical boundaries of the county or 
other municipal road authority. Neither jurisdiction over a road, nor 
liability for it, is transferred by a maintenance agreement with another 
road authority. Only one road authority can have jurisdiction over a 
road. However, since counties and the s ta te  are not responsible for 
sidewalks and crosswalks, jurisdiction over them belongs to the local 
municipality through which the s ta te  or county road runs. The general 
rule is that the road authority with jurisdiction over a particular road is 
liable for defects in that road. 
f 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
A statute  of limitations is a statute that limits the time after a legal 
claim arises in which a lawsuit can be filed. There are many different 
statutes of limitations, for the different types of claim that can arise, 
For claims for personal injuries and property damage, the general s tatute  
of limitations is three years (16). For claims against a road authority, 
however, the statute of limitations is specified in the act creating the 
liability; the time limit is two years (17). 
The effect of a statute of limitations is drastic. If a plaintiff waits 
even one day beyond the prescribed time, his claim is barred. Thus, the 
statute of limitations is a very good defense in those cases where i t  
applies, although the cases in which the plaintiff will have waited too 
long are few. 
Because statutes of limitations can completely bar a claim that might 
in fact have merit, they have often been attacked by plaintiffs, The 
road liability statute of limitations is no exception. It has been argued 
that it is unconstitutional because it establishes a shorter period for a 
road authority 's negligence than for the negligence of an ordinary 
defendant. However, the courts have held that it is constitutional (18). 
In other cases, plaintiffs have argued that the general three-year 
statute of limitations should be applied, The courts have rejected this 
argument (19). The state,  approaching the problem from the other side, 
has argued that a one-year statute of limitations applying generally to 
claims against the state should be applied (20). The court again held that 
the tweyear statute of limitations in the road liability act applied (21). 
There remains only one way to avoid the effect of a statute of 
limitations. It is called " e ~ t o p p e l . ~  If a defendant conceals from the 
plaintiff that he has a right to sue, or if it misrepresents the amount of 
time he has to sue, or induces him to delay filing suit until the statute 
has run, then the defendant is not permitted to raise (is estopped from 
raising) the s tatute  as a defense (22). In practice, there are likely to be 
few cases in which the road authority's conduct can be used to avoid the 
statute on the theory of estoppel. 
The statute of limitations itself contains some exceptions. Two of 
these are called "savings provisions.~ One of them provides that if a 
plaintiff dies before the statute runs out or within thirty days afterwards, 
the period can be extended up to an additional three years (23). Another 
applies to persons unable to bring a legal action because of being a 
minor, insane, or imprisoned at the time the claim arises. As to them, 
the  s t a t u t e  of l imitations does not expire until one year after the 
disability ends (24). The other exceptions involve the "tollingH of the 
statute;  a s tatute  of limitation is tolled when the counting of elapsed 
time is suspended. One provision states that the statute of limitations is 
tolled as to any defendant who is absent from the state, and cannot be 
served with a summons, for a period greater than two months ( 2 5 ) .  
Another provides tha t  the  running of the s tatute  of limitations is 
suspended when the lawsuit is filed and served on the defendant or when 
it is filed and given to an officer for immediate service (in this case the 
tolling of the statute ends after 180 days if service is not made) (26). 
The purpose of these statutory exceptions is to avoid the harsh effect of 
the statute of limitations in specific situations where it would be unjust 
to deprive the plaintiff of his right to sue. While these exceptions are 
important, they reach only a small portion of the cases. The statute of 
limitations, when it applies, is a very strong defense. 
Summary 
A statute  of limitations is a law that limits the time after a claim 
arises that a lawsuit can be started. In the case of road authorities, the 
s tatute  of limitations is two years. Unless a lawsuit is started within 
two years after the accident occurred, the plaintiff's right to sue is 
forever barred. There are a few provisions in the law that modify the 
effect of the statute in certain cases, but the statute of limitations 
remains a very strong defense in the cases in which it applies. 
FAILURE TO NOTIFY ROAD AUTHORITY OF INJURY 
Introduction 
The first statutes creating liability for defective roads included a 
requirement that anyone who claimed damages because of a defective 
road must not i fy the road authority of his injury and certain facts 
relating to it. The s tatute  has required that the notification be quite 
detailed, stating the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury 
sustained, and the names of witnesses. As a result, there has been much 
litigation involving the requirement and whether the plaintiff has met it. 
Background 
The doct r ine  of governmental immunity holds that a government 
cannot be sued without its consent, and the law has traditionally held 
that the government could attach any conditions it chose to that consent. 
The requirement of notification of the injury and the defect was one such 
condition (27). Originally this notification was required to be given within 
sixty days of the accident. Because the statutes required t h a t  t h e  
notification be quite detailed, there has been much litigation over the 
years concerning the requirement, whether the plaintiff has complied with 
i t ,  and the effect of failure to comply with it. This litigation has led to 
much change in the law in the area, so that a rule that once provided a 
strong legal defense has become a much less strong factual defense. 
In the early days, almost any defect in the notification of injury was 
sufficient to make it void and bar the suit. Notifications have been held 
defective when given to the board of road commissioners instead of their 
c l e rk  ( 2 8 ) ,  for fai l ing to s ta te  on which of the four corners at  an 
intersection the sidewalk was defective (29) ,  when not verified (signed 
under oath) by the claimant (30), or when describing the defect as a 
"depressionv in a sidewalk and the testimony at trial described it as a 
"trapn (31). The inquiry into the sufficiency of the notification tended to 
be mechanical. If there was any defect, whether it actually affected the 
road authority's ability to defend itself or not, the plaintiff had failed to 
comply with the statute and could not sue. The courts even held that if 
the injury was severe enough that the claimant was unable to notify the 
road authority within sixty days, the suit was still barred (32). 
Changes in the  Rule  
As judicial attitudes changed, courts began to mitigate the harshness 
of the  rule.  One way this  was done was simply to review t h e  
notification more leniently, by requiring only ffsubstantial compliance" 
within the statute ( 3 3 ) .  In addition, courts began to find that certain 
de fec t s  were not f a t a l  to the plaintiff's claim. Thus, the lack of 
verification was no longer held to be fatal (34),  and the failure to s ta te  
the place of the accident was also held not to bar the claim (35). 
Eventually, the changing attitude toward the rule led to an attack on 
the rule itself, The first such case involved a minor who had failed to 
notify the road authority because he had been incapacitated by t h e  
accident, The court, in a split decision, held that barring the claim of 
an incapacitated plaintiff violated his right to due process of law (36). 
This case was soon followed by another that held the notification 
provision unconstitutional as to all claimants, whether minors or adults, 
and whether incapacitated or not (37).  The legislature responded by 
enacting the statute which is in force today. 
The Rule  Today 
The current statute,  which was enacted after the sixty-day provision 
was declared unconstitutional, addressed m any of the criticisms directed 
at  its predecessor by the courts. It provides that the notification must 
be given within 120 days of the injury and must specify the exact location 
and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the 
witnesses known at the time by the claimant. For road authorities other 
than the s tate ,  the notification can be served on any person who could 
accept service of a summons for the road authority, and can be served 
personally or by certified mail. As to the state, service must be made in 
triplicate to the clerk of the court of claims. If the claimant is a 
minor, he has 180 days to give the notification, and it can be served by a 
parent, attorney, or legally appointed guardian. If t he  claimant  is 
incapable of giving notification, he has 180 days after the end of the 
incapacity to do so. 
The  c o u r t s  have held this provision const i tut ional ,  but have 
significantly reduced its effectiveness, from a defendant's point of view. 
They have held tha t  since the purpose of the provision is to avoid 
prejudice to the defendant (i.e., putting it  at an unfair disadvantage in 
preparing its defense), the failure to give proper notification will bar a 
claim only if it results in "actual prejudice" to the defendant. That is, 
the defendant must show that its ability to defend itself has in some way 
been impaired. This rule applies even if no notification at  all is given 
within 120 days (38). 
Summary 
The statutory requirement that a claimant notify the road authority of 
his injury has undergone considerable change over the years. Today the 
s tatute  requires in general that notification be given within 120 days of 
the injury (180 days from the end of the minority or disability if the 
claimant is a minor or disabled). The notification must state the location 
and nature of the defect, t he  injury sustained,  and the  names of 
witnesses. As a matter of constitutional law, the courts have added a 
provision that the failure to comply with the statute will not bar the 
claim unless it causes actual prejudice to the road authority, that is, 
impairs its ability to prepare a defense to the claim. 
LACK OF NOTICE OF THE DEFECT 
One of the limits on a road authority's liability for defective roads 
relates to its knowledge of the defect. Since the road authority is, 
generally speaking, liable for any defect in a road, regardless of how the 
defect arose, its liability is potentially very great. The statute reduces 
that exposure by a notice provision requiring some knowledge of t h e  
defect. The statute says: 
No governmental agency is liable for injuries or damages 
caused by defective highways unless the governmental agency 
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
known, of the existence of the defect and had a reasonable 
t i m e  to repair  the  de fec t  before the injury took place. 
Knowledge of the defect and time to repair the same shall be 
conclusively presumed when the defect existed so as to be 
readily apparent to an ordinarily observant person for a period 
of 30 days or longer before the injury took place. (1) 
This provision states that the road authority is only liable if it had 
ac tua l  notice (knowledge) or constructive notice (Ifin the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have knownv) of the  de fec t  and had a 
reasonable time to repair it. The effect of this provision is to give the 
road authority some protection from liability. That protection is limited 
by the further provision that notice of the defect and time to repair it 
will be conclusively presumed when the defect has been readily apparent 
for at  least thirty days. When a fact is ltconclusively presumed,I1 it is no 
longer treated as a disputed fact. If a plaintiff in a case offers evidence 
tending to show that a defect had been readily apparent for thirty days, 
the judge will tell the jury that if they agree that the defect was readily 
apparent for thirty days they must find that the road authority knew 
about it and had time to correct it. 
The lack-of-notice defense is an important one and has been raised 
frequently. There are many appellate cases in which the  issue is 
discussed, and it is presumably raised frequently at trial. The large 
number of appellate cases provide much information on how the notice 
requirement has been applied and how useful it is as a defense. 
Notice as a Question of Fact 
Perhaps the  clearest  principle to emerge from the cases is that 
whether the road authority had notice of the defect is almost always a 
question of fact. Only in four cases since the basic road liability statute 
was enacted in 1879 have the courts found as a matter of law that the 
road authority did not have notice (40). Three of those cases are more 
than fifty years old. In the first, the court said that the fact that a 
condition had existed for four days was not enough to show notice, where 
there was no proof that the condition was nnotoriouslf (i.e., a matter of 
general public knowledge) or that road authority officials had traveled the 
s treet  in question (41). The next case found that the road authority could 
not be charged with notice of a defect that was not visible (42).  The 
third case involved an llinconspicuous defect" (a nail in a plank of a 
wooden sidewalk), that had existed for only two days (43). The fourth 
case  is much more recent.  he defect alleged in that case was an 
uneven sidewalk. The only testimony as to notice was t h a t  of the  
plaintiff, who said that the defect was plainly visible, although she did 
not see it until she tripped over it. The court held that this was not 
sufficient, and noted the absence of testimony from residents of the area 
(44). 
These few cases in which the court found a lack of notice as a 
matter of law are exceptions that illustrate the force of the general rule. 
Only in very clear cases will a court find a lack of notice as a matter of 
law. The amount of evidence required to put the question to the jury for 
its decision is not great. This does not mean that the lack-of-notice 
defense is not a good one. I t  does mean that it is a factual defense the 
value of which will usually be decided by the jury in each case. How 
well the defense works for any road authority can best be determined by 
a review of that authority's own litigation experience. 
The Road Authority's Duty to  Inspect 
The notice provision of the road liability statute refers to both actual 
and constructive notice. Constructive notice is defined in the clause: 
"or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known." The 
phrase "reasonable diligencen gives rise to the question whether a road 
authority must actively inspect the roads under its jurisdiction. 
The law is clear that a road authority does not have a general duty to 
inspect its roads. Routine or regular inspections are not required (45). 
Inspection is required only when the road authority has knowledge of facts 
that are sufficient to put it on inquiry, that is, if it has notice of facts 
that llwould lead an ordinarily prudent man to make an examination.ll If 
i t  has such facts and fails to investigate, then it will be treated as 
having notice of whatever it would have learned from the investigation 
(46). A road authority was required to inspect an entire wooden bridge 
when it knew that one portion of it was defective (47). In another case, 
a defect i n  a sidewalk had been reported to the village s t r e e t  
commissioner, and it was held that the village then had a duty to inspect 
and to use due care in doing so (48). Similarly, when the defective 
condition of a wooden bridge was reported to the appropriate officials, 
the court held that the road authority was required to inspect it. The 
court also said that when "it is generally known that a bridge has become 
decrepit, or when a bridge has stood so long that there is much suspicion 
of i t ,  the officers of the township may not disregard the warning 
conveyed to take action on the ground of having no actual notice of the 
dangerous infirmity.ll (49) 
In summary, there is no legal requirement that a road authority 
undertake regular or routine inspections. The duty to inspect arises only 
in specific situations where the authority has reason to believe a defect 
exists. 
Persons Whose Knowledge is Attributable to the Road Authority 
As was said earlier, in the great majority of cases i t  will be a 
question of fact whether the road authority had notice of a defect. 
Since the road authority is an organization it cannot, by itself, have any 
knowledge. It is therefore necessary to identify the persons whose 
knowledge of a defect will give notice to the authority. It is clear that 
the knowledge of any !'highway official" is notice to the authority (50). 
In the case of a city, it was held that neither the clerk nor the mayor 
was such an official (51). However, a township highway commissioner 
(52), an overseer of highways (53), or a superintendent of city streets 
( 5 4 ) ,  is a highway official. The rule is not limited to supervisory 
personnel, but extends at least to all those employees of a road authority 
who are involved in road work (55). One case can be read as saying that 
the knowledge of any city employee can establish notice on the part of a 
city; however, it is a doubtful authority because the statement is indirect 
and conflicts with earlier cases, discussed above, regarding the knowledge 
of responsible officials (56). It is not clear whether the rule extends to 
all employees of a road commission, including support personnel, but it is 
likely that their knowledge would be attributed to their employer. It 
appears that the knowledge of the employees of a public agency not 
responsible for roads, such as police officers, will not be attributed to the 
road authority (57). 
A road authority is charged not only with the knowledge of its own 
employees but also with the knowledge of any contractor hired by the 
authority, This is true whether the contractor is a private company (58) 
or another road authority operating under a maintenance agreement (59). 
Two of the cases attributing the knowledge of the contractor to the road 
authority refer to the fact that the road authority retained control of the 
work (601, but more recently it has been held that contractor's knowledge 
will establish notice to the road authori ty even when the re  is no 
communication between them (61). 
In summary, a road authority will be found to have notice of a defect 
if any of its employees, or any contractor hired by it ,  has actual or 
constructive notice (should have known) of it. 
Factors Relevant to Establishing Notice 
Whether a road authority will be found to have notice of a defect will 
depend on the facts of each case. The appellate cases considering the 
question of notice cover a wide variety of situations, and they do not 
give rise to any unifying theme. Although each case must be evaluated 
on its own merits, there are some useful principles that emerge from the 
reported cases. The cases suggest some factors that tend to establish 
notice. As was said at the beginning of this section, most of the cases 
are concerned not with whether there was in f a c t  notice but with 
whether there were enough facts in a case to permit the jury to decide 
that there was notice. Therefore, any statement below that certain facts 
were sufficient to establish notice does not necessarily mean that the 
same facts will result in liability in another case; it will still be a matter 
for the jury's decision. 
Plaintiffs frequently seek to use evidence of prior accidents to show 
that the road authority had notice of a defect. The rule is quite clear 
that evidence of prior accidents is admissible for this purpose (62). It is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that the road was unsafe, 
although it is not possible to guarantee that the jury will use it only for 
one purpose and not the other. Therefore, when there is no real dispute 
as to whether the road authority had notice, and the plaintiff is prepared 
to offer evidence of prior accidents, the road authority might be well 
advised to admit notice of the defect. 
On the question of using the absence of accidents as proof that the 
road authority did not have notice, the cases seem to be in conflict. In 
one, the road authority tried to ask a witness whether he knew of any 
prior injuries at the accident site; the court held that the testimony was 
not admissible (63). A later case, however, said that the absence of 
accidents at a site tended to show that the road authority did not have 
notice of any defect there (64). While the admissibility of the lack of 
accidents is not clear, it is clear that evidence of periodic maintenance 
and prompt repair of defects is admissible to prove lack of notice (65). 
When the defect alleged is flooding on a highway, the rule is that a 
road authority must take into account the ordinary flow of water. Thus, 
a road authority is not liable for unusual floods, but is considered to have 
notice of ordinary seasonal flooding (66). 
When the plaintiff attempts to satisfy the notice requirement by  
showing that the defect has existed for more than thirty days, public 
knowledge becomes important. In this regard, the testimony of citizens 
and police officers as to the length of time the defect has existed is 
important (67). 
It is not necessary to show that a defect existed for thirty days. In 
one case where a large tree limb had fallen across a road, the court held 
that  two days were sufficient for the road authority to learn of the 
defect and take action to correct it (68). In another case, a barricade at  
a construct ion s i t e  had been knocked down ten minutes before the 
plaintiff drove into the excavation. The court in that case considered 
notice of the excavation to be sufficient notice, treating the sufficiency 
of the barricade as a separate question (69). 
When the alleged defect is one of design, it might be argued that the 
plaintiff should not have to show that the road authority had notice of 
the defect, since the authority itself created it. This in fact was the 
rule until fairly recently (70). The rule today, however, is that notice 
must be proven in all cases (71). When a plaintiff proves notice of a 
design defect, he will do so by using the road authority's design plans and 
construction records, so that the new rule does not impose any significant 
burden on the plaintiff. 
Summary 
The requirement that a road authority have actual or constructive 
notice of a defect and a reasonable time to repair it is a significant 
limitation on a road authority's liability. However, it is not a defense 
that often succeeds in stopping a lawsuit short of trial; instead, it is 
usually a question of fact to be decided by a jury based on the evidence 
presented in the case. A road authority will not be found to have notice 
merely because it failed to carry out routine inspections of its roads; only 
when it has reason to believe there is a defect at some location must it 
inspect. In general, the knowledge of any road authority employee will 
be considered notice to the road authority; the knowledge of a contractor 
(whether it is a private company or another road authority) will also be 
attributed to the road authority. Whether the road authority is found to 
have notice in any particular case will be decided on the basis of the 
facts of that case. Factors that have been considered in making this 
decision are the presence or absence of prior accidents, whether the 
defect is caused by seasonal occurrences (such as flooding), the knowledge 
of the community as to how long the condition has existed, and whether 
the defect is contained in the road authority's own plans or construction 
records. 
A RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AS A DEFENSE 
In appropriate cases, a road authority with a risk management program 
might try to use that program as a defense at trial. While it would not 
be an absolute legal defense, a risk management program--or, more 
spec i f ica l ly ,  a road management procedure that  is part of the 
program-could be persuasive if explained to the jury. If, for example, a 
defective condition has arisen despite the road authority's best efforts in 
carrying out a well-organized road inspection and maintenance program, 
the road authority might want the jury to consider its program in 
deciding whether it was at fault. The argument, in essence, would be 
that the authority was making the best use of its limited resources and 
therefore should not be liable for an individual undetected defect. In a 
simpler form, this defense could take the form of a simple argument that 
the road authority lacked the funds or the staff to correct the defect. 
Road authorities have tried to raise this defense several times in 
Michigan, but they have not been successful. It was first raised in 1881 
in a case involving an injury caused by a hole in a street. The defendent 
city argued that it had only two street commissioners and that they 
'tcould not possibly supervise the streets of so large a city." The court 
replied that this argument was ". . . inadmissible. The statute having 
reposed the duty of repair and the liability for neglect, the city at its 
peril must do whatever is needful to protect itself against actions for 
injuryn (72). 
When the lack-of-funds defense was next raised, it was also rejected. 
The case arose out of an injury caused by a hole in a wooden sidewalk. 
The defendant village in that case argued that it had only been in 
existence for fifteen months and lacked the means to cure the defect. 
The court noted that the defendant did in fact have the means to correct 
the defect, and went on to say that the duty to keep i t s  sidewalks 
reasonably safe was "an imperative one. It involves the duty of providing 
all that is necessary to that end, including . . . a 'full complement of 
officers and employees,' as well as the necessary funds for that purpose." 
( 7 3 )  
The defense was raised again in  1965, in a case arising out of an 
injury to a pedestrian caused by a chuckhole. The defendant in that case 
did not plead lack of funds, but instead tried to show "the procedures 
followed in routine maintenance of its streets, the number and size of its 
s t ree t s  and s t ree t  repair crews, and in general, the problems of 
- 
maintenance and construction in the streets while attempting to keep the 
same in a condition reasonably safe and fit for public travel." The court 
said that this evidence was properly excluded because it was not relevant 
to the factual issue of the condition of the road. (74) 
In the most recent case, when the lack-of-funds defense was raised, it 
met the same fate. The court of appeals quoted the  t r ia l  judge's 
statement that the law "imposes a duty on the road commission to keep 
all roads in reasonable repair and that duty is in no way altered by the 
way in which the road commission spends its allocated fundsn (75). 
It appears from these cases that neither a simple lack-of-funds 
argument or a more sophisticated ''reasonable allocation of resources" 
argument would be accepted by the Michigan courts as a defense based 
on the reasonableness of the road authority's actions (76). The decision 
to reject the defense in each of the cases rested ultimately on the  
language of the statute. The statute requires that the road authority 
maintain a condition (reasonably safe roads); this is different from the 
usual negligence concept, which inquires into the defendant's conduct to 
determine whether it was reasonable (77). If the test were whether the 
road authori ty used reasonable ca re ,  then a defense based on a 
well-organized system for allocation of resources would more Iikely be 
accepted. However, as long as the statute bases liability on the condition 
of the road, neither a lack-of-funds nor an allocation-of-r esources defense 
is likely to  be accepted. Still, as noted earlier, one of the prime 
components of a risk management program-a road inspection system--can 
be used to support the lack-of-notice defense. 
STATE OF THE ART 
When a road authority is sued for an alleged design defect, it might 
raise a state-of-the-art defense. This defense can take any of three 
forms. First, the road authority might argue that the road complied with 
all of the engineering design standards of the time it was built and 
therefore the road should be considered reasonably safe even if it does 
not meet current design standards. Second, the road authority might 
argue tha t  a road tha t  meets  current  design standards should be 
considered reasonably safe as a matter of law. Finally, a road authority 
might want to have the jury consider whether the road was in as good a 
condition as other roads in the area. 
The defense that a road complied with design standards when it was 
built is recognized in a number of states. It is strongest in  New Jersey, 
where a statute provides immunity for any lfplan or design" prepared by 
any employee with discretionary authority. This immunity continues to 
apply even when changed conditions subsequently make the road, as 
originally designed, unsafe (78). 
A less extensive version of the state-of-the-art defense is recognized 
in California and New York. In New York, the courts have developed the 
rule that design immunity does protect the initial plan or design (absent a 
showing that the plan was evolved without adequate study or lacked 
reasonable basis) (79), but that the state has a "continuing duty to review 
its plan in the light of its actual operationtf (80). 
In California, design immunity is statutory (81) and, as in New Jersey, 
extends to any plan or design prepared by an employee exercising 
discretionary authority. However, in California the court has followed the 
lead of the New York courts and held that "design immunity persists only 
so long as conditions have not changed." (82) Both California and New 
York provide that the state loses its design immunity when it has notice 
that the plan or design has created a dangerous condition (83). 
In these states, the doctrine of design immunity offers considerable 
protection to the road authority. In New Jersey it even goes beyond a 
state-of-the-art defense, because immunity is based on the fact that 
designing a road is a discretionary activity; whether that design complies 
with any objective standards is irrelevant. In New York, the scope of 
immunity is not as great but is still considerable. 
The law in these states illustrates how the law might have developed 
in Michigan, but it does not express the law as it has in fact developed, 
Road liability is based on statutory law, and the statutes of each state 
largely determine the shape that liability will take. Courts, in the course 
of applying a s ta tu te ,  may by their interpretat ions make a few 
modifications in  it, but the statute itself remains the ultimate authority. 
In the s tates  discussed above, the state-of-the-art defense, in the form of 
design immunity, is created by statute. In Michigan, the statutory basis 
of road liability is quite different. Michigan's road liability statutes 
establish a broad and continuing duty to provide reasonably safe roads. In 
virtually every case, the question will be whether a road was in fact 
reasonably safe. 
A t  a minimum,  Michigan 's  road  l iabi l ty  s t a t u t e s  e l iminate  
?'state-of-the-art1' as an absolute defense in the form of design immunity. 
Not long af ter  the current statutory basis for liability was created, the 
question of design immunity was raised. The court rejected the concept, 
saying that a road authority 
. . , cannot construct a dangerous and unsafe road,-one not 
safe and convenient for public travel,-and shield itself behind 
its legislative powers to adopt a plan and method of building 
(84) 
Therefore, a court will not rule that, as a matter of law, a road was 
reasonably safe because it complied with design standards. It will leave 
that question for the jury to decide, Compliance with neither the current 
nor a past state of the art will ensure freedom from liability. 
If s t a t e  of the art  is not an absolute defense, it still can be an 
important factual defense. That is, it could be very helpful in persuading 
the jury that a road was, as a matter of fact, reasonably safe. Different 
types of evidence might be used in this kind of state-of-the-art defense. 
A road authority might, for example, try to show that other roads are in 
similar or worse condition or that its practices are those in general use 
by other commissions. The road authority might also try to show that a 
road was designed in accordance with generally accepted engineering 
standards. 
I t  is c lear  tha t  a road author i ty  cannot base a defense on a 
comparison of the road in question to other roads. In one case, a city 
that had been sued for an injury caused by a hole in the road tried to 
show that similar defects were permitted to continue for a considerable 
time without attention from the public authorities. The court described 
this evidence as flwholly immaterialT' (85). In another case, also involving 
a city street, the city tried to show that the street was no worse than a 
country road. The court rejected the evidence, saying that '?the fact that 
a country road was not kept in reasonable repair would in no way excuse 
a city for its neglect to keep its streets in such a conditiont1 (86). The 
rule was also followed in a case where the claimed defect was the 
absence of a guardrail. The defendant tried to introduce evidence as to 
"the custom and usage generally as to placingtt guardrails. The court said 
that the statutory duty was plain, and whether other municipalities 
complied with it  was not relevant (87). In another case the road 
authority tried to introduce evidence of the usual plans and customs 
employed in constructing roads on fills. The court said that the question 
was not whether the road was built llin accordance with the prevailing 
custom in  vogue in that vicinity, but whether it was . . . reasonably safe 
and fit for public travelt1 (88). 
The court's rejection of evidence of local custom and practice should 
not be taken as indicating that engineering standards cannot be used. 
The cases discussed above arose before highway and traffic engineering 
had become separate disciplines. A more recent case treated the road 
au t horityls compliance with the standards in the Michigan Manual of 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices as proof of care (89). Because the 
manual is adopted under statutory authority, the law provides that failure 
to comply with it is evidence of negligence (go ) ,  but there  is no 
corresponding rule that compliance with a regulation is proof of care. It 
is because the manual expresses engineering standards that compliance is 
proof of care. Similarly, other engineering data and standards should be 
admissible. The ultimate question--whether the road was reasonably 
safe--will almost always be decided by the jury, but evidence of facts 
such as the strength of a guardrail or the coefficient of friction of a 
road is relevant to that decision and therefore admissible (91). Therefore, 
evidence as to whether a design complies with current engineering 
standards should also be admissible. 
Summary 
The st  at e-of-the-art defense can take several forms. In its strongest 
form, i t  would provide immunity from liability for a road t h a t  met 
ordinary design standards when it was built, even if it is no longer safe 
by current standards or under current conditions. This rule is recognized 
in a few states, but not in Michigan. The state-of-the-art defense can 
also provide immunity from liability for a road that meets current design 
standards. This rule also does not apply in Michigan. In Michigan the 
test is always whether the road was reasonably safe, and that will almost 
always be a question of fact for the jury, so that state-of-the-art 
arguments will be arguments of fact. Evidence as to the condition of 
other roads or the custom of other road authorities has been held not to 
be admissible. However, engineering facts and engineering standards do 
tend to establish the  reasonable safety of the road, and should be 
admissible. 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN MICHIGAN 
Introduction 
In the case of Placek v. City Sterling Heights, decided February 8, 
1979 (92), the Supreme Court of Michigan changed the law of negligence 
by replacing the doctrine of contributory negligence with the doctrine of 
comparative negligence. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence a 
court could completely deny recovery to someone injured by another's 
negligence when the injured person was also negligent. Under the new 
doctrine of comparative negligence, however, an injured person's own 
negligence will only reduce his recovery, not bar it completely. 
Negl igence  
Both contributory and comparative negligence are based on the broader 
concept of negligence. Negligence involves the general duty to  use 
reasonable care to avoid causing harm to a person or to property. This 
duty arises whenever it is foreseeable that  one's conduct poses an 
unreasonable risk of injury to another (93). When injury is foreseeable 
and a person nevertheless fails to use reasonable care, he is negligent and 
is responsible to pay damages to the person who is injured. This concept 
is a very broad one; it is applied in specific cases by the jury, which 
decides on the facts of each case whether the defendant exercised 
reasonable care. 
Contributory Negligence 
The concept of negligence extends not only to the defendant in a 
lawsuit, but to a plaintiff as well. Just as a defendant can have a duty 
to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury to a plaintiff, the plaintiff 
himself has a duty to exercise reasonable care for his own safety (94). 
The plaintiff's failure to exercise this care is contributory negligence. 
The traditional rule (and, until -9 Placek the rule in Michigan) was that 
a plaintiff who was negligent could not recover any damages from the 
defendant. Even if it was clear that the defendant's negligence was much 
greater  than the plaintiff's negligence, the defendant still was not 
required to pay any damages to the plaintiff. 
This rule was often criticized as being too harsh, and therefore unjust 
(95). It was also long suspected that juries simply ignored the theory of 
contributory negligence as a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery, and 
made their own rough apportionment of fault between the parties (96). 
The judges also had the same dissatisfaction with the harshness of the 
contributory negligence rule. One way the courts mitigated the harshness 
of contributory negligence was by creating an exception to it: the 
doctrine of "last clear chance." This doctrine was used to permit an 
injured plaintiff to recover even when he was negligent. It applied when 
the plaintiff3 negligence had ceased to operate, or had "come to rest" 
(97). For example, the plaintiff might have been negligent in a way that 
caused his car to become disabled on a highway (e.g., had run out of 
gas). If the defendant drives on that highway negligently and collides 
with the plaintiff's car, he will be responsible even though the plaintiff 
was also negligent; the theory is that he had the last clear chance to 
avoid the collision (98). The rationale of the last clear chance rule was 
that the plaintiff's negligence had ended and therefore did not cause the 
injury. The practical effect of the rule was to avoid the harshness of 
the contributory negligence rule. 
The last clear chance rule illustrates both the dissatisfaction with 
contributory negligence and the difficulty of attempting to mitigate its 
harshness. While las t  c lear  chance does reduce the harshness of 
contributory negligence, it does so only in a small minority of cases: 
those in which the plaintiff's negligence has come to rest. In addition, 
the last clear chance rule is itself is as harsh as the rule i t  modifies. It 
requires  tha t  the  defendant pay the fu l l  amount of the plaintiff's 
damages, even when the plaintiff's own negligence in fact caused some of 
them. Yet it has survived simply because it offered a way to avoid the 
effects of contributory negligence (99). 
Comparative Negligence 
Comparative negligence is not a new concept. It has long existed in 
other areas of the law (loo), and is now in general use in negligence 
cases in a majority of s t a t e s  (101). In most of the states where 
comparative negligence is the law, it was adopted by the legislature (102). 
Only three states besides Michigan have adopted it by court decision (103). 
The rule of comparative negligence, as adopted by the  Michigan 
Supreme Court in the - Placek case, requires that the plaintiff's recovery in 
a negligence case be reduced in proportion to his own negligence (104). 
Thus, where both plaintiff and defendant are at fault, the plaintiff will 
not be barred from recovery, but he will receive less than to ta l  
compensation. 
The mechanism to be used by the jury is a simple one. It is required 
to decide the amount of the plaintiff's damages and the  amount of 
plaint if fls negligence (expressed as a percentage) and reduce the plaintiff's 
recovery by that percent. Thus, a plaintiff who is 20% negligent will 
receive 80% of his damages. Although this formula is simple to state, its 
application is not as precise as it may appear. The law does not provide 
any guidelines for jurors to assess percentages of fault. It is not possible 
to predict whether a jury will find a plaintiff in a particular case to be 
20% at fault or 25% at fault. 
Effect of Comparative Negligence on Other Rules of  Law 
The Placek decision adopts the rule of comparative negligence in 
Michigan, but it does not go beyond that. Questions that may arise when 
comparative negligence is put into practice are left by the Supreme Court 
to be decided as they arise. One of the rules that may be affected by 
the adoption of comparative negligence is the last clear chance rule. As 
discussed above, last clear chance was used to permit recovery to a 
plaintiff who would otherwise be denied compensation by the rules of 
contributory negligence. Under comparative negligence, a defendant might 
argue that the last clear chance rule should not be permitted to exclude 
the plaintiff's negligence from the jury's consideration. 
A Michigan court faced with this question could hold that the last 
clear chance rule still applied. The theory of last clear chance is that 
the plaintiff9 negligence had "ceased to operatev and therefore was not a 
"proximate causev of his injuries. The theory that the plaintiff's 
negligence did not cause his injuries could be applied in a comparative 
negligence system; the result would be that the plaintiff's negligence 
would not be considered and his damages would not be reduced. 
Retaining last clear chance would be to the plaintiff's advantage. 
On the other hand, the court might consider that approach to be too 
mechanical and to miss the point of comparative negligence. It might 
say that the fundamental purpose of the last clear chance rule was to 
reduce the harshness of the contributory negligence rule, and that the 
abolition of contributory negligence therefore eliminated the need for the 
last clear chance rule. The result of this view would be that the jury 
would be asked to consider the plaintiff's contributory negligence and 
reduce his award by an appropriate amount. 
It is not possible to predict with certainty what decision a Michigan 
court will make, but the elimination of last clear chance appears more 
consistent with the theory of comparative negligence. The states with 
comparative negligence systems like Michigan's have taken this approach 
(105). Thus, it appears likely that the doctrine of last clear chance will 
no longer play a part in the Michigan law of negligence. 
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In addition to changes in legal doctrine, such as last clear chance, 
comparative negligence may also change the type of conduct that is 
considered negligent. For example, the law in Michigan clearly holds that 
the failure of an injured plaintiff to wear a seat  belt cannot be 
considered as negligence (106). However, in two states that have 
comparative negligence, the failure to wear a seat belt can be considered 
by the jury as negligence, which would increase the plaintiff's percent of 
fault (107). It is possible that the Michigan courts might take this 
approach, so that the failure to wear seat belts-or other conduct which 
is not at present considered negligent-might become a factor to be 
considered in determining relative degrees of fault. 
Apportionment of Damages 
The operation of comparative negligence is simple enough in the case 
of one plaintiff and one defendant; the reduction requirements are applied 
to the plaintiff's award and the defendant pays that reduced amount. If, 
however, the plaintiff sues two or more ,defendants and wins, the  
defendants may ask how the payment should be shared among them and 
what effect, if any, copparative negligence.has on the amounts they have 
to pay individually. 
When a plaintiff is injured by the negligence of two or more 
defendants, the rule has long been that he can collect the entire award 
from any one of them. There is a mechanism for allocating the burden 
of paying the award among the defendants, but from the plaintiff's point 
of view, each defendant is responsible for the entire amount (108). This 
method of collecting the award is known as joint and several liability. 
The Placek decision does not discuss the question of collection from 
multiple defendants, but the question is likely to arise. A defendant who 
is asked to pay the entire award, for example, may argue that he should 
be responsible to pay only as much of the award as was due to his own 
negligence. This could be accomplished by determining both the plaintiff's 
fault and the fault of each defendant; the court could then calculate the 
amount owed by each defendant and the plaintiff could collect that 
amount from each (109). 
From the plaintiff's point of view, this approach would be somewhat 
more complicated, but usually not much different from collecting all of 
the award from a single defendant. However, if one defendant turns out 
to be ltuncollectiblew (unable to pay the judgment), the difference becomes 
major. At present, since the rule of joint and several liability permits the 
plaintiff to collect all of his award from any one defendant, the burden 
of an uncollectible defendant falls on the other defendants. If 
comparative negligence is interpreted to mean that each defendant is only 
liable for the damage caused by his own negligence, then the burden of 
an uncollectible defendant would fall on the plaintiff, who would be 
unable to collect part of his award. Note that there is no "fair" solution 
to this problem; the burden of the uncollectible defendant must fall either 
on the plaintiff or on the other defendants. 
As yet, there are no cases in Michigan discussing this  question. 
However, except where a statute specifically abolishes joint and several 
liability, all states considering the matter have retained it ,  including two 
of the three states with systems similar to Michigan's. Also most states 
considering the issue in recent times have retained the rule that the 
plaintiff can collect his entire award from any one defendant (ll0). It is 
therefore likely that Michigan courts will do the same. 
A similar question arises in the case of a "missing defendant." Often 
someone who is in fact responsible for a portion of the plaintiff's injuries 
is not a defendant in the lawsuit. There are several reasons why this 
might happen. Sometimes the person responsible cannot be sued; for 
example, an employee is prohibited from suing his employer for injuries 
suffered during the course of his employment. In other cases, the time 
limit within which a lawsuit must be filed may have expired as to one 
defendant. For whatever reason, the "missing defendant" is not a 
defendant a t  all, even though he is in fact responsible for part of 
plaint if Ps dam ages. 
As i n  the case of the uncollectible defendant, the defendants who are 
being sued might argue that the negligence of the absent person should be 
determined along with theirs,  and that  each defendant should be 
responsible only for the damages caused by his own negligence. Without 
joint and several liability, this approach would mean that the plaintiff 
would lose the portion of the award attributable to the absent person just 
as if he were uncollectible. 
There is a wide variation among the states on the question of 
considering the negligence of the "missing defendant." Some completely 
exclude consideration of his negligence, some freely permit it, and some 
permit it in certain circumstances (111). However, the leading cases 
permit the defendants to "point the fingern at an absent person, but 
retain the rule of joint and several liability (ll2). Thus, the plaintiff can 
s t i l l  collect all of his award and the missing defendant becomes a 
problem only for the defendants, as they are left  to allocate the absent 
person's share among themselves. 
Contribution Among Defendants 
The purpose of the rule that the plaintiff can collect all of his award 
from any one defendant is to ensure that the plaintiff receives all of the 
compensation to which he is entitled. The defendant who has paid the 
award is not, however, required to bear the loss alone. The law provides 
that, after he has paid the judgment, he can require the other defendants 
to make pro-rata tlcontributionsll to him, so that all defendants bear the 
loss equally (ll3). Thus, if there were three defendants, the one who paid 
the judgment could require each of the other two defendants to pay 
one-third. 
The Placek decision does not discuss the question of contribution 
among co-defendants, but the question is certain to arise. In a case with 
three defendants, a defendant whose negligence was found to be 10% will 
object to being required to pay one-third of a judgment. He will argue 
that, even if the plaintiff can collect all of his damages from any one 
defendant, among the defendants themselves the burden of the award 
should be based on their relative percentages of negligence. This 
argument is strong since it is a logical application of comparative 
negligence and has no adverse effect on the plaintiff. 
Again the states take differing approaches to this issue, but the  
majority, including California and New York, permit each defendant to 
collect contribution for the amount paid above his percent of fault, so 
that a defendant whose negligence is 10% need not pay one-third of a 
judgment (114). In Michigan, however, the rule requiring pro-rata sharing 
of the plaintiff's award is expressed in a s t a tu t e  which forbids 
consideration of percentages of fault (US). Unless this statute is amended 
or repealed the courts must continue to apply strict pro-rata contribution 
(US). 
The question of the effect of comparative negligence on the plaintiff's 
ability to collect his judgment when one defendant is missing or absent, 
and on the apportionment of damages among defendants, will be answered 
as the appropriate cases arise in the future. The last clear chance rule 
may also be reconsidered, and the courts may also begin to consider some 
conduct--such as failure to wear seat belts--as negligent. Any changes 
that come about in these areas wi l l  be in the nature of adjustments to 
the law to make it more compatible with comparative negligence. 
The changes may have a significant effect on the dollar amount of a 
road authority's liability in specific lawsuits. The question of the basis 
for contribution among co-defendants illustrates this. If the court adopts 
a system of apportionment of damages among defendants on the basis of 
fault, instead of the present pro-rata system, this wi l l  reduce a road 
authority's liability in some cases and increase it in others. If the  
authority is less negligent than i t s  co-defendant, it would prefer 
apportionment by fault; if it is more negligent, it would prefer a pro-rata 
system. While the results in each case will vary, a road authority's 
liability on the whole is likely to be much the same as before. 
Practical Effects of Comparative Negligence 
The last clear chance rule and the questions arising i n  multiple 
defendant cases illustrate some areas in which legal theories may be 
changed because of comparative negligence. But comparative negligence 
will also have some practical effects on the handling of negligence cases. 
Some of these are: 
Change i n  Emphasis - The prior law of contributory 
negligence encouraged arguments tending to show tot a1 
guilt and total innocence, Comparative negligence is likely 
to encourage each party to argue that relatively higher 
degrees of fault should be assigned to the opposing party 
and lesser degrees of fault should be assigned to h i m .  
Therefore, evidence showing the relative amounts of fault 
may become more important under comparative negligence 
than under contributory negligence. 
Admissions - Some parties may feel that they will appear 
more truthful before the jury by admitting to slight fault 
rather than insisting on total innocence. The adoption of 
comparative negligence may therefore prompt admissions of 
some degree of fault that would not have been made under 
the prior law. 
Increased Value of Small Claims - If Michigan juries tend 
to assign slight fault rather than no fault, more claims 
will be worth at least something. Therefore, claims of 
small value may be more frequently raised and seriously 
pursued than would have been so under the prior law. 
Reduction of Large Claims - It is commonly thought that 
juries are swayed by sympathy for the injured plaintiff and 
are therefore reluctant to find contributory negligence 
when it completely bars recovery. Comparative negligence 
may alter this pattern by permitting the jury to make a 
discount for the plaintiff's misconduct but still permitting 
some compensation for injuries. The more sizable claims 
would thus be reduced. This development would, of 
course, benefit defendants. 
Facility of Sett lement - Comparative negligence may 
facilitate more freauent settlement bv directing attention 
to the percentages of fault of thewparties rafher than to 
the strength or weakness of the defense of contributory 
negligence. Litigators are often able to reach agreement 
early on with respect to the presence or absence of 
liability. Since comparative negligence will permit them 
to consider relative degrees of fault they may now also 
agree more easily on damages. These developments would 
lead to more frequent and more rapid settlement. 
Proving Negligence of Co-Defendants - If comparative 
negligence results in a change in the rules of contribution 
among co-defendants to permit contribution on the basis of 
fault rat her than pro-rata, defendants will devote more 
energy than at present to proving the degree of fault of 
their co-defendants. This is particularly true of a 
defendant,  like a road authority, which is a l1targetl1 
defendant, especially where its negligence is less than that 
of its co-defendants. 
Like the changes in legal theories related to negligence, these changes 
in litigation practice are not major. They are changes in emphasis rather 
than fundamental changes in approach. As the relative degree of fault 
becomes more important than the presence or absence of fault ,  the  
practical aspects of negligence litigation are similarly modified. This may 
have a significant effect on specific cases. For example, the value of 
small claims is likely to increase somewhat. On the other hand, it is 
equally likely that the value of large claims will decrease somewhat. 
Therefore, on the average, a road authority, like other defendants, 
probably will be in much the same position after comparative negligence 
as before. 
Conclusion 
The adoption of comparative negligence brings about a significant 
change in the law of negligence. An injured person's negligence no longer 
will completely bar his recovery of damages. Instead, it will reduce his 
recovery proportionately. 
The change from contributory negligence to comparative negligence 
may also bring about changes in other l e g a l  theories related to  
negligence. For example, the rule of last clear chance may be eliminated 
and defendants may share a judgment based on their respective degrees of 
fault rather than a strict pro-rata system. 
In addition, conduct that is presently considered not to be negligent 
may be treated as negligence, since it will only reduce, and not bar the 
plaintiff's recovery, It is likely, therefore, that comparative negligence 
will permit a road authority to raise matters in defense or mitigation of 
fault that were not previously allowed. A plaintiff's failure to wear seat 
belts has been noted as one such possible factor, and other similar 
''human factorstt should also be considered. Since the findings of studies 
of accident causation indicate that human factors are causally involved in 
nearly 93 percent of traffic crashes, as compared to 33.8  percent for 
environmental factors and 12.6 percent for vehicle factors,  the 
identification of such factors for use in defending against claims will be 
more important for defendants (ll7). 
In addition to possible changes in legal theory, comparative negligence 
may bring changes in present litigation practice. The value of small 
claims will likely be increased and the value of large claims reduced. 
The emphasis in trials will likely change from proving the comple te  
absence of fault to showing differing degrees of fault. 
Although comparative negligence is a s ignif icant  change from 
contributory negligence, it is nevertheless a change within the fault 
system, not a change of the system itself. Fault will continue to be the 
basis of the system and proving fault remains the central purpose of 
negligence litigation. Conduct that was negligent before comparative 
negligence continues to be negligent, and the evidence used to prove 
negligence remains largely the same. In individual cases the changes 
brought about by comparative negligence may have a significant effect on 
a road authority's liability, but on the whole its liability is substantially 
unchanged. 
THE NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW 
Introduction 
Michigan's no-fault automobile insurance law (No-Fault) made 
substantial changes in the way persons involved in automobile crashes are 
compensated for injuries and for damage to their property. Under 
No-Fault the litigation system, in which compensation depends on fault, is 
replaced by a system in which an injured person receives insurance 
benefits without regard to fault. 
The General Highway Law and the Governmental Immunity Law (road 
liability laws) both provide that road authorities are responsible for 
injuries caused by their fault in failing to provide safe roads. 
When the No-Fault law and the road liability laws intersect, that is, 
where a defective road causes a crash which results in damage to a car 
or injury to its occupants, (and where the No-Fault law would otherwise 
apply),  a road authori ty might argue that the No-Fault law takes 
precedence and in effect negates its liability under the road liability laws. 
To assess the strength of this argument, it is necessary to begin with a 
discussion of the No-Fault law in general. 
The No-Fault Law 
The law has traditionally determined responsibility for injuries in a 
traffic crash on the basis of fault. This was expressed in the concept of 
negligence, the failure to use ordinary care in the situation in which the 
accident occurred. Thus, to receive compensation, the injured party was 
required to prove that the other driver had been careless. However, the 
other driver, even if he was negligent, could avoid paying the injured 
party by showing that the injured party was also negligent (ll). In the 
case of a road authority, fault is determined with respect to its statutory 
duty to maintain reasonably safe roads. The concern with establishing 
fault often led to numerous and long trials and was thought to be a 
major cause of court congestion. The result was that a legitimate claim 
for a large amount of money, where the injuries were severe, was likely 
to be settled for less than it was worth, because of the injured party 
needed the money. On the other hand, a small claim could often be 
se t t led  for more than it  was worth because it was cheaper for a 
defendant to settle it than to pay to defent it. 
Dissatisfaction with the operation of the negligence system led to the 
passage of the No-Fault law in 1972. This law has been upheld by the 
Michigan Supreme Court (119). Because the No-Fault law is fairly recent 
and complex, it will be described relatively completely in the rest of this 
section. In general, it can be said that No-Fault changed the focus of 
the injury compensation system. Before No-Fault, the focus was on the 
personal fault of the driver. After No-Fault, it is on the insurer of the 
vehicle. 
The No-Fault law eliminated liability for negligence and replaced it 
with insurance benefits available from the injured person's own insurer. 
There are two important exceptions to this rule. Liability for negligence 
is retained where (a) the damages for economic loss (wages, expenses, 
etc.) exceed the amounts paid for these losses under the insurance, or (b) 
the injured person suffers "death, serious impairment of body function or 
permanent serious disfigurementv (120). These exceptions establish a 
threshold. Above the threshold, lawsuits for damages based on fault are 
still permitted. Therefore, it is clear that the No-Fault law is intended, 
not to abolish liability for negligence altogether, but to limit it to the 
more serious cases. It follows that if it does apply to suits against the 
commission, No-Fault will eliminate only the lesser ones, and not those 
where the injuries are serious. 
No-Fault changed the  focus of the compensation system to the 
insurance of one's own vehicle rather than the conduct of the o ther  
driver. Insurance is mandatory under No-Fault. To register a motor 
vehicle in Michigan, its owner must present proof of insurance (or be an 
approved self-insurer) (121). Three types of insurance are required: 
personal injury, property damage, and residual liability. Residual liability 
insurance covers accidents occurring out of state, but more important, it 
covers cases where the driver covered by the policy is a t  fault and the 
injuries are above the threshold. These are the cases where claims 
against the negligent driver are still permitted by No-Fault. Personal 
injury and property damage coverage are discussed below. 
No-Fault's personal injury provisions make the insurers of owners and 
operators of motor vehicles responsible for "economicff losses suffered by 
the occupants of their vehicle (122). Personal injury insurance covers 
these losses. Economic losses include lost wages, loss of support, and 
out-of-pocket expenses. Out-of-pocket expenses include the cost of 
supplies, services, and accommodations during treatment and recovery. 
Lost wages are limited to the first three years after an accident (123). 
As long as a person's injuries are below the No-Fault threshold, he is not 
permitted to sue for damages. But if the .losses exceed the No-Fault 
benefits, or if the injuries involve death, serious impairment of body 
function, or permanent serious disfigurement, then the injured person is 
above the threshold and can sue for damages based on negligence. 
Within the  l imits of No-Fault coverage, however ,  f i n a n c i a l  
responsibility for an accident is on the insurer of the owner or operator 
of the vehicle occupied by the injured person. Thus, the personal injury 
protection carried by the vehicle (i.e., by its owner) applies to all the 
occupants of the vehicle. This protection applies whether the vehicle is 
privately owned or is owned by a company and driven by an employee. 
Therefore, if the owner of the vehicle is driving i t  and he and a 
passenger are injured, they both receive compensation from the owner's 
insurer. If the owner has not insured the vehicle, then the occupants are 
compensated by the insurer of that vehicle's driver (unless, of course, the 
driver is the owner). If neither the owner nor the driver is insured, then 
the occupants look to the insurance on their own vehicles (124). 
No-Fault's property damage provisions make the insurers of owners and 
operators of motor vehicles responsible for the cost of accidental damage 
to physical property "arising out oftt the use of such vehicles in Michigan 
(125). Covered damages include loss of use of property. Responsibility is, 
however, limited to the lesser of repair or depreciated replacement cost. 
The maximum liability of an insurer in any single accident is limited to 
one million dollars. No-Fault property damage benefits will not pay for 
damage to the motor vehicle itself unless, at the time of the accident, it 
was properly parked and was struck by another vehicle (126). Insurance 
for damage to one's own vehicle can be obtained by purchasing a separate 
collision rider, usually with a deductible provision, whereby the insured 
pays a certain amount and the insurer pays the excess. These riders 
typically waive the deductible if the driver was not at fau l t  in the  
accident. However, collision riders are not mandatory under No-Fault. 
They are options available to those who want this protection in exchange 
for addi t ional  premiums. The extent of the collision coverage is a 
contractual matter between the insurance company and the vehicle owner 
and is spelled out in the insurance policy. 
The Effect of the No-Fault Law on Road Authority Liability 
The road liability laws impose liability on a road authority when its 
negligence in constructing or maintaining the high ways causes dam age or 
injury to an automobile or i ts  occupants. On the other hand, the 
No-Fault law abolishes liability for negligence arising out of the use of an 
automobile except where the injuries are serious enough to be above the 
threshold. Thus, these laws appear to be in conflict. This section 
discusses that conflict and possible resolutions of it. 
Two points should be made at the outset. First, even if No-Fault 
does apply to claims by injured persons against road authorities, it does 
not entirely bar them; rather, No-Fault would still permit such claims 
where the claimed injuries are above the threshold (127). Second, an 
authoritative resolution of the conflict between the statutes can only 
come from the legislature itself, or from an interpretation of the statutes 
by the courts. At present, there are no decisions from the Michigan 
courts on this question. Therefore it is necessary to examine the statutes 
themselves, and the legislature's intent in enacting them. 
Read literally and by itself, No-Fault appears to bar suits against road 
authorities for injuries or property damage caused by defective highway 
maintenance, since all such injuries arise out of the use of motor vehicles 
in Michigan. 
The No-Fault law reads in part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability 
arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this 
state of a motor vehicle . . . is abolished [.I 
The Supreme Court has explained the legislature's intent in enacting 
the personal injury portion of the No-Fault law (128). It stated that the 
legislature sought: 
to end the delays in settling claims that were common 
under the negligence system, 
to reduce pressure on injured parties to take less than 
their claims were worth, and 
to lessen the number of motor-vehicle accidents litigated 
in court. 
The court also summarized the purposes of the property damage provisions 
of the No-Fault law. In this regard the legislature sought: 
to create safer cars by keying premium costs to repair 
costs of the insured's car and so promote development of 
more crash-worthy cars, 
to eliminate accident investigations, thereby lowering 
preiums by reducing administrative costs, and 
to make group insurance feasible and so reduce premium 
costs because of its relatively lower administrative costs. 
All of these stated rationales would apply to suits by drivers against a 
road authority, and therefore support the conclusion that No-Fault bars 
suits against road authorities for defective highway maintenance, 
The nature and strength of these purposes must be weighed against the 
purpose of the road liability laws. The purpose of the liability provisions 
in the road liability laws is twofold: to provide an incentive to road 
authorities to be diligent in carrying out their responsibility to provide 
safe roads; and to provide a means for compensating anyone injured by a 
road authority's failure to do so. 
The No-Fault law limits liability for negligence to cases involving 
serious injury. The road liability laws establish liability for negligence 
against road authorities. The purpose of No-Fault is to provide a fairer 
and swifter system of compensation by eliminating the expense and delay 
of litigation. The purpose of the road liability laws is to provide a 
means of compensating persons injured because of defective roads and to 
provide an incentive to road authorities to provide safer roads (129). 
A court that tries to resolve the conflict between these laws will 
likely base its decisions on the intent of the legislature in enacting the 
statutes. In addition to referring to the language used in the acts, the 
court will use some general principles of interpretation which apply 
whenever statutes seem to be in conflict. The following discussion 
describes the reasoning that a court might follow and summarizes the 
results a court might reach. 
There are several reasons that support the conclusion that No-Fault 
bars claims for negligence against a road authority. As was stated above, 
No-Fault's purpose is to c rea te  a fairer compensation system by 
substituting insurance for negligence liability. Since the use of litigation 
t o  d e t e r m i n e  faul t  is as expensive and time-consuming i n  a a 
defective-road case as in any other case, No-Fault's benefits should apply 
in those cases and the road authority should not be liable. 
The very specific language in the No-Fault act also supports this  
conclusion. As stated earlier, the act provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tor t  l iabi l i ty  
arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this 
state of a motor vehicle...is abolished [.I 
These words would appear to include any injury or damage to a 
vehicle caused by the roadway, since the use of the vehicle was a 
factor in the crash. 
Finally, if No-Fault does conflict with the road liability laws, it can 
be argued that it has priority because it is the more recent statute,  and 
when two statutes deal with the same area and are in conflict, the more 
recent one ordinarily takes precedence (130). 
While the arguments in favor of No-Fault's limiting a road authority's 
liability are substantial, there are also substantial arguments for the 
opposite conclusion. 
The first of these is the strength of the policy, underlying the road 
liability statutes, that road authorities be held responsible for damage 
caused by their failure to exercise care in making the roads safe for 
travel. This principle is not a new one. It has been recognized for at  
least a century (131). Its strength is reflected not only in the fact that it 
has continued to exist  for so long b u t  also in tha t  i t  was never 
questioned during a recent dispute between the Michigan Supreme Court 
and the legislature over governmental immunity. The Supreme Court 
twice issued opinions tha t  reduced the  scope of s t a t e  and local 
governmentsf immunity from liability (13 2 ) .  The legis la ture  twice 
responded with statutes that reestablished that immunity (133). However, 
neither of those statutes changed the rule that road authorities were 
responsible for failure to use care in keeping the roads safe, Thus, the 
legislature never contemplated immunity for road authorities. 
Moreover, in a recent case where a road authority attempted to use 
another statute to reduce its general liability to maintain safe roads, the 
Michigan Supreme Court nonetheless found the commission liable. In 
Mullins v. Wayne County (134), the road commission was sued for failure 
to erect a sign indicating the end of a road a t  a T-intersection. The 
commission raised as a defense that its failure to erect a sign was 
justified by the Uniform Traffic Signal Control Statute (135), which gives 
road authorities discretion as to erecting signs. The court rejected that 
argument, stating that a road authority could not use the more lenient 
s tatute  "as a shield to its statutory liability for construction of an unsafe 
road." While the Mullins case does not deal with the effect of the  
No-Fault law, it does illustrate the importance that the court attaches to 
a road authority's statutory obligation to provide safe roads, even where 
another statute apparently reduces that liability. 
Second, if the No-Fault law does limit road authority liability for 
de fec t ive  roads, then No-Fault is, in effect,  a partial repeal of the 
statutes establishing that liability. However, when the legislature enacts 
a s tatute  that repeals or modifies an earlier one, the repealing statute 
generally names the affected statute explicitly. If this were not done, i t  
would become very difficult to tell which laws were currently in force. 
It sometimes happens that a more recent statute will repeal or modify an 
earli er one "by impli~ation.'~ This repeal happens when the application of 
the newer statute necessarily conflicts with the earlier one. Such repeals 
are possible, but it has been held by the courts that: 
Repeals by implication are not favored. The intent to repeal 
must very clearly appear, and courts will not hold to a repeal 
if they can find a reasonable ground to the contrary. (136). 
The principle tha t  the  law does not favor a repeal by 
implication is of especial application in the  case  of an 
important public s tatute  of long standing, which should be 
shown to be repealed either expressly, or by a strong and 
necessary implication. 
A court taking this approach might also rely upon the language in the 
No-Fault act limiting its application to injuries and damage "arising out 
of the . . . use of a motor vehicle." This language could be interpreted 
to mean that only crashes caused by the operation of a vehicle are within 
the scope of No-Fault. When an accident is claimed to be caused by a 
defective highway, it could be said that the accident arose out of the 
defect rather than the operation of the vehicle. 
Finally, a court facing the question of whether the No-Fault law 
limited road authority liability would also consider the relative breadth of 
the laws. The No-Fault law covers the entire field of injuries arising out 
of motor vehicle use. The road liability laws deal with only a part of 
that field, namely injuries caused by defective roads. It is a general rule 
that where two statutes apply to the same situation, but one applies 
specifically while the other applies in general terms which cover other 
situations as well, the more specific statute will take precedence over the 
more general (138). Since the road liability statutes are quite specific, 
this rule would support the conclusion that the No-Fault law does not 
limit a road commissionls liability for defective roads. 
It is clear that arguments can be made for and against the application 
of No-Fault to limit road authority liability. Based on this analysis, there 
appear to be three possible results. 
First, a court might decide that the No-Fault law takes precedence 
over the road liability laws and therefore limits claims against a road 
authority to those permitted by No-Fault. The result of this would be 
that the authority would be liable only where the injuries were above the 
threshold, as defined by the No-Fault law. 
Second, a court might reach the opposite conclusion and hold that the 
No-Fault law does not apply at all where the road authority's failure to 
provide safe roads was the cause of injury. This would mean that an 
injured person would not be covered by No-Fault benefits and that he 
could seek compensation only from the  road author i ty ,  by way of 
litigation, to establish that the authority was at fault. 
There is a third possibility as well. A court could decide that both 
No-Fault and the road liability laws apply. This approach would permit 
an injured person to seek compensation from both the insurer and the 
road authority. 
Because the re  are substantial arguments to support any of these 
decisions, it cannot be stated with certainity which approach a court 
would in fact  take. The next section suggests methods of resolving this 
problem. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The legislative purpose behind the No-Fault law is clear, as is the 
purpose behind the road Liability laws. However, it is not clear which of 
these laws would take precedence if the road authority were to raise the 
No-Fault law as a defense in a suit alleging tha t  i t  was l iable  for  
maintaining defective roads. The No-Fault law seeks to provide fairer 
and swifter compensation for injured persons. It does this by eliminating 
l iab i l i ty  for negligence where the injuries are not serious, thereby 
eliminating the delay and expense of lawsuits to determine fault, On the 
other hand, the road liability laws express a continuing policy of holding 
road authorities liable for all damages caused by their failure to keep the 
roads in good repair and reasonably safe for public use. The relationship 
between these policies can be determined only by a decision of the  
courts, or by the legislature itself. 
There are three possible approaches that might be taken to obtain 
such a resolution: 
A road authority could raise No-Fault as a defense in a 
trial in which it is sued for damages, 
A road author i ty  could bring a declaratory judgment 
action, asking a court specifically to determine the effect 
of No-Fault. 
A road authority could ask the legislature to resolve the 
issue by enacting an amendment clarifying the law. 
Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages that should be 
weighed before deciding on any course of action. 
If a road authority is sued by a person whose damages are below the 
No-Fault threshold or are for property damage only, i t  could ra ise  
No-Fault as a defense in the trial. The trial judge would then be 
required to decide whether No-Fault limits the road authority's liability. 
The trial judge's decision could be appealed to the Michigan Court of 
Appeals and probably to the Michigan Supreme Court. A final ruling 
from the Michigan courts would resolve the issue as to present law. 
However, the legislature could, if it chose to do so, change the law as 
determined by the courts by enacting a new statute to amend No-Fault or 
one of the road liability laws. 
The road authority might also seek a resolution from the courts by 
way of a declaratory judgment action. This is a form of lawsuit, and is 
like the first approach in that it is begun in the trial court and the trial 
judge's decision can be appealed, The result of this approach would also 
be a resolution of the issue under present law, subject to the power of 
the legislature to change the law. There is also a significant difference 
between the declaratory judgment approach and the first approach. A 
declaratory judgment action asks only that the court declare the law in a 
certain area. It is not based on a specific accident or injury, and does 
not ask the court to  determine who was a t  fau l t  and how much 
compensation should be paid. Therefore, the declaratory judgment 
approach would permit the specific question of the effect of No-Fault on 
road authority liability to be raised and decided without considering other 
issues that are part of an ordinary lawsuit. 
An additional advantage of the declaratory judgment approach is that 
it permits the road authority to begin the proceedings at  a time of i ts 
choosing, rather than as part of a defense to a claim brought by someone 
else. 
Both of these approaches offer the opportunity to obtain a specific 
answer to the question raised, since it is difficult for a court to avoid 
answering a question that is properly brought before it. The legislature, 
on the other hand, cannot be required to enact a law. There a re ,  
however, significant advantages to the legislative approach. 
The third way to determine the effect of the No-Fault law on road 
authority liability is to ask the legislature itself to resolve the issue by 
amending one of the acts. This approach has several advantages. First, 
since the question involves the interpretation of statutes enacted by the 
legislature, the legislature itself is the final authority. Its decision, 
expressed in an amendment to one of the statutes, would be binding on 
the courts and would, in effect, overrule an inconsistent court decision. 
Closely related to this is the possibility that any court decision that 
might result from the first two approaches would ultimately be reviewed 
by the legislature, if those who disagreed with the court decision sought a 
statutory amendment to override it. 
Additional advantages are derived from the nature of the legislative 
process. While a court makes its decisions in seclusion after hearing the 
arguments of all parties, the legislature operates more openly in moving a 
bill through the various stages to enactment into law. It is therefore 
possible to discuss proposed legislation with any member of the legislature 
at any time. This can provide two benefits. First, it may be possible to  
determine the legislative sentiment toward a proposed bill before it is 
introduced. Second, it is easier to monitor the prospect of a favorable 
result. 
Considering the relative advantages and disadvantages of the three 
possible approaches, the legislative approach appears to be preferable. 
The legislature is the final authority where the meaning of a statute is in 
question, and the more open nature of the legislative process may make 
it easier to estimate the likelihood of, and to bring about, a favorable 
result. In addition, if the legislature fai led to  a c t ,  the  f i r s t  two 
approaches would still be available. 
Each of the three possible approaches presents the possibility of an 
unfavorable decision as well as a favorable one. In considering whether 
to  seek  a de terminat ion ,  and i f  so,  which course to choose, it is 
necessary to weigh the advantages of each and t h e  probablity of a 
favorable result. Since this weighing process is a matter of judgment, 
any decision should be made only after consul tat ion with the  road 
au thorityls counsel. 
SUMMARY 
A road authority has a broad range of defenses available to it in 
appropriate cases. Some of these defenses (lack of jurisdiction over the 
road, and s tatute  of limitations) are nearly absolute when they apply, but 
they apply only in a small percentage of cases. Other possible defenses 
(s ta te  of the a r t ,  risk management program, and No-Fault insurance law) 
seem not to be of very much use in Michigan. 
The remaining defenses are more directly concerned with the claim 
itself. They deal with the plaintiff's conduct (contributory negligence and 
failure to notify the road authority of the injury) and with the road 
authority's activities (notice of the defect). These are the defenses that 
are most commonly raised. In most cases, these defenses are addressed 
to the jury, which will decide in each case where the responsibility lies. 
In the large majority of cases, therefore, the extent of a road authorit.yfs 
liability w i l l  be determined by a jury as it weighs these defenses and 
considers the underlying question in each case: whether the road was 
reasonably safe. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ROAD AUTHORITY LIABILITY FOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT 
Road authorities are also road users. Whether performing field studies 
and surveys, driving to and from work sites, or working on the road 
itself, road authorities make extensive use of vehicles and equipment. 
This use raises questions of the road authority's liability, not as a road 
authority, but as an owner of vehicles and equipment. A discussion of 
this type of liability must begin with an explanation of the no-fault 
automobile insurance law (No-Fault). 
THE NO-FAULT LAW 
Laws have traditionally determined responsibility for injuries in a 
traffic crash on the basis of fault. This was expressed in the concept of 
negligence, the failure to use ordinary care in the situation in which the 
accident occurred. Thus, the injured party, to receive compensation, was 
required to prove that the other driver had been at  fault. The other 
driver was then personally responsible to compensate the injured person. 
However, the other driver, even if he were negligent, could avoid paying 
the injured party by showing that the injured party was also negligent (1). 
This concern with establishing fault often led to numerous and long trials 
and was thought to be a major cause of court congestion, The result was 
that a legitimate claim for a large amount of money, where the injuries 
were severe, was likely to be settled for less than it was worth, because 
the injured party needed the money. On the other hand, a small claim 
could often be settled for more than it was worth just because it was 
cheaper to settle than to pay to defend it. 
Dissatisfaction with the operation of the negligence system led to the 
passage of the No-Fault law in 1972 (2 ) .  That law has been upheld by 
the Michigan Supreme Court (3 ) .  Because the No-Fault law is fairly 
recent and complex, it will be described relatively completely in the rest 
of this section. 
In general, it can be said that No-Fault changed the focus of the 
injury compensation system. Before No-Fault, the focus was on the  
personal faul t  of the driver. After No-Fault it is on the insurance 
maintained by the vehicle's owner. 
The No-Fault law eliminated liability for negligence and replaced it 
with insurance benefits available from the injured person's own insurer (4).  
There are two important exceptions to this rule. Liability for negligence 
is retained where (a) the damages for economic loss (wages, expenses, 
etc.) exceed the amounts paid for these losses under the insurance, and 
where (b) the injured person suffers "death, serious impairment of body 
function or permanent serious disfigurementl1 ( 5 ) .  These exceptions 
establish a threshold. Below the threshold, liability for negligence is 
abolished. Above the threshold, lawsuits for damages based on fault are 
still permitted. Therefore, it is clear that the No-Fault law is intended, 
not to abolish liability for negligence altogether, but to limit it to the 
more serious cases. It follows that if it does apply to suits against a 
commission, No-Fault will eliminate only the lesser ones, not those where 
the injuries are greater. 
No-Fault changed the focus of the compensation system from the 
drivers1 conduct to the vehicle's insurance. Insurance is mandatory under 
No-Fault. To register a motor vehicle in Michigan, its owner must 
present proof of insurance (or be an approved self-insurer) (6). Three 
types of insurance are required: personal injury, property damage, and 
residual liability. Collision insurance, that is, insurance for damage to 
one's own vehicle, is not required. Residual liability insurance covers 
accidents occurring out of state,  but more important, it covers cases 
where the driver covered by the policy is a t  fault and the injuries are 
above the threshold. These are the cases where claims against  the  
negligent driver are still permitted by No-Fault. Personal injury and 
property damage coverage are discussed below. 
No-Fault's personal injury provisions make the insurers of owners and 
operators of motor vehicles responsible for economic losses suffered by 
the occupants of their vehicle (7). Economic losses include out-of-pocket 
expenses, lost wages, and loss or support. Out-of pocket expenses include 
the cost of supplies, services and accomodations during treatment and 
recovery.  Lost wages are limited to the first three years after an 
accident (8). 
As long as a person's injuries are below the No-Fault threshold, he is 
not permitted to sue for damages. But if the losses exceed the No-Fault 
benefits, or if the injuries involve death, serious impairment of body 
function, or permanent serious disfigurement, then the injured person is 
above the threshold and can sue for damages based on negligence. 
Within the threshold limits of No-Fault coverage,  however, t he  
financial responsibility for an accident is on the insurer of the owner or 
operator of the vehicle occupied by the injured person. This personal 
injury protection carried by the vehicle (i.e., by its owner) applies to all 
the occupants of the vehicle. This coverage applies whether the vehicle 
is privately owned or owned by a company and driven by an employee. 
Therefore, if the owner of the vehicle is driving i t  and he and a 
passenger are injured, they both receive compensation from the owner's 
insurer. If the owner has not insured the vehicle then the occupants are  
compensated by the driver's insurer (unless, of course, the driver is the 
owner). If neither the owner nor the  driver is insured, then the  
occupants look to the insurance on their own vehicles (9). 
No-Fault's property damage provisions make the insurers of owners and 
operators of motor vehicles responsible for the cost of accidental damage 
to physical property arising out of the use of property. Responsibility is, 
however limited to the lesser of repair or depreciated replacement cost. 
The maximum liability of an insurer in any single accident is limited to 
one million dollars. No-Fault benefits will not pay for damage to the 
motor vehicle itself unless, at the time of the accident, it was properly 
parked and was struck by another vehicle (ll). Insurance for damage to 
one's own vehicle can be obtained by purchasing a separate "collision 
rider," usually with a deductible provision, whereby the insured pays a 
certain amount and the insurer pays the excess. These riders typically 
waive the deductible if the driver was not a t  fault in the accident. 
However, collision riders are not mandatory under No-Fault. They are 
options available to persons who want this protection in exchange for 
additional premiums. The extent of this coverage is a contractual matter 
between the insurance company and the vehicle owner and is spelled out 
in the provisions of the policy. 
REGISTERED ROAD AUTHORITY VEHICLES 
Some road authority vehicles are registered for use on the highways. 
As to these vehicles, the authority is in the same situation as any other 
owner of a fleet of vehicles and not far different from a private vehicle 
owner. 
The description of No-Fault above therefore applies to a road 
authority. Briefly, this means that an injured person would first seek 
compensation from the insurer of the vehicle he occupied. If the vehicle 
were not insured, next in line to pay is the driverss insuper, followed (in 
the case of a passenger) by the passenger's own insurer. If the personal 
injuries are above the threshold, the normal rules of negligence liability 
would apply. Unless one of the  vehicles was properly parked, 
compensation for damage to the vehicle itself would not be paid under 
the property damage coverage of No-Fault; it would be covered under the 
optional collision coverage if the owner had such coverage. The vehicle's 
No-Faul t property da mage coverage would apply to any nonvehicle 
property damage, such as signs or fences. 
There is one modification of this scheme, which arises out of the fact 
that the road authority is also an employer. If the authority's employee 
were injured, worker's compensation insurance would provide benefits 
before the road authority vehicle's No-Fault insurance became available 
(12). 
UNREGISTERED EQUIPMENT 
No-Fault applies only to motor vehicles that are required to be 
registered in  Michigan (13). Some of the road authority's equipment, 
though motorized, is not required to be registered and therefore is not 
insured under No-Fault. Graders and mowers fall into this category. If a 
piece of road equipment is involved in  an accident with a registered 
vehicle, both the personal injury and the property damage provisions of 
No-Fault will apply. 
If the occupants of the registered vehicle are injured, they will look 
for payment first to the insurer of their vehicle, then to its driver's 
insurance, then to their own, No-Fault abolishes any claim against the 
road authority just as it would if a registered commission vehicle were 
involved. Only if their injuries are above the threshold can the injured 
persons sue the road authority for negligence. 
A road authority employee who is operating unregistered equipment is 
not an occupant of a registered motor vehicle.  The No-Fault law 
therefore  treats him in the same way i t  treats pedestrians, If he is 
injured in a collision with a registered vehicle, he will receive benefits 
from the insurance of the vehicle's owner or driver, He can sue the 
other driver for negligence only where his injur ies  a r e  above t h e  
threshold. Because he is an employee, he would also be covered by 
worker's compensation insurance, which would provide benefits before the 
No-Fault policies. 
If the other vehicle were damaged, compensation would be determined 
under the No-Fault law. That is, its owner must bear the loss himself 
unless he has the optional collision coverage. The road authority would 
not be liable for the damage. 
If the road equipment is damaged, however, the road authority is 
entitled to be paid without regard to fault under the property damage 
coverage of the other vehicle or its driver, because property damage 
coverage applies to &ll physical property except registered mot or vehicles 
(14) .  
If the other vehicle involved in the accident were not a registered 
motor vehicle-for example, a farm tractor--then No-Fault would not 
apply a t  all and the rules of negligence would govern. Such situations 
are likely to be rare. 
DAMAGE TO ROAD AUTHORITY PROPERTY 
Motor vehicles can also cause damage to a road authority's property. 
Examples of such damage might include knocking over or denting signs, 
guardrails, or fences. Road authority property of this type is in the same 
category as the unregistered road equipment. The authority should be 
able to claim for such damage against the property damage provisions of 
the No-Fault insurance carried by owners or operators of other vehicles 
involved. 
SUMMARY 
When a road authority uses vehicles and equipment in its work, its 
liability is determined under the No-Fault automobile insurance law. That 
law treats registered vehicles and unregistered road equipment differently. 
Specifically, it provides that: 
As to its registered vehicles, the road authority is in the 
same situation as any other employer that is also a fleet 
o w n e r .  I t s  vehicle coverage,  along with worker's 
compensation coverage, protects the vehicle's occupants. 
If unregistered road equipment is involved in an accident 
with a motor vehicle, the occupants of the motor vehicle 
are not entitled to claim against the road authority for 
injuries, unless those injuries a re  above t h e  No-Fault 
threshold. They must instead look to their own No-Fault 
insurers. 
If unregistered road equipment is damaged in an accident 
with a motor vehicle, the road authority is entitled t o  
compensa t ion  under the  No-Fault property damage 
insurance of the other vehicle. 
The road authority is entitled to compensation under the 
No-Fault insurance of a motor vehicle or its driver for 
damage caused by that vehicle to the authority's property 
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Since the  recent case of P l a c e k  v. C i t y  of S t e r l i n g  Heigh t s ,  405 
M i c h .  6 3 8 ,  2 7 5  N.W.2d 511 ( F e b r u a r y  8, 1979), which a d o p t e d  
c o m p a r a t i v e  neg l igence ,  e a c h  person ' s  n e g l i g e n c e  r e d u c e s  h i s  
recovery.  
M.C.L.A. 500.3101, et seq., M.S.A. 24.13101 e t  seq. 
Shavers v. Kelley, 403 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). 
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M.C.L.A. 500.3109, M.S.A. 24.13109. T h e  l a w  in this a r e a  is still  
developing. One case holds tha t  the  employee may not r e c o v e r  a n y  
b e n e f i t s  at  all f r o m  his employer's no-fault insurance carrier ,  even 
if his damages a r e  greater  than the  worker's compensation b e n e f i t s .  
O t t e n  Wess v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co., 84 Mich. App. 292, 
269 N.W.2d 570. However ,  t h i s  dec i s ion  h a s  b e e n  c r i t i c i z e d  and  
n o t  f o l l o w e d  i n  t w o  m o r e  r e c e n t  C o u r t  of Appea l s  decisions:  
Hubert v. Citizens Insurance C o m p a n y  of A m e r i c a ,  88 Mich. App. 
710, 279 N.W.2d 48 (1979); and  Lewis  v. Yellow F r e i g h t  System, 
Inc., 89 Mich. App. 66, 279 N.W.2d 327 (1979), which hold t h a t  t h e  
e m p l o y e e  may r e c o v e r  under  t h e  no-fault policy, less the  amounts 
received from worker's compensation. 
M.C.L.A. 500.3101, M.S.A. 24.13101 
M.C.L.A. 500.3121, M.S.A. 24,13121 

CHAPTER SEVEN 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
OF ROAD AUTHORITY EMPLOYEES 
Like any other organization, a road authority can act only through its 
employees, This raises the question of the potential civil and criminal 
liability of those employees for actions performed or decisions made in 
the performance of their duties. Of special concern are employees, such 
as engineers, who exercise professional judgment in planning or desgning 
highways or superintending road maintenance or construction. The 
principles discussed in this chapter, however, apply to all employees. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of civil liability 
for negligence and how it applies in the context of road authori ty 
ac t iv i ty .  I t  then discusses the possibility of criminal liability for 
employees, identifying the types of criminal liability most likely to arise, 
and the consequences and likelihood of conviction. Finally, it considers 
whether a road authority is permitted or required to provide a legal 
defense or indemnity (reimbursement) to an employee who is found civilly 
or criminally liable. 
CIVIL LIABILITY-NEGLIGENCE 
Any civil lawsuit against a road authority employee will likely be 
based on negligence. Negligence exists where someone owes a duty to 
use reasonable care to avoid causing injury to another, and breaches that 
duty by failing to use reasonable care, the result being injury or damage 
to a person or to property. The duty to use reasonable care is the basis 
of negligence liability; it arises whenever it is foreseeable that one's 
conduct--an action or a failure to act--poses an unreasonable risk of 
harm. The protection provided by this duty extends to all who are within 
the scope of the risk. In the case of a road authority's employees, any 
person who is injured because of an employee's negligence is entitled to 
sue the employee for money damages. 
This definition of negligence is very general and relies heavily on a 
concept of reasonableness. The law does not provide a more specific 
definition. Rather, it leaves it to the jury to apply the general principles 
to the specific facts of the case and decide whether the defendant (the 
person being sued) was in fact negligent. If the jury does find that the 
defendant was negligent, it also decides the amount of the damages the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant. A defendant who is 
found liable for negligence in a civil case is required to pay damages; a 
civil case does not lead to punishment by a fine or a jail term, nor does 
it require that the defendant's license (whether professional or vehicle 
operator) be suspended or revoked. 
Because the definition of negligence is broad, it includes a broad range 
of conduct. In the case of a road authority's employee, it could include 
many ac t iv i t ies .  For example, a construction site might be left  
unguarded and children might play there and be injured, or a passerby 
might be injured by an employee's negligent operation of equipment. 
Negligence might also be found in the operation of a motor vehicle or in 
the design, construction, and maintenance of the highways, these latter 
areas of possible liability will be discussed in more de ta i l ,  but the  
principles of negligence on which they are based apply to road commission 
activities in general. 
Negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle is not unique to road 
authority employees and therefore presents no special problems in the 
a rea  of civil liability. Whether certain driving is negligent does not 
depend on the fact that the driver works for a road author i ty .  In 
addition, road authorities are, by statute, made liable for damages caused 
by the negligent operation of motor vehicles (1). Therefore, it is not 
likely that an employee sued for negligent operation of a motor vehicle 
would stand alone; the authority will usually be sued as well, since i ts 
greater resources make it the preferable defendant. 
It is also possible for a road authority employee to  be sued for  
negligence in the design, construction, or maintenance of a highway. This 
type of liability is similar to the liability of the authority itself, though 
it is not the same. Road authorities are made responsible by statute for 
providing flreasonably safef1 roads (2) .  This duty is more specific than the 
employeefs general duty of reasonable care. The employeefs duty relates 
to his actions, while the commissionls duty is phrased in terms of a 
result--reasonably safe roads. Therefore, while the authority can be liable 
for a condition, the employee is only responsible for his own actions. 
An employeefs negligence i n  respect to road operations can cause an 
unsafe road condition to arise. When this happens, both the employee and 
the road authority will be liable. On the other hand, unsafe conditions 
that would make a road authori ty  l iable could occur without any 
particular employee having been negligent. 
Since an employee is liable only for his own negligent acts, supervisory 
personnel w i l l  not necessarily be liable for the negligence of the 
employees under their supervision. The clearest example of this is the 
case where a claim is brought against the individual members of a board 
of county road commissioners, or against a state highway commissioner. 
The rule is that where there is no active personal negligence on the part 
of the board members or the highway commissioner, they a r e  not 
personally liable ( 3 ) .  The same rule applies to supervisors in general. 
The power to hire and fire subordinates does not make the supervisor 
responsible for their  act ions (4 ) .  It is only when his own acts or 
omissions amount to ffactive, personal negligencetf that an employee, 
whether a supervisor or not, is liable (5). If a supervisor is actively and 
personally negligent in carrying out his supervision, then he can be liable, 
but his liability does not arise from his position; it arises from his actions. 
Even when a road authority employee is personally liable, he will not 
n e c e s s a r i l y  be sued i n  every case.  Some prac t ica l  and legal 
considerations may influence a plaintiff's decision. Foremost is the  
flvisibilitytf of the defendants. While the plaintiff may have trouble 
identifying the individual employee whose negligence caused his injuries, it 
will not be difficult at all to identify the agency responsible for an 
unsafe road. Also very important is the collectibility--the ability to pay 
a judgment--of the defendant. The plaintiff is ultimately seeking money. 
Since the road authority will often be liable whenever its employee is, 
and since it will be seen as a better source of funds, a plaintiff may 
simply choose to sue only the authority. The road authority is also likely 
to be a better defendant, from the plaintiff's point of view, for another 
reason, A jury in a trial for damages is more likely to award a sizeable 
verdict against the road authority than against an individual. Thus, in 
terms of both the size and collectibility of the award, the road authority 
is likely to be the target defendant. A legal consideration leads to the 
same conclusion. As was explained above, the authority is liable when a 
road is unsafe. The employee is liable when the road is unsafe and his 
active, personal negligence contributed to its unsafe condition. Therefore, 
i t  may well be easier for a plaintiff to prove his case against the road 
authority. For these reasons, the plaintiff may well decide to ignore the 
employee and sue the authority instead. 
Even when the employee is sued, i t  is likely that the road authority 
will also be sued. If both the employee and the authority are found 
liable, the plaintiff is entitled to collect all of the award from either 
defendant. In this situation, the greater collectibility of the road authority 
may again make it the target defendant (6). 
There is, however, one legal consideration that could persuade the 
plaintiff to sue only the employee. The Michigan s tatute  of limitations 
provides that any claim against a road authority must be brought within 
two years of the injury, When individuals are sued, the period is three 
years. Therefore, a plaintiff who has waited more than two years will 
have no one left to sue but the employee. 
In summary, road authority employees are liable for payment of 
damages where their active, personal negligence causes injury to someone. 
Supervisory employees are liable on the same basis; they are not liable 
merely because the employees they supervise are negligent. Although 
employees may be sued individually, it is likely that the road authority 
itself will also be sued, and will in fact be required to pay any judgment. 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
It is also possible (though much less likely than being found civilly 
liable) that an employee may be found guilty of criminal conduct in the 
course of his duties. To assess the likelihood of this, it is necessary to 
understand some of the differences between civil and criminal liability. 
The primary purpose of a civil lawsuit is to provide compensation to 
an injured plaintiff, It does this by requiring the defendant who has been 
found liable to pay damages to the plaintiff. On the other hand, the 
ultimate purpose of criminal prosecutions is to preserve an orderly 
society; i t  does this by punishing those found guilty of crimes, This 
punishment can be in the form of a fine, a jail or prison sentence, or a 
combination of the two. 
Because the consequences of conviction of a crime are more severe 
than the consequences of civil liability, there are many provisions of law 
that make it more difficult for a person to be convicted of a crime. 
First, the laws that create the liability are different. Civil liability is 
based on very general principles. Negligence is a good example of this: 
its principles are very broad, and can be applied in a g rea t  many 
situations. Criminal laws are much more specific. For the most part, 
conduct is criminal only when a specific statute or ordinance says i t  is. 
For example, whether driving at 30 miles an hour down a residential 
street is negligent depends on the circumstances, but it is a crime only if 
an ordinance or statute prohibits it. 
Criminal cases are also not as easily started as civil cases. Any 
person can begin a civil case by filing the appropriate papers and paying 
the ncessary fees. Criminal cases can be begun only by government 
officers, such as the county prosecuting attorney. The prosecutor has 
broad discretion whether to bring charges; he is not required to do it 
even if the facts clearly would support a conviction. 
Once a prosecution is begun, additional protections come into play. 
Two of these relate to proof. First, the prosecutor must prove the  
defendant's guilt; the defendant is not required to prove his innocence. In 
addition, the prosecutor must prove the defendant's guilt  beyond a 
reasonable doubt." In a civil case the plaintiff wins if he must show that 
it is more likely than not tha t  the defendant was a t  faul t .  The 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is more strict. It is 
sometimes said to require a "moral certainty" as to the guilt of the 
defendant (7). 
Another important protection is the jury system. In a civil case, the 
defendant can be found liable if five of six jurors agree. In a criminal 
case there are twelve jurors, and all must agree that the defendant is 
guilty, Obviously this makes it much easier for a single member of the 
jury to prevent a conviction. 
All of these protections, all of which are parts of the criminal justice 
system, make a criminal conviction much less likely than a finding of 
civil liability. Therefore, unless the employee's misconduct is particularly 
bad and the consequences particularly severe, a prosecutor is not likely to 
bring criminal charges. Even when a person is found to be liable in a 
civil case, it does not follow that he would be found guilty in a criminal 
case. The two are so different that a finding of liability in a civil case 
cannot be used in evidence if there is a criminal prosecution. 
There are many crimes that a road authority employee could commit, 
from embezzlement to arson. Most of these have nothing to do with the 
employee's job. If an employee robs a bank, whether on duty or off, it is 
a crime, but i t  does not relate to the road authority's business. Two 
types of crimes deserve special mention because they are the only ones 
likely to arise out of the activities of a road authority employee. 
The first is known as "negligent homicide1' (8). A more descriptive 
name would be llvehicular homicidef1 because it applies only to death 
caused by negligent driving (9). The maximum penalty is a $2,000 fine, 
two years imprisonment, or both. The same negligence tRat c rea tes  
liability in the civil area applies here also, although the prosecution is 
still subject to the protective rules described above, and negligent 
homicide prosecutions are not frequent. As is the ease with civil liability 
for negligent driving, negligent homicide does not relate to the nature of 
a road authority's activities. It applies to everyone who drives a motor 
vehicle. 
A criminal prosecution of a road authority employee for on-the-job 
activities is not likely to occur unless the employee's misconduct caused 
someone's death or serious injury. This is so because there appear to be 
no specific crimes that would apply to injuries less than death or serious 
injury caused by a road authority employee's actions in the course of his 
employment. In addition, as a practical matter, such injuries would be 
considered a civil matter by a prosecutor. The second type of crime that 
might be charged against a road authority employee is the crime of 
"involuntary manslaughter" (10). An example of this is a case in 
Massachusetts where a bridge collapsed, killing three people. The main 
beams had not been secured with enough bolts and pins, The engineer 
supervising construction was charged with manslaughter. He was found 
not guilty (ll). 
While negligent homicide applies only to vehicles, manslaughter is 
broader. It could, in fact, include a killing by automobile and by other 
means as well. For example, a supervisor might order employees to use 
equipment in violation of safety regulations and when he knows the  
equipment is unsafe and likely to cause serious injury. While involuntary 
manslaughter can include a killing by automobile, there is an important 
d i f ference  bet ween it  and negligent homicide. Negligent homicide 
requires only ordinary negligence, while manslaughter requires "gross 
negligencen (12). Gross negligence is not a greater from of negligence. 
It is different "not in degree but in kindr' (13), and is based on the  
assumption that the defendant 'Idid know but was recklessly or wantonly 
indifferent to the results" of his actions (14). It is therefore treated as 
the equivalent of intent (15). Since it is not possible to know what was 
in the defendant's mind, this knowledge can be inferred from the facts 
surrounding the incident, but those facts must support the conclusion that 
the danger "must have been apparent to himn (16). 
Since the kind of conduct that would amount to gross negligence is 
seldom likely to occur, and since the knowledge that must be proven is 
d i f f icu l t  to  establish, the possibility of criminal liability is slight. 
Although the possibility cannot be eliminated, it should not be considered 
significant. 
INDEMNITY AND DEFENSE 
When an employee is sued for money damages or charged with a 
crime, he is likely to have two concerns. First, if he is found liable, he 
may be required to pay a substantial amount of money, either as damages 
or as a fine. In a criminal case, he may be concerned about having to 
spend time in jail or prison. In addition, whether he wins or loses, he 
will be concerned about paying the costs of his defense, principally in the 
form of attorney fees (17). If an employee were convicted of a crime 
and sentenced to jail, the road authority could do nothing with respect to 
the sentence. However, the employee might look to the road authority to 
help him present a defense a t  trial, and to pay any judgment or fine 
(idemnify him) if he lost. 
The question of a road authority providing a defense or indemnity is 
specifically covered by a statute in Michigan (18). The statute treats 
civil and criminal cases differently. As to civil cases, it provides that 
when an employee of a governmental agency is sued for injuries caused 
by his negligence in the course of his employment and while acting within 
the scope of his authority, the agency is permitted to provide a defense 
or indemnity or both, but it is not required to do so. 
In criminal cases the rule is different in two ways (19). First, the 
employee must have had reason to believe that he was within the scope 
of his authority. Second, the agency may provide a defense (but is not 
required to do so) but is not permitted to indemnify him by paying any 
fine. 
Therefore, the decision whether to provide a defense (in civil and 
criminal cases) or indemnity (in civil cases only) is, by statute,  entirely 
within the discretion of the road authority. The next section discusses 
the range of alternatives available to a road authority in deciding whether 
to  provide an employee with a defense or indemnity, and makes 
recommendations as to the most appropriate course of action. 
ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE 
Because the statute authorizing a governmental agency to defend or 
indemnify its employee does not require that the agency do either, a 
broad range of alternatives is possible. Briefly, these alternatives can be 
divided into three general approaches. First, the authority could decide 
to defend and indemnify all employees sued for negligence and defend all 
employees charged with cr imes.  Second, a t  the other end of the 
spectrum, the authority could elect never to provide a defense or 
indemnity. Finally, in between these two approaches is the more complex 
one of providing a defense or indemnity or both in some, but not all, 
cases. 
The first choice, to defend and indemnify all employees, needs to be 
qualified in  one important respect .  Since the s t a t u t e  permit t ing 
indemnity and defense restricts them to cases where the employee was 
acting within the scope of his authority (or, in criminal cases, believed he 
was within the scope of his authority), any agreement to defend and 
indemnify in all cases would have to reflect this restriction. With this 
except ion,  though, it would be possible to provide both defense and 
indemnity in any case. This approach could be accomplished either by 
contract or by official policy. The road authority could agree to the 
inclusion of a defense/indemnity clause in its employment contracts, or it 
could simply declare and follow a policy of providing a defense and 
indemnity in all cases. The contract method provides greater protection 
for the employee, a t  the expense of less freedom of action for the 
authority. The policy method provides somewhat less protection for the 
employee, since the authority could rescind or modify its policy at any 
time. 
Whether expressed in a contract or a policy, the decision to defend 
and indemnify in all cases has several advantages and disadvantages. The 
advantages are: 
It would improve employee morale. 
It might promote road sa fe ty ,  and thereby decrease  
commission exposure to liability, by encouraging employees 
to make the more difficult judgment decisions. 
As to civil cases, which are by far more frequent, the 
commission will often be a defendant itself, so the cost 
may in fact not be very great. 
This last point merits some discussion. When the road authority is a 
co-defendant, it will likely be called upon to pay any judgment itself. In 
such cases, it has in fact indemnified the employee anyway, so to do i t  
officially as well as in fact  costs nothing. As to providing a defense in 
such cases, the reasoning is similar, though not identical. In most cases, 
the legal positions of the employee and the road authority will be the 
same; when this happens, the authority's counsel can also represent the 
employees. In some cases, their positions would be different, possibly in 
conflict; in those cases, it would be necessary that the employee have his 
own counsel, which would be an additional cost to the road authority. 
The decision to defend and indemnify in a l l  c a s e s  a l s o  h a s  
d i sadvan t ages : 
It would cost money. How much it would cost could be 
estimated by reviewing the history of litigation against 
road authority employees. 
It might invite some additional lawsuits. For example, 
when more than two years have passed since the injury 
and the  road author i ty  i tself  can no longer be sued, 
providing an employee defense and indemnity might have 
the  ef fec t  of extending the authority's liability for an 
additional year. 
It might raise the settlement cost of the lawsuit, since the 
plaintiff will have a more collectible defendant. 
It might commit the road authority, in advance, to provide 
a defense and indemnity in cases that it believes do not 
merit them. It is not possible to anticipate all of the 
types of cases that might arise, and then draft a contract 
provision or a policy sufficiently precise to separate those 
that merit defense and indemnity from those that do not. 
It might lead to some employee dissatisfaction if cases 
arise that the road authority considers beyond the policy 
because it believes the employeefs activity was outside the 
scope of his authority. If the agreement is part of an 
employment contract, the disagreement might lead to a 
lawsuit by the employee against the road authority for 
breach of contract. 
Clearly, providing defense and indemnity in all cases as a matter of 
contract or policy has definite advantages and disadvantages. The second 
a p p r o a c h ,  not  providing them in any case,  has advantages and 
disadvantages that reflect the fact  that it is the opposite of the first 
approach. The primary advantage of this approach is that it is the least 
costly alternative. It avoids the possibility of additional attorney fees 
and damage awards, and also avoids the prospect of attracting additional 
lawsuits when plaintiffs become aware that the road authority will pay 
any judgment against one of its employees. The primary disadvantage of 
this approach is its adverse effect on employee morale. Since employees 
tend to see liability problems as being greater than they really are, this 
effect on morale may be larger than the risk of liability actually justifies. 
Each of the first two approaches has significant problems. A blanket 
policy of providing indemnity and defense in all cases may commit the 
road authority to liability, in advance, in situations that do not merit it. 
On the other hand, refusing to provide it at all is bad for employee 
morale. The third approach therefore becomes especially important, It 
involves providing either a defense or indemnity, or both, in some cases, 
but not necessarily all cases.  This approach covers a range of 
possibilities; for purposes of discussion they can be divided into two 
groups according to the  method used. The first method involves 
establishing specific criteria for determining the cases in which the road 
authori ty w i l l  provide a defense or indemnity. The second method 
involves a general declaration that the road authority will provide a 
defense and indemnity in appropriate cases, but will make the decision on 
a case by case basis. 
The first method envisions a set of criteria that will be applied to 
determine whether a case qualifies for indemnity or defense or both. 
There are several criteria that might be used. They include: 
Whether a case is civil or criminal; 
Whether, in a civil case, the road authority is also a 
defendant; 
Whether the case was brought within two years; 
Whether the employee's conduct involved professional 
judgment; and 
Whether the employee's conduct was reasonable and taken 
in good faith. 
This list is intended to give examples of criteria that might be used; it is 
not intended to list all that might be used. Note also that the criteria 
would require the road authority to provide a defense or indemnity in 
those cases that satisfy the criteria but would not prevent  i t  from 
providing a defense or indemnity even in cases where the criteria do not 
require it do so. 
The criteria can be made fairly specific, For example, under the first 
criterion listed above, one possibility is to exclude all criminal cases on 
the theory that they are likely to involve conduct that does not merit 
assistance to the employee. Another possibility is to exclude only certain 
cr i m es. For exa m ple, only cases involving professional judgment (such as 
the Massachusetts case discussed earlier) might be included; all crimes 
related to driving might be excluded. Another variation could be to 
exclude driving cases where the use of alcohol is a factor. A similar 
analysis could be used in civil cases. 
Because this f i r s t  method involves c r i t e r i a  tha t  obligate the 
commission to provide a defense or indemnity in specified cases, i t s  
advantages and disadvantages are similar to those of the first approach, 
which requires the authority to defend and indemnify in all cases. Thus, 
it may be expected to improve employee morale, and may encourage 
those who must exercise judgment to do so more freely. On the other 
hand, it will cost some money, and may cause dissatisfaction (and perhaps 
lawsuits) on the part of employees who are sued and whom the authority 
declines to help. In addition, it may commit the authority in advance to 
defend or indemnify an employee in a case in which it would prefer not 
to,  
The second method involves less of a commitment on the part of the 
road authority. The authority would indicate i ts intention to provide a 
defense and indemnity in appropriate cases, but would expressly reserve 
the right to decide in each case whether to provide help and what type 
to provide. While this would preserve flexibility for the authority, it 
might also be less beneficial to employee morale than including all cases 
or using firm criteria. However, in making decisions on individual cases, 
the road authority will in fact  use some criteria. The authority could 
therefore make those criteria known to its employees as the guidelines i t  
will use, so as to increase employee confidence in the policy. 
The case-by-case method provides flexibility in that it does not bind 
the road authority in advance to defend and indemnify all cases. I t  has 
other advantages as well: 
I t  permits the authority to tailor its response to the 
individual case. Thus, it might decide to provide only a 
defense, or to indemnify up to or beyond a certain amount 
(if, for example, the employee had insurance coverage of 
his own). 
It permits the authority to keep the question of indemnity 
or defense a private one. The plaintiff need not know 
that indemnity will be provided, and may therefore settle 
his claim for a lesser amount. 
I t  leaves the authority free to develop more specific 
guidelines as more experience with individual cases is 
gained. A t  some time in the future the knowledge gained 
may be sufficient that specific binding criteria may be 
developed. 
As against these advantages,  the case-by-case method has two 
disadvantages. First, it will cost money, though the amount wi l l  be to 
some extent in the control of the road authority. Also, it may not 
improve employee morale as much as an explicit commitment to defend 
and indemnify, though the way in which the policy is presented may have 
much to do with this. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A road authority employee is liable for damages if his negligence 
causes harm to a person or to property. He is not liable merely because 
of any position he may hold, such as supervisor, but is liable only for his 
own active, personal negligence. When his liability is based on his 
activities as a road authority employee, the authority itself will usually 
be liable as well; therefore, it is likely that the authority will be a 
codefendant and will bear the actual loss. 
An employee can be criminally liable for negligent homicide if his 
negligent driving causes a death, though such prosecutions are relatively 
infrequent. Apart from this, an employee can be criminally liable only 
where he is guilty of gross negligence, which amounts to wanton and 
reckless disregard of the consequences of his actions. Because of the 
difficulty of proving this, and because this type of conduct is uncommon, 
criminal prosecutions of road authority employees are likely to be very 
rare. 
When an employee is sued for damages because of his work for the 
road authority, the authority is permitted, but not required by statute, to 
provide a legal defense for him and to pay any damages assessed against 
him (indemnify him). If criminal charges are brought, the authority may 
provide a defense, but may not indemnify him. 
Because the statute permits defense and indemnity, but does not 
require either, a broad range of options is possible. Some of them are: 
e The authority can, by contract or declaration of policy, 
agree in advance to defend and indemnify the employee in 
all cases where the statute permits it. 
The authority can, by contract or declaration of policy, 
agree in advance to defend or indemnify the employee in  
all cases that meet certain specific criteria. 
The authority can declare that it intends to defend and 
indemnify employees in appropriate cases, but reserve the 
right to determine, with or without specific guidelines, 
which cases are appropriate, and to determine what help 
should be provided each case. 
The authority can decline to defend or indemnify its 
employees in any case. 
Because the third option offers the prospect of substantial help to an 
employee while preserving the road authority's control over its costs and 
flexibil i ty in its policy, it appears to be preferable. However, the 
approach finally decided on need not fit entirely into any one of the four 
categories listed above. It may range across two or more of them. 
Those categories, and this discussion, are intended only as guides for 
discussion by the road authority. What form the policy should take is a 
matter for the judgment of the authority in consultation with its counsel. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SELF-INSURANCE 
The decision to become a self-insurer usually does not involve doing 
without insurance. Instead, self-insurance usually involves the retention of 
a large amount of primary liability exposure, with an insurance policy to 
cover losses above that amount. In this way, the road authority becomes 
its own insurer, while the insurance company provides excess coverage, 
just as one insurance company will often provide primary coverage and 
another excess coverage. Self-insurance can also be seen as simply an 
ordinary insurance arrangement except that the amount of the deductible 
is greatly increased. 
However self-insurance is described, it involves something of a reversal 
of roles between the insured and the insurance company. In the usual 
arrangement, the insurance company pays any successful claim up to the 
amount of its policy limit. If more is to be paid, either because of a 
lawsuit or in a settlement of a claim, the insured is responsible for the 
excess. In a self-insurance arrangement, the insured is first responsible 
for a relatively large amount of liability, and only after that is the 
insurer responsible. 
In the ordinary insurance situation, a large claim-in that it presents a 
possibility of exceeding policy limits-can be a cause of friction between 
the insured and the insurance company. If, for example, the policy limit 
is $10,000, the insured will be responsible for any claim above tha t  
amount. In one case, the insurance company could have settled a claim 
for $10,000 but refused to do so and a trial resulted in a verdict of 
$331,000, of which the insured was required to pay $321,000. Cases like 
this tend to give rise to a second lawsuit, one in which the insured sues 
his own insurance company, claiming that its refusal to settle the case 
was improper. The substance of the insured's argument in this type of 
case is that the insurance company acted in bad faith, that is, it looked 
after its own interests rather than those of its insured. 
The reversal of roles in a self-insurance arrangement could lead to the 
problem operating in reverse. Thus, the insurance company may claim 
that the insured should have settled a claim before trial. In addition, if 
the excess coverage applies after the claim is paid by the insured reach 
an aggregate limit, the insurance company might claim that the insured 
should not have settled some or all of the claim. 
Because self-insurance is a relatively recent phenomenon, there are no 
cases in Michigan dealing with the obligation of an insured to a company 
providing excess insurance. To assess the nature and extent of those 
obligations, it is therefore necessary to examine cases involving the 
ordinary situation and then determine how they might apply when 
self-insurance reverses the positions. 
BAD FAITH 
The first case in Michigan involving an insured's claim of bad faith 
was City of Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity (1). The principles expressed in 
that case continue to be valid law today. In Wakefield, the policy limit 
was $10,000. The insurance company refused to accept the plaintiff's 
offer to set t le  his claim for $4,325, and at  trial the verdict was over 
$15,000, The insurer paid $10,000 and the city was required to pay the 
rest. The city sued its insurer for the amount it was required to pay, 
claiming the insurer had acted in bad faith in refusing to accept the 
settlement offer. The court agreed that an insurance company would be 
liable beyond its policy limits if it had acted in bad faith, and discussed 
the concept at some length. 
[A] rbitrary refusal to settle for a reasonable amount, where it 
is apparent that suit would result in a judgment in excess of 
the policy limit, indifference to the effect of refusal on the 
insured, failure to fairly consider a compromise and facts  
presented and pass honest judgment thereon, or refusal upon 
grounds which depart from the contract and the purpose of 
the power [to settle cases], would tend to show bad faith (2). 
The court also listed some considerations tending to show that the insurer 
was not acting in bad faith. 
It is not bad faith if counsel for the insurer refuse settlement 
under the bona fide belief that they might defeat the action, 
or in any event, can probably keep the verdict within the 
policy limit, or have a "fighting chance" to win. A mistake 
of judgment is not bad faith (3). 
After stating these principles, the court proceeded to review the case and 
evaluate the insurance comp,any's conduct and the propriety of its decision 
not to settle. On the facts of the case, the Wakefield court found that 
the insurer had not acted in bad faith. 
Subsequent cases have followed the Wakefield principles, and have shed 
some additional light on what is required of the insurance company. In 
general, the requirements add up to a duty to keep the insured informed 
of f a c t s  that he needs to make an intelligent decision regarding his 
liability. In one case, the court held that there was no bad faith when 
the  insurance company believed it had a good defense and told the 
insured the amount of the claim and that he had a right to hire his own 
counsel ( 4 ) .  More recent cases tend to elaborate on this theme of 
communication. In one case, where the policy limit was $10,000 and the 
verdict was over $30,000, the court rejected a claim of bad faith, noting 
that the insurer communicated extensively with the insured and suggested 
that he retain separate counsel. The insurer in that case also raised the 
question of settlement with its insured, and the insured agreed that the 
settlement offer should be rejected. The court observed that "if the 
insured actively concurs in the rejection of a compromise offer, he cannot 
recover against the insurer for failure to settleu. ( 5 )  
The most recent case on bad faith is the one mentioned at  the  
beginning in which the insurer's refusal to sett le for $10,000 led to a 
verdict of $331,000. The court found bad faith in that case, and spelled 
out the insurance company's obligations in greater detail than the earlier 
cases (6). The court said: 
As necessary corollary of the insured's right to retain 
independent counsel for protection against excess "liability" it 
is clear that the insurer has a duty promptly and clearly to 
inform the insured of: (1) the possibility of a judgment i n  
excess of the policy limits; ( 2 )  the insured's right to retain 
independent counsel; (3 )  the limits of the insurer's interest in 
the lawsuit; and (4) all set t lement  of fers ,  including t h e  
insurer's response to such offers and the legal significance of 
those responses expressed in terms of the insured's liability. 
The extent and clarity of such notice is a substantial factor 
to be weighed in determining whether the insurer handled 
settlement negotiations in bad faith. 
The courts deciding bad faith questions will also, as did the court in 
Wakefield, review the case itself and evaluate whether the settlement 
offer was  one that should have been accepted. In doing this, the courts 
tend to give the benefit of the doubt to the insurer, so that it is for the 
insured to prove bad faith, rather than for the insurance company to 
justify its actions. 
Therefore there are, broadly speaking, two tests that are applied to 
answer the question of bad faith. The first is whether the decision not 
to set t le  was in fact proper, in the light of the facts of the case. The 
second is whether the insurance company kept its insured adequately 
informed of the status of the claim. It appears that bad faith will not 
be found unless the insurance company fails both tests, although no case 
directly addresses that point. 
SELF-INSURANCE AND BAD FAITH 
The q u e s t i o n  is whether these  t e s t s  a r e  any d i f f e ren t  when 
self-insurance reverses the roles of insured and insurer, so t h a t  t h e  
insurer, by virtue of its excess coverage, stands to lose by the insured's 
bad faith in refusing to settle a case. There are no cases on this point, 
so conclusions must be tentative. 
It seems clear that the requirement of good faith, at least in some 
form, does apply to the insured. The Wakefield court said: 
Prohibition against fraud or bad faith is imposed by law upon 
every legal relationship, is a part of every lawful grant of 
power, and it is not necessary to contract for it. (7)  
Since the self-insured still has a legal relationship to i ts insurer and 
also has the power to set t le  cases, the same basis of the duty of good 
faith exists. 
It seems likely that first test of bad faith-whether, on the facts, it 
was improper not to sett le the claim--will be retained.  This is a 
fundamental, if somewhat subjective, test of bad faith, and is therefore 
an essential element of a bad faith claim. 
The requirement of communication between the parties should also 
continue to apply, although some modifications seem likely. Of the four 
duties established in the - Jones case, two of them do not appear to be 
appropriate when an insurance company is receiving information. These 
are duties to inform of the right to retain counsel and to make clear the 
limit of the insured's liability. While this information may be important 
for an individual who may well be unfamiliar with litigation and 
insurance, it is not likely that an insurance company would be able to 
persuade a court that it needed to be told that it could hire a lawyer, 
and needed to be reminded of the point at which its liability began. 
The  o the r  two communication duties,  however, seem clearly 
appropriate even when the information is going to an insurance company. 
First, the insured should keep its insurer informed of the possibility of a 
judgment in excess of the self-insured amount, Since the possibility may 
change as the claim progresses, the duty is a continuing one. Second, all 
settlement offers, and the insured's response to them, should be 
transmitted to the insurer. The cases do not require that the insurer 
consent to a rejection of a settlement offer. The decision to accept or 
reject a settlement rests with the insured, as the party with primary 
liability. However, since the insurer's concurrence in rejection would 
foreclose a claim of bad faith, it is advisable to seek concurrence in 
appropriate cases. The purpose of supplying this information is to perm it 
the insurer to make intelligent decisions ragarding its own interests so 
that it can participate in the defense of the case, if appropriate, and 
settle its own liability exposure separately if it chooses to do so. 
In summary, it appears that a self-insured has a duty to its excess 
insured to use good faith in handling cases, and to keep its insurer 
informed of settlement offers and liability exposure. 
The preceding discussion has dealt with bad faith as an isolated legal 
issue. In fact, of course, it arises in the context of a cont rac tua l  
relationship and whether the theory itself is one of contract (91, the 
problems it addresses arise within that context. Theref ore, solutions 
should be worked out in the contract between the insured and the insurer. 
Rather than rely solely on the principles discussed here, the insured 
should reach an agreement with its insurer. The agreement should 
establish a procedure, satisfactory to the insurer, by which the insurer 
can be informed of the status of various claims and be consulted on those 
that pose a substantial risk of a large verdict. The procedure could 
require that the insurer be notified of all claims, or could specify criteria 
by which certain claims would be selected for notification to the insurer. 
Those c r i t e r i a  could include a dollar value cut-off below which 
settlements made by the insured cannot be questioned, or other factors 
(such as the type of injury suffered). 
The exact details of the agreement with the insurer will depend on 
the needs of the parties, in view of their contractual relationship. It is 
very much in the interest of the parties to have such an agreement, but 
particularly so for the insured. So long as claims do not exceed the 
self-insurance limit, of course, there is no problem. But if a claimant 
gets a verdict against the insured that is greater than the amount of his 
insurance coverage, then the absence of an agreement can only hurt the 
insured, since it will offer the insurer a chance to avoid liability on the 
theory of bad faith. If the insured has complied with a procedure that 
the insurer has agreed to, the insurer's claim of bad faith would be much 
harder to sustain. 
SUMMARY 
When an insurance company acts in bad faith in failing to settle a 
claim against its insured within i ts policy limit and the insured is then 
required to pay a judgment in excess of the policy limit, the insured can 
recover the entire amount from the insurance company. In determining 
whether the insurance company acted in bad faith, a court will review 
the facts relating to the settlement offer and wi l l  also consider whether 
the insurance company kept its insured sufficiently informed of the status 
of the case and his liability exposure. 
Self-insurance reverses the roles of insured and insurer, since the 
insured has primary liability while the insurer is responsible for any 
excess beyond the self-insurance limit. The same question could therefore 
arise, but in reverse, with the insurer suing its insured for bad faith. 
While there are no cases directly on point, it is likely that the same 
principles would apply. 
Because bad faith issues arise out of a contractual relationship, an 
insured who chooses to self-insure should take affirmative steps to reduce 
the risk of being sued for bad faith. This means that the insured should 
reach an express agreement with its insurer, containing an explici t  
procedure for giving the insurer an opportunity to protect its interests. 
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GENERAL HIGHWAY LAW 
M.C.L.A. 224.21, M.S.A. 9.12 
County Road Commissioner's authority to obligate county, limitation; roads 
under construction; duty of county to keep roads in repair;  act ions 
brought against board; liability for damages. 
Sec. 21. Said board of county road commissioners shall  
have no power to contract indebtedness for any amount in 
excess of the moneys credited to such board and actually in 
the hands of the county treasurer: Provided, That the board 
may incur liability to complete roads under construction and 
upon cont rac ts ,  a f t e r  a tax is voted, to  an amount not 
exceeding 314 of the said tax. It is hereby made the duty of 
the counties to  keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be 
reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county 
roads, bridges and culverts that are within their jurisdiction 
and under their care and control and which are open to public 
t ravel .  The provisions of law respecting the liability of 
townships, cities, villages and corporations for damages for 
injuries resulting from a failure in the performance of the 
same duty respecting roads under their control, shall apply to 
counties adopting such county road system. Actions arising 
thereunder shall be brought against the board of county road 
commissioners of the county and service shall be made upon 
the clerk and upon the chairman of the board made defendant 
therein, which shall be named in the process as the "board of 
county road commissioners of the county of .It and 
any judgment obtained thereon against such board of county 
road commissioners shall be audited and paid from the county 
road fund as other claims against such board of county road 
commissioners: Provided, however, That no board of county 
road commissioners, subject to any liability under this section, 
shall be liable for damages sustained by any person upon any 
county road, either to his person or property, by reason of any 
defective county road, bridge or culvert under the jurisdiction 
of the board of county road commissioners, unless such person 
shall serve or cause to be served within 60 days af ter  such 
injury shall have occurred, a notice in writing upon the clerk 
and upon the  chairman of t h e  board  of  c o u n t y  r o a d  
commissioners of such board, which notice shall set  forth 
substantially the time when and place where such injury took 
place, the manner in which it occurred, and the extent of such 
injuries as far as the same has become known, the names of 
the witnesses to  said accident, if any, and that  the person 
receiving such injury intends to hold such county liable for 
such damages as may have been sustained by him. It is the 
intention that the provisions of this section shall apply to all 
county roads whether such roads become county roads under 
chapter 4 of the general highway laws, Act No. 283 of the 
Public Acts of 1979, (1) as amended, or under the provisions of 
the Covert Act, so-called, the same being Act No. 59 of the 
Public Acts of 1915, (2) as amended. 
(1) M.C.L.A. 224.1 to 224.31, M.S.A, 9.101 to 9.129 (11) repealed 
in part as obsolete or inoperative by P.A. 1958, No. 77, Eff. 
Sept. 13. 
(2)  M.C.L.A. 247.415 to 247.482, M.S.A. 9.7ll to 9.776 repealed 
in part as obsolete or inoperative by P.A. 1958, No. 77, Eff. 
Sept. 13 and in part by P.A. 1963, No. 213, Eff. Sept. 6. 
M.C.L.A. 247.291, M.S.A. 9.1421 
Closing highways for construction or repair; barriers. 
Sec. 1. The officials in charge of constructing, improving 
or repair ing highways may close any highway or portion 
thereof, which is under process of construction, improvement or 
repair  or upon which is located any bridge which is being 
constructed or repaired. No highway shall be closed under the 
provisions of this act until suitable barriers have been erected 
a t  the ends of the highway or of the closed portion thereof, 
and also a t  the point of intersection of such highway or 
portion thereof with other highways. Suitable barriers are 
those which conform to the manual of uniform traffic control 
devices adopted pursuant to section 608 of Act No. 300 of the 
Public Acts of 1949, being section 257.608 of the Compiled 
Laws of 1948. For the purposes of this act "highwayN includes 
roads and streets. 
M.C.L.A. 247.292, M.S.A. 9.1422 
Same; detours, notices, removal of barriers on completion of work. 
Sec. 2. No highway shall be closed under the provisions of 
this act until suitable detours around the same, or the closed 
portion thereof, are provided and are placed in reasonably safe 
and passable condition for traffic. Notices in the form of 
plainly legible signs shall be placed by the highway officials 
having such work in charge at either end of the closed highway 
or portion of highway and a t  such intermediate points along 
the detour, or detours, as may be necessary to plainly mark 
the same. Upon the completion of the work of constuction, 
improvement or repair and as soon as the highway or bridge 
constructed, improved or repaired shall be in suitable condition 
for public travel, all barriers, marks and signs whatsoever 
erected under the provisions hereof shall be at once removed 
by the officials erecting or placing the same. 
M.C.L.A. 247.312, M.S.A. 9.1423(2) 
Mechanically operated barricading devices; authority to install, approval of 
public utilities commission. 
Sec. 2 .  The public authorities having jurisdiction and 
control over any highway i n  this state,  whenever they shall 
deem tha t  the  safety of persons and property require the 
i n s t a l l a t ion  of the devices herein provided for  a t  any 
intersection of such highway with any other highway, or a t  any 
bridge approach in such highway, or at any intersection of such 
highway with a railroad, are  hereby authorized to construct, 
install, operate and maintain at each such place automatic or 
mechanically operated barricading devices, which, when giving 
warning, shall rise from a bed in the highway and become a 
barrier in such highway: Provided, That  before any such 
devices is constructed, installed, operated and maintained at 
any such railroad intersection, the detailed plans of such 
device, a description of the  proposed mode of operation 
thereof, and a map showing the proposed location thereof shall 
be submitted to, and approved by, the Michigan public utilities 
com mission. 
M.C.L.A. 247.313, M.S.A. 9.1423(3) 
Same; warning signs, size, wording, distance. 
S e c ,  3. Whenever such barricading device shall  be 
constructed, installed, operated or maintained, the  public 
authorities having jurisdiction and control over the highway at 
any such place shall install and maintain a t  the side of such 
highway, immediately adjacent to such device, reflectorized 
warning signs with the words "automatic barrierff in letters not 
less than 3 inches high. Whenever such device is located at a 
railroad intersection, additional reflectorized warning signs, of 
a design to be prescribed by the state highway commissioner, 
shall be installed and maintained on both sides thereof a t  a 
d i s t a n c e  no t  less  than 4 0 0  f e e t  therefrom when such 
intersection is located on a highway where vehicular traffic is 
permitted to travel a t  speeds in excess of 30 miles per hour, 
and not less than 200 feet therefrom when such intersection is 
located on a highway where vehicular traffic is permitted to 
travel at speeds not in excess of 30 miles per hour, and such 
device and warning signs shall be in lieu of all other protection 
a t  such intersection. The advance warning signs required by 
any other law of th is  s t a t e  shal l  a lso be instal led and 
maintained. 
M.C.L.A. 250.62, M.S.A. 9.902 
Construction, Improvement, and Maintenance; contracts, work on state 
account. 
Sec. 2.  The s ta te  highway commission may contract with 
boards of county road commissioners, township boards, and 
municipalities of this state, or with any other persons, firm or 
corporation for the construction, improvement, and maintenance 
of trunk l ine highways, or i t  may do the work on s ta te  
account. The s ta te  highway commission, subject  to  the  
approval of the s tate  administrative board, shall do all acts or 
things necessary to carry out the purpose of this act. The 
highway com mission, without such approval, may contract for 
extra work or labor, or both, not exceeding $10,000.00 for 
contracts having a value of $500,000 or less and not exceeding 
2% of contracts having a value over $500,000.00 under a 
contract with a private agency authorized by this section, and 
for an amount not exceeding $500,000.00 under a contract, for 
an amount not exceeding $5,000.00 for each contract, for toilet 
vault cleaning, use of licensed sanitary landfills, pickup and 
disposal of refuse, pavement surfacing and patching, rental of 
equipment for emergency repairs and maintenance operations, 
curb replacement, maintenance of office equipment, installation 
of utility services, and installation of traffic control devices 
and, without approval, may authorize boards of county road 
commissioners, township boards, and municipalit ies,  under 
con t rac t s  for  the  maintenance of trunk line highways, to 
subcontract in amounts not to  exceed $5,000.00 for each 
subcontract. 
M.C.L.A. 254.2.0, M.S.A. 9.1190 
Posting of narrow bridge, "1-lane bridge." 
Sec. 20.  Every bridge which has a clear 2-way roadway 
width of less than 19 feet,  but more than 17 f e e t  a t  the  
narrowest part thereof, shall be posted as a narrow bridge; and 
every bridge which has a clear 2-way roadway width, as so 
measured, of 17 feet or less shall be posted as a 1-lane bridge. 
Such posting shall be in accordance with the manual of uniform 
traffic control devices adopted pursuant to section 608 of Act 
No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, being section 257.608 of 
the Compiled Laws of 1948. 
M.C.L.A. 254.21, M.S.A. 9.1191 
Movable bridge; warning, protection, penalty. 
Sec. 21. All movable bridges shall be provided with warning 
lights, signs, protection gates and other devices as shall be 
prescribed by the state highway commissioner and as may be 
required by the  board of supervisors i n  i t s  permit  for 
construction, which said lights, signs, protection gates and 
other devices shall be so constructed, placed, maintained and 
operated as to provide reasonable sa fe ty  to  the  public. 
Protection gates or devices shall at all times be closed before 
the draw or swing span is opened for any purpose and shall be 
kept closed until the draw or swing is closed, and the bridge is 
ready for public travel. Any person who shall wilfully violate 
any of the  provisions hereof shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a 
fine of not more than 50 dollars or by imprisonment in the 
county jail for not more than 30 days, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. 
M.C.L.A. 257.608, M.S.A. 9.2308 
Uniform system of traffic-control devices; manual. 
Sec .  608. The s t a t e  highway c o m m i s s i o n e r  a n d  
commissioner of s t a t e  police shall  adopt a manual and 
specifications for a uniform system of traffic-control devices 
consistent with the provisions of this chapter for use upon 
highways within this  s t a t e .  Such uniform system shall  
correlate with and so far  as possible conform to the system 
then current as approved by the American Association of State 
Highway Officials and such manual may be revised whenever 
necessary to carry out the provisions of this act. It is hereby 
declared to be the policy of the state of Michigan to achieve, 
insofar as is practicable, uniformity i n  the design, and shape 
and color scheme of t raff ic  signs, signals and guide posts 
erected and maintained upon the streets and highways within 
the state with other states. 
M.C.L.A. 257.609, M.S.A. 9.2309 
Same; placement and maintenance; restrictions; county road commission, 
permission, costs. 
Sec. 609.  (a) The state highway commission shall place or 
require to be placed and maintain or require to be maintained 
such traffic-control devices, conforming to said manual and 
specifications, upon al l  s t a t e  highways as i t  shall  deem 
necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this 
chapter or to regulate, warn or guide traffic. 
( b )  No l o c a l  au thor i ty  shall  place or maintain any 
traffic-control device upon any trunk line highway under the 
jurisdiction of the s tate  highway commissioner except by the 
l a t t e r ' s  permisision upon any county road without t h e  
permission of the county road com mission having jurisdiction 
thereof. With the approval of the  department  of s t a t e  
highways the  board of county road commissioners of any 
county, a t  i ts  option, may instal l  and maintain uniform 
traffic-control devices according to the standards promulgated 
by the department of state highways and as required by the 
commission on trunk line highways, if  the cost would be less 
- 
than that estimated by the s ta te  highway commission, billing 
the s ta te  highway commission for i ts  share of the cos t  of 
installation. 
M.C.L.A. 257.610, M.S.A. 9.2310 
Traffic control devices. 
Sec. 610. (a) Plac ing  and maintaining; conformance t o  
state manual and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  Local au thor i t ies  and 
county road commissions in their respective jurisdiction shall 
place and maintain such traffic control devices upon highways 
under their jurisdiction as they may deem necessary to indicate 
and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or local traffic 
opdinances or to regulate, warn or guide traffic. A l l  such 
traffic control devices hereafter erected shall conform to the 
state of the manual and specifications. 
(b) Noncompliance, withholding tax refunds.  The s ta te  
highway commissioner shall  withhold from any township, 
incorporated village city or county, failing to comply with the 
provisions of section 608, 609, 612 and 613 (11, the share of 
weight and gasoline tax refunds otherwise due the township, 
incorporated village, city or county. Notice of such failure, 
and a reasonable time to comply therewith, shall first be given. 
( c )  S a l e s  a n d  purchases ,  conformance  t o  manual o f  
u n i f o r m  t r a f f i c  c o n t r o l  d e v i c e s .  A person, firm o r  
corporation shall not sell or offer for sale to local authorities 
and local authorities shall not purchase or manufacture any 
traffic control device which does not conform to the Michigan 
manual of uniform traffic control devices except by permission 
of the director of the department of state highways. 
(1) M.C.L.A. 257.608, 257.609, 257,612, 257.613, M.S.A. 9.2308, 
9,2309, 9.2312, 9.2313. 
M.C.L.A. 257.612, M.S.A. 9.2312 
Traffic control signal legend; signals over traveled portion of roadway. 
Sec. 612. (1) When traffic is controlled by traffic control 
signals, not less than 1 signal shall be located over the traveled 
portion of the roadway so as to give drivers a clear indication 
of the right of way assignment from their normal positions 
approaching the intersection. The vehicle signals shall exhibit 
different colored lights successively 1 a t  a t ime,  or with 
arrows. The following colors shall be used and the terms and 
lights shall indicate and apply to drivers of vehicles as follows: 
(a) Green indication. 
Vehicular traffic facing the signal, except when prohibited 
under section 664  (I),  may proceed straight through or turn 
right or left  unless a sign a t  that place prohibits either turn. 
Vehicular traffic, including vehicles turning right or left ,  shall 
yield the right of way to other vehicles and to pedestrians 
lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk a t  the 
time the signal is exhibited. 
(b) Steady yellow indication. 
Vehicular traf fic facing the signal shall stop before entering 
the nearest crosswalk a t  the intersection or a t  a limit line 
when marked, but if the stop cannot be made in safety, a 
vehicle may be driven cautiously through the intersection. 
(c) Steady Red indication: 
(i) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal alone shall 
stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the 
intersection or a t  a limit line when marked or, if none, then 
before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until 
a green indication is shown, except as provided in subparagraph 
(ii). 
( i i )  Vehicular t r a f f i c  facing a steady red signal, after 
stopping before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the 
intersection or a t  a limit line when marked or, if none, then 
before entering the intersection, shall be privileged to make a 
right turn from a l-way or 2-way street into a 2-way street or 
into a 1-way street carrying traffic in the direction of the 
right turn; or a left  turn from a 1-way or 2-way street into a 
1-way roadway carrying traffic in the direction of the left  turn 
unless prohibited by sign, signal, marking, light, or other traffic 
control device. The vehicular traffic shall yield the right of 
way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to 
other traffic lawfully using the intersection. 
(d) Steady green arrow indications. 
Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal, shown alone 
or in combination with another indication, may cautiously enter 
the intersection only to make the movement indicated by the 
arrow, or other movement permitted by other indications shown 
at the same time. Vehicle traffic shall yield the right of way 
to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to 
other traffic lawfully using the intersection. 
(e) If a traffic control signal is erected and maintained at a 
place other than an intersection, the provisions of this section 
shall be applicable except as to those provisions which by their 
nature cannot have application. Any stop required shall be 
made a t  a sign or marking on the pavement indicating where 
the stop shall be made, but, in the  absence of a sign or 
marking, the stop shall be made at  the signal. 
(2) A person who violates this section is responsible for a 
civil infraction. 
(1) M.C.L.A. 257.664, M.S.A. 9.2364. 
M.C.L.A. 257.627, M.S.A. 9.2327 
Speed restrictions; assured clear distance ahead. 
Sec. 627. (1) A person driving a vehicle on a highway shall 
drive a t  a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less 
than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, 
surface, and width of the highway and of any other condition 
then existing. A person shall not drive a vehicle upon a 
highway a t  a speed greater than that which will permit a stop 
within the assured, clear distance ahead. 
Business or res idence distr icts;  public parks, posted 
speed limits 
( 2 )  Subject to subsection (1) and except in those instances 
where a lower speed is specified in  this chapter, i t  shall be 
prima facie lawful for the driver of a vehicle to drive at a 
speed not exceeding the following, except when this speed 
would be unsafe: 
( a )  25 miles an hour on a l l  highways in a business or 
resident district as defined in this act. 
(b) 25 miles an hour in public parks unless a different speed 
is fixed and duly posted. 
Prima facie unlawful to exceed speed limitations 
(3) It shall be prima facie unlawful for a person to exceed 
any of the speed limitations prescribed in subsection (21, except 
as provided in section 629 (1). 
Vehicles with trailers 
( 4 )  A person driving a passenger vehicle drawing another 
vehicle or trailer shall not exceed a speed of 55 miles per 
hour, unless the vehicle or trailer has 2 wheels or less and 
does not exceed the combined weight of 750 pounds for the 
vehicle or trailer and load, or a trailer coach of not more than 
26 feet in length with brakes on each wheel and attached to 
the passenger vehicle with an equalizing or stabilizing coupling 
unit. 
Trucks and combinations weighing over 5,000 pounds 
(5)  A person driving a truck, t r a c t o r ,  or t r ac to r  with 
trailer, or a combination of these vehicles with a gross weight, 
loaded or unloaded in excess of 5,000 pounds shall not exceed 
a speed of 55 miles per hour on highways, streets, or freeways, 
which shall be reduced to 35 miles per hour during the period 
when reduced loadings are being enforced in accordance with 
this chapter. 
School buses 
(6)  A person driving a school bus shall not exced the speed 
of 50 miles per hour. 
Maximum of speed 
(7)  The maximum rates of speeds allowed pursuant to this 
section are subject to the maximum rates established pursuant 
to section 629b. 
Designated work areas; speed limit, traffic control 
devices 
(8) A person who operates a vehicle on the highway shall 
not exceed a speed of 45 miles per hour when entering and 
passing through a designated work area where a normal lane or 
part of the lane of traffic has been closed due to a highway 
construct ion,  maintenance, or surveying activities. The 
department of state highways and transportation, county road 
commission, or local authority shall identify a designated work 
area with traffic control devices which are in conformance 
with the Michigan manual of uniform traffic control devices on 
streets and highways under its jurisdiction. A person shall not 
exceed the  foregoing speed limitation or those established 
pursuant to section 628 or 629(3). 
(1) M.C.L.A. 257.629, M.S.A. 9.2329. 
(2) M.C.L.A. 25?.629b, M.S.A. 9.2329(2). 
(3) M.C.L.A. 257.628, 257.629, M.S.A. 9.2328, 9.2329. 
M.C.L.A. 257.628, M.S.A. 9.2328 
Speed limits, maximum, minimum, day and night. 
Sec. 628. (1) When the state highway commission or county 
road  commiss ion ,  with respect  to  highways under i t s  
jurisdiction, and the director of the department of s tate  police 
shall jointly determine upon the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that the speed of vehicular traffic on a 
s tate  trunk line or county highway is greater or less than is 
reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist a t  an 
intersection or other place or upon a part of the highway, the 
officials acting jointly may determine and declare a reasonable 
and safe maximum or minimum speed limit thereat which shall 
be effective a t  the t imes determined tha t  the  speed of 
vehicular t ra f f ic  on a s tate  trunk line or county highway, 
which is within 1,000 feet of a school in the school district of 
which that person is the superintendent, is greater or less than 
is reasonable or safe ,  the  off icials  s h a l l  i n c l u d e  t h e  
superintendent of the school district affected in acting jointly 
in determining and declaring a reasonable and safe maximum or 
minimum speed limit thereat. The maximum speed limits on 
all s ta te  trunk line highways or parts of s t a t e  trunk line 
highways upon which maximum speed limits are not otherwise 
fixed pursuant to this act shall be 65 miles per hour during the 
daylight hours and 5 5  miles per hour during the night hours. 
The maximum speed limits upon freeways shall be 7 0  miles per 
hour, and the maximum speed limits on all highways or parts 
of highways under the  jurisdiction of the  county r o a d  
commission upon which maximum speed l imi ts  a r e  not 
otherwise fixed pursuant to this act shall be 6 5  miles per hour 
during the daylight hours and 5 5  miles per hour during the 
night hours. 
Speed control signs 
( 2 )  If upon investigation the s tate  highway commission or 
county road commission and the director of the department of 
s tate  police find it in the interest of public safety, they may 
order the township board, city, or village officials to erect and 
maintain,  take down, or regulate the speed control signs, 
signals, or devices as directed, and in default thereof the s tate  
highway commission or county road commission may cause the 
designated signs, signals, and devices t o  be e rec ted  and 
maintained, taken down, regulated, or controlled, in the manner 
previously directed, and pay for this out of the highway f u n d  
designated. 
Public record in office of county clerk; temporary 
construction or repair signs, authorization; evidence 
(3)  A public record of all speed control signs, signals, or 
devices so authorized shall be filed in the office of the county 
clerk of the county in which the highway is located, and a 
certified copy shall be prima facie evidence in all courts of 
the issuance of the authorization. The public record with the 
county clerk shall not be required as prima facie evidence of 
authorization in the case of signs erected or placed temporarily 
for the control of speed or direction of traffic a t  points where 
construct ion,  repairs ,  or maintenance of highways is in 
progress, if the signs are  of uniform design approved by the 
s tate  highway commission and the director of the department 
of state police and clearly indicate a special control, when 
proved in court that the temporary traffic-control sign was 
placed by the state highway commission or on the authority of 
t h e  s t a t e  highway commission and the  d i rec tor  of the  
department of state police, or by the county road commission 
or on the  author i ty  of the county road commission, a t  a 
specified location. 
Failure to observe speed or traffic control signs 
(4) A person who fails to  observe an authorized speed or 
traffic control sign, signal, or device is responsible for a civil 
infraction. 
Minimum speed on freeways 
(5) The minimum speed limit on all freeways shall be 45 
miles per hour except when reduced speed is necessary for safe 
operation or in compliance with law or in compliance with a 
special permit issued by an appropriate authority. 
Overriding maximum speed limit 
(6 )  The maximum rates of speeds allowed pursuant to this 
section are subject to the maximum rate  established pursuant 
to section 629b (1). 
(1) M.C.L.A. 257.629b, M.S.A. 9.2329(2). 
M.C.L.A. 257.629, M.S.A. 9.2329 
Prima facie speed limits; establishment, signs. 
Sec. 629. (1) Local authorities may establish or increase 
t h e  p r ima  fac ie  speed l imi ts  on highways under their  
jurisdictions subject to the following limitations: 
(a) Al l  highways within business or residential districts on 
which the prima fac ie  speed l imit  is increased shal l  be 
designated through highways at the entrance to which vehicles 
shall be required to stop before entering, except that where 2 
of these through highways intersect, local authorities may 
require traffic on 1 highway only to stop before entering the 
intersection. 
(b) The local authorities shall place and maintain, upon all 
through highways in which the permissible speed is increased, 
adequate signs giving notice of the special regulations and shall 
also place and maintain upon each highway in tersec t ing  a 
through highway, appropriate signs which shall be reflectorized 
or illuminated at night. 
(c) Local authorities may establish prima facie lawful speed 
limits on highways outside of business or residential districts 
which shall  not be less than 25 miles per hour, except as 
provided in subsection (4). 
( 2 )  The s tate  highway commission, within its discretion, may 
establish the speed which shall be prima facie lawful upon all 
trunk line highways outside of business districts and located 
within cities and villages, as follows: 
(a) A written copy of the authorization or determination 
shall be filed in the office of the county clerk of the county 
or counties where the highway is located and a certified copy 
thereof shall be prima facie evidence in all courts  of the 
issuance of the authorization or determination. 
(b) When the state highway commission increases the speed 
upon a trunk line highway as provided i n  this ac t ,  the 
department of state highways and transportation shall place and 
maintain upon these highways adequate signs giving notice of 
the permissible speed as fixed by the highway commission. 
(3) Local authorities are authorized to decrease the prima 
facie speed limits in public parks under their jurisdiction. A 
decrease in the prima facie speed limits shall be binding when 
adequate signs are duly posted giving notice of the reduced 
speeds. 
( 4 )  Local authorities are authorized to decrease the prima 
facie speed limits to not less than 15 miles an hour on each 
s t reet  or highway under their jurisdiction which is adjacent to 
a city owned park or playground. A decrease in the prima 
facie speed limits shall be binding when adequate signs are 
duly posted giving notice of the reduced speeds. 
( 5 )  The maximum rates of speeds allowed pursuant to this 
section are subject to the maximum rate established pursuant 
to section 629b.(1) 
(6 )  A person who exceeds a lawful speed limit established 
pursuant to this section is responsible for a civil infraction. 
(1) M.C.L.A. 257.629(b), M.S.A. 9.2329(2). 
M.C.L.A. 257.631, M.S.A. 9.2331 
Speed and load limitations on signposted bridges, causeways, and viaducts. 
Sec. 631. (1) A person shall not drive a vehicle upon a 
public bridge, causeway, or viaduct at a speed or with a load 
which is greater than the maximum speed or load which can be 
maintained with safety to the structure, when the structure is 
signposted as provided in this section. A person who violates 
this subsection is responsible for a civil infraction. 
(2 )  The depart men t of s ta te  highways and transportation, 
county road commission, or other authority having jurisdiction 
of a public bridge, causeway, or viaduct may conduct an 
investigation of that bridge, causeway, or viaduct. If it is 
found after investigation that the structure cannot with safety 
to itself withstand vehicles traveling at the speed or carrying a 
load otherwise permissible under this chapter, the department, 
commission, or other authority shall determine and declare the 
maximum speed of vehicles or load which the structure can 
withstand, and shall cause or permit suitable signs stating that 
maximum speed and load l imi ta t ions  to  be e rec ted  and 
maintained not more than 5 0  feet from each end of the 
structure, and also at a suitable distance from each end of the 
bridge to enable vehicles to take a different route. 
(3) The findings and determination of the department of 
s ta te  highways and transportation, county road commission, or 
other local authority, shall be conclusive evidence of the  
maximum speed and load which can with safety be maintained 
on a public bridge, causeway, or viaduct. 
M.C.L.A. 257.640, M.S.A. 9.2340 
No passing zones, marking; violation. 
Sec. 640.(1) The s tate  highway commission and county road 
commissions shall determine those portions of a highway under 
their jurisdiction where overtaking and passing or driving to the 
left  of the roadway would be especially hazardous, and b y  
appropriate signs or markings on the roadway shall indicate the 
beginning and end of those zones in a manner enabling an 
ordinary observant driver of a vehicle to observe the directions 
and obey them. A sign shall be placed to the lef t  of the 
highway on those portions of a highway where additional notice 
is considered necessary. 
( 2 )  The no-passing zones provided for by this section shall 
be based upon a t r a f f i c  survey and engineering s tudy.  
Traffic-control devices installed pursuant to this section shall 
conform to the state manual and specifications as provided for 
by section 608 (1). 
(3) A person who fails to obey the traffic-control devices 
installed pursuant to this section is responsible for a civil 
infraction. 
(1) M.C.L.A. 257.608, M.S.A. 9.2308. 
M.C.L.A. 257.641, M.S.A. 9.2341 
One-way roadways and rotary traffic islands. 
Sec. 641. (1) The s tate  highway commissioner may designate 
any highway or any separate roadway under his jurisdiction for 
l-way traffic and shall erect appropriate signs giving notice 
thereof. 
( 2 )  Upon a roadway designated and signposted for l-way 
traffic a vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated. 
( 3 )  A vehicle passing around a rotary traffic island shall be 
driven only to the right of that island. 
( 4 )  A person who violates subsection (2) or (3) is responsible 
for a civil infraction. 
M.C.L.A. 257.642, M.S.A. 9.2342 
Laned roadways, traffic rules. 
Sec. 642. (1) When a roadway has been divided into 2 or 
more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in 
addition to all others consistent with this act shall apply: 
(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as prac t icable  
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the 
lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement 
can be made with safety. Upon a roadway with 4 or more 
lanes which provides for 2-way movement of traffic, a vehicle 
shall be driven within the extreme right-hand lane except when 
overtaking and passing, but shall not cross the center line of 
the roadway except where making a left turn. 
(b) Upon a roadway which is divided into 3 lanes and 
provides for 2-way movement of traffic, a vehicle shall not be 
driven in the center lane except when overtaking and passing 
another  vehicle traveling i n  the same direction, when the 
center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in  
preparation for a left  turn or where the center lane is at the 
time allocated exclusively to t ra f f ic  moving i n  the  same 
direction the  vehicle is proceeding and the allocation is 
designated by official traffic control devices. 
(c) Official traffic control devices may be erected directing 
specified traffic to use a designated lane or designating those 
lanes to be used by traffic moving in a particular direction 
regardless of the center of the roadway and drivers of vehicles 
shall obey the directions of the traff ic-control device. 
(d) Official t raff ic-control  devices may be installed 
prohibiting the changing of lanes on sections of roadway, and 
drivers of vehicles sha l l  obey t h e  d i r e c t i o n s  of t h e  
traffic-control devices. 
( 2 )  A person who violates this section is responsible for a 
civil infraction. 
M.C.L.A. 257.668, M.S.A. 9.2342 
Railroad grade crossings, stop signs. 
Sec, 668 .  (1) The department  of s t a t e  highways, and 
transportation with respect to highways under its jurisdiction, 
the  county road commissions, and local authorities with 
reference to highways under their jurisdiction may designate 
ce r t a in  grade crossings of railways by highways as llstopu 
crossings, and erect signs at the crossings notifying drivers of 
vehicles upon the highway to come to a complete stop before 
crossing the railway tracks. When a crossing is so designated 
and signposted, the driver of a vehicle shall stop not more 
than 50 feet but not less than 10 feet from the railway tracks 
before traversing the crossings. The erection of or failure to 
replace or maintain the signs shall not be a basis for an action 
of negligence against the department of s tate  highways and 
transportation, county road commissions, or local authorities. 
(2 )  A person who fails to stop as required by this section is 
responsible for a civil infraction. 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
M.C.L.A. 691.1401, M.S.A. 3.996(101) 
Governmental function; liability for negligence; definitions. 
Sec, 1. As used in this act: 
(a) flMunicipal corporationff means any city, village, township or 
charter township, or any combination thereof, when acting jointly. 
( b )  "Pol i t ica l  subdivisionff means any municipal corporation, 
county, township, charter township, school district, port district, or 
metropol i tan district ,  or any combination thereof, when acting 
jointly, and any district or authority formed by 1 or more political 
subdivisions. 
( c )  "S ta t e f f  means the  s t a t e  of Michigan and its agencies, 
departments, and commissions, and shal l  include every public 
universi ty  and college of the  s t a t e ,  whether established as a 
constitutional corporation or otherwise. 
(d) ffGovernmental agencyff means the state political subdivisions, 
and municipal corporations as herein defined. 
(e) "Highwayff means every public highway, road and street which 
is open for public travel and shall include bridges,  sidewalks,  
crosswalks and culverts on any highway. The term ffhighwayu shall 
not be deemed to include alleys. 
M.C.L.A. 691.1402, M.S.A. 3.996(102) 
Defective highways; liability for innjuries; limitations. 
Sec. 2 .  Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any 
highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that i t  is 
reasonably sa fe  and convenient for public travel. Any person 
sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of 
failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its 
jurisdiction in  reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe  and 
fi t  for travel, mav recover the damages suffered by him from such 
governmental agency. The liability, procedure and remedy as to 
county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission 
shall be as provided in section 21, chapter 4 of Act No. 283 of the 
Public Acts of 1909, as amended, being sec t ion  224.21 of the  
Compiled Laws of 1948. The duty of the state and the county road 
commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the  l iabi l i ty  
therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway 
designed for vehicular travel and shall  not include sidewalks, 
crosswalks or any other installation outside of the'improved portion 
of the highway designed for vehicular travel. No action shall be 
brought against the state under this section except for injury or loss 
suffered on or after July 1, 1965. Any judgment against the s tate  
based on a claim arising under this section from acts or omissions 
of the s tate  highway department  shall  be payable only from 
restricted funds appropriated to the s tate  highway department or 
funds provided by its insurer. 
M.C.L.A. 691.1403, M.S.A. 3.996(103) 
Same; knowledge of defect, repair, presumption. 
Sec. 3. No governmental agency is liable for injuries or damages 
caused by defective highways unless the governmental agency knew, 
or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the 
existence of the defect and had a reasonable time to repair the 
defect before the injury took place. Knowledge of the defect and 
time to repair the same shall be conclusively presumed when the 
de fec t  existed so as  t o  be readily apparent to  an ordinarily 
observant person for a period of 30 days or longer before the injury 
took place. 
M.C.L.A. 691.1404, M.S.A. 3.996(104) 
Notice of injury and highway defect. 
Time; form and contents of notice 
Sec. 4. (1) As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained 
by reason of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 
days from the time the injury occurred,  except  a s  otherwise 
provided in subsection ( 3 )  shall serve a notice on the governmental 
agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice 
shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury 
sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the 
claimant. 
Service, filling; examination of claimant and witnesses 
( 2 )  The notice may be served upon any individual, e i ther  
personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may 
lawfully be served with civil process directed aga ins t  t h e  
governmental agency, anything to the contrary in the charter of any 
municipal coporation notwithstanding. In case of the state, such 
notice shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of the court of 
claims. Filing of such notice shall constitute compliance with 
sect ion 6431 of Act No. 236 of the Public Acts of 1961, being 
section 600.6431 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, requiring the filing 
of notice of intention to file a claim against the state. If required 
by the legislative body or chief administrative off icer  of the 
responsible governmental agency, the claimant shall appear to 
testify, i f  he is physically able to do so, and shall produce his 
witnesses before the legislative body, a committee thereof, or the 
chief administrative officer, or his deputy, or a legal officer of the 
governmental agency as directed by the legislative body or chief 
administrative officer of the responsible governmental agency, for 
examination under oath as to the claim, the amount thereof, and the 
extent of the injury. 
I n j u r e d  p e r s o n  u n d e r  18 o r  p h y s i c a l l y  or  m e n t a l l y  
incapacitated, t ime  for service;  determination of capability; 
ef fect  as to  charters, statues, and ordinances 
If the injured person is under the age of 18 years at  the time 
the injury occurred, he shall serve the notice required by subsection 
(1) not more than 180 days from the time the injury occurred, which 
notice may be filed by a parent, attorney, next friend or legally 
appointed guardian. If the injured person is physically or mentally 
incapable of giving notice, he shall serve the notice required by 
subsection (1) not more than 180 days after the termination of the 
disability. In all civil actions in which the physical or mental 
capability of the person is in dispute, that issue shall be determined 
by the trier of the facts, The provisions of this subsection shall 
apply to all charter provisions, statutes and ordinances which require 
written notices to counties or municipal corporations. 
M.C.L.A. 691.1405, M.S.A. 3.996(105) 
Government owned vehicles; liability for negligent operation. 
Sec. 5. Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury 
and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any 
officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, or a motor 
vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in 
Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 
257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. 
M.C.L.A. 691.1407, M.S.A. 3.996(107) 
Governmental immunity from tort liability, continuance. 
Sec. 7 ,  Except as  in this  a c t  o t h e r w i s e  p rov ided ,  a l l  
governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all 
cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or 
discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided 
herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting 
the immunity of the s t a t e  from to r t  l iabili ty as i t  existed 
heretofore, which immunity is affirmed. 
M.C.L.A. 691.1408, M.S.A. 3.996(108) 
Civil or criminal actions against officer or employee of governmental 
agency; attorney; compromise and settlement; indemnity 
Sec. 8. (1) Whenever a claim is made or a civil action is 
commenced against an officer or employee of a governmental 
agency for injuries to persons or property caused by negligence 
of the officer or employee while in the course of employment 
and while acting within the scope of his or her authority, the 
governmental agency may pay for, engage, or furnish the 
services of an attorney to advise the officer or employee as to 
the claim and to appear for the represent  the  of f icer  or 
employee in the  act ion.  The governmental agency may 
compromise, sett le,  and pay the claim before or a f t e r  the  
commencement of a civil action. Whenever a judgment for 
damages is awarded against an of f icer  or employee of a 
governmental agency as a result of a civil action for personal 
injuries or property damage caused by the officer or employee 
while in the course of employment and while acting within the 
scope of his or her authority, the governmental agency may 
i n d e m n i f y  t h e  o f f i c e r  or employee or pay, s e t t l e ,  or 
compromise the judgment, 
(2 )  When a criminal action is commenced against an officer 
or employee of a governmental agency based upon the conduct 
of the officer or employee in the course of employment, if the 
employee or officer had a reasonable basis for believing that 
he or she was acting within the scope of his or her authority 
at the time of the alleged conduct, the governmental agency 
may pay for, engage, or furnish the services of an attorney to 
advise the officer or employee as to the action, and to appear 
for and represent, the officer or employee in the action. An 
officer or employee who has incurred legal expenses a f t e r  
December 21, 1975 for conduct prescribed i n  this subsection 
may obtain reimbursement for those expenses under this  
subsection. 
( 3 )  This sec t ion  shal l  not impose any l iab i l i ty  on a 
governmental agency. 
M.C.L.A. 691.14ll, M.S.A. 3.996(1ll) 
Limitation of actions 
Sec. 11. (1) Every claim against any governmental agency 
shall be subject to  the general law respecting limitations of 
actions except as otherwise provided in this section. 
(2) The period of limitations for claims arising under section 
2 of this  act (1) shal l  b e  2 years. 
(3)  T h e  p e r i o d  of  l i m i t a t i o n s  f o r  all c l a i m s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
s t a t e ,  e x c e p t  those  arising under sec t ion  2 of this  act, shal l  be  
governed by chap te r  64 of Act  No. 236 o f  t h e  P u b l i c  A c t s  of  
1961(2). 
(1) M.C.L.A. 691.1402, M.S.A. 3.996(102) 
(2) M.C.L.A. 600.6401, M.S.A. 27a.6401 
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Agent, K.R. 1973. Evaluation of the  high accident  location spot 
im~rovement Dropram in Kentuckv. Frankfort: Kentuckv De~artment of .--- - .  .- -..- . - -  - - - ~ ~- - - - - -  - - ~ - .~ - ~- 
~ i g h w a ~ s  rese&chnreport no. 357. KYP-72-40, HPR-i8. Part I f .  
A before-and-after evaluation of the Kentucky Spot Improvement 
Program is performed. A benefit-cost ratio is used to evaluate improved 
3/10 and 1110-mile segments in rural Kentucky. A comparison sample of 
other high-accident locations where no improvement program was 
implemented enhances the study. The results showed that the benefit 
cost ratios of the program were greater than 1.0 in all cases, with these 
results being statistically significant. 
The ''equivalent property damage onlyT1 (EPDO) method of assigning 
costs to accidents is described in detail. Weights of the various types of 
accidents are justified and a rationale is given as to why Kentucky found 
f a t a l  accidents  to  be nine times as costly or a s  i m p o r t a n t  a s  
proper ty-damage-only accidents. 
Council, F.M..; Dutt, A.K.; Hunter, W.W.; Leung, A.Y.; and Woody, N.C. 
1977. Project selection for roadside hazards 'limination. volume 11. 
User manual for roadside hazard correction ranking program. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Highway Safety Research Center. 
This is a presentation of a computer program by which a state can do 
the analysis described in the final report. The program, called the  
Roadside Hazard Correction Ranking (RHCR) program may be modified by 
changing inaccurate information or adding new hazards and treatments to 
the  analysis. The program ranks improvements by annual benefit, 
benefit-cost ratio, and net discounted present value. The program also 
gives tables predicting the number of fatal, injury, or PDO accidents, 
which will be reduced by the treatment for each year of the treatment's 
life. 
Datta, T.K.; Bowman, B.L.; and Opiela, K.S. 1978, Evaluation of highway 
safety projects using quality-control techniques. In  rans sport at ion 
Research Record no. 672, pp.9-19. Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
of Sciencies; National Research Council 
A new method of evaluating highway safety programs and identifying 
safety-deficient locations is presented as an a1 t ernative to Poisson and 
chi-square distributions because "they are neither suitable for locations 
with very low accident frequency nor responsive to local conditions or 
 standard^.^' The study was done in Oakland County, Michigan. 
Confidence intervals for accident patterns were established for t wo-lane, 
four-lane, five-lane, and freeway links, segregated by traffic volume. 
Thus, for these classes of roads, mean values were established allowing 
testing of the hazardousness of the location based on average conditions 
of Oakland County roads, as opposed to using some statewide average or 
t h e o r e t i c a l  average.  This study was sponsored by the  Traf f ic  
Improvement Association of Oakland County. 
Datta, T.K., and Rodgers, R,J, 1979. Computerized s treet  index for 
Michigan accident location index system. In Transportation Research 
Record no. 706, pp.20-22. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of 
Sciences; National Research Council. 
Four deficiencies in highway recordkeeping and analysis of highway 
data are described as the impetus for Michigan's attempt to develop a 
computerized statewide reporting system. They are (1) most communities 
do not have access to accident recordkeeping, ( 2 )  many communities do 
not record property damage only (PDO) accidents ,  ( 3 )  different  
communities have different s tandards for keeping records of PDO 
accidents, and (4) the means to analyze traffic data are not present, even 
if the data are available to communities. Thus, the Michigan Department 
of S t a t e  Highways and Transportat ion (MDSHT) and the Michigan 
Department of State Police developed the Michigan accident location 
index (MALI). The system generates a computerized physical description 
of accident locations. This is done through the requirement on all local 
and state  police that accidents be referenced by distance and direction 
from the nearest cross-street intersection when reporting accidents.  
Then, computer programs take these accident reports ,  and on a 
county-by-county basis provide statistical ranking of intersections by 
hazardousness, based on the total number of accidents that occur within 
45 meters of an intersection. At the time date of publication of the 
Da t t a  and Rodgers article, MIDAS, which does an accident pattern 
analysis, had not been developed. (See Michigan Department of State 
Highways and Transportation 1978. Fifth annual report of Michigan's 
overall highway safety improvement program. Lansing Michigan.) 
Deacon, J.A.; Zegeer, C,V,; and Deen, R.C. 1975. Identification of 
hazardous rural highway locations. In Transportation Research Record no. 
543, pp.16-33. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciencies; 
National Research Council. 
A procedure is established for the identification of hazardous rural 
highway locations using four indicators: (1) number of fatal accidents; (2 )  
number of accidents; (3) number of "equivalent property damage onlyn 
(EPDO) accidents; and (4) EPDO accident rate. The decision process 
applies each of the above indicators, in the order listed, to each location. 
A high number of fatal accidents is itself enough to judge a location 
hazardous, while the 'Inumber of accidents" indicator must be combined 
with a high EPDO number of high EPDO rate to define a hazardous 
locat ion. 
Department of Civil Engineering. 1976. A procedure for the analysis of 
high accident locations. Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University. 
A procedure is described in which ranking of locations is done by using 
a matrix consisting of accident frequency and accident ra te .  The 
resultant rankings are reranked using an accident severity index. Once 
hazardous locations are ranked, computer collision diagrams, accident 
report summaries, field observations, and traffic conflicts analysis are 
recommended for identifying "contributing factorstf to accident occurrences 
at high-accident locations. 
Checklists are presented for engineers1 use in choosing an appropriate 
t r e a t m e n t  once the  cause is identified. However, the report stops 
here--economic analysis, implementation s t r a t eg ies ,  a l locat ion and 
budgeting, staffing, timing and program evaluation are not considered. 
FHWA Offices of Highway Safety and Development, and Goodell-Grivas, 
Inc. 1979. ~va lua i ion  o f  highway safety projects. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration. 
Several methods of project evaluations are reviewed, including: (1) 
before-and-after tests with controls (comparison to untreated sites); (2 )  
before-and-after tests without controls; (3) comparative parallel studies; 
and (4) before, during, and after tests. 
Examples of evaluations a r e  given, with expl ici t  how-to-do-it 
procedures described. Phases of projects  a re  also in the  r epor t ,  
Evaluation is divided into six steps: (1) developing an evaluation plan; (2)  
collecting and reducing data; (3)  performing a comparison of different 
measures of effect iveness;  (4)  performing tests of significance; (5) 
performing economic analyses; and (6) preparing the evaluation document. 
Each step is discussed in the framework of an instructional manual, with 
references for more theoretical discussion and description given. 
Fleischer, G.A. 1977. Significance of benefit/cost and cost/effectiveness 
ra t ios  in analyses of t r a f f i c  sa fe ty  programs and projec ts .  In 
Transportation Research Record no. 635, pp.32-36. Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy of Sciences; National Research Council. 
This report is a critique of various methods of cost-benefit analysis, 
including benefit-cost ratio, cost-effectiveness ratio, and net present 
worth methods. These methods are discussed in light of their misuse 
when applied to highway safety research. Specifically, Fleischer argues 
that ranking of projects by benefit-cost ratios is not feasible under most 
investment conditions. He also explains why ranking by benefi t-cost ratio 
can lead to different project selection than ranking by net present worth. 
This report is good background reading for dynamic programming. 
Hunter, W.W.; Council, F.M.; and Dutt, A.K. 1977. Project selection for 
roadside hazards modification. Volume I. Final report. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Highway Safety Research Center. 
This analysis was concerned with fixed project hazards, including trees, 
utility poles, exposed bridge rail  ends, substandard bridge rails,  
underpasses, rigid sign supports and guardrail ends. These hazards all are 
within thirty feet of the pavement, Benefit/cost analysis is used to rank 
improvements-accidents are valued in dollars. This program contrasts 
with most other programs because it is not a spot-improvement, but an 
area-improvement program. This is because accidents associated with 
fixed-object hazards are rarer than automobile collisions on the roadways. 
Thus, hazards are aggregated and categorized as to location-that is, 
rural, urban, highway type, highway character, highway features, etc, 
Therefore, a program might be aimed at removing all trees from the 
roadside on all curved nonintersection segments of two-lane highways in 
rural  regions. Improvements for each hazard a re  assessed using 
cost-benefit  analyses based on past experience of improvement 
effectiveness. 
Johnson ,  M . M . ;  Dare, C.E.; and Skinner, H.B. 1971. Dynamic 
programming of highway safety projects. Transportation Engineering 
Journal 97 ( 4 )  : 667-79. 
Dynamic programming, a computerized method of prioritizing and 
staging safety (or other) projects, is proposed as an alternative to, the 
F H W A procedure for decision-making dynamic programming. This method 
has been used by the s t a t e  highway departments  in Alabama and 
Kentucky. Its foundations are in physics and mathematics; it is generally 
an alternative to linear programming and cost-benefit analysis. 
The FHWA method used the following process: (1) choose a lfbesttl 
project from a set of projects applicable to each location identified (by 
some earlier method) as hazardous based on a cost-benefit study; (2)  
rank-order each chosen project at each hazardous location by cost-benefit 
analysis (rate of return, present worth or benefit/cost ratio); and (3) 
implement projects by going down the rank-ordered list until funds are 
exhausted. 
The weaknesses of this procedure are explained: (1) the alternative of 
choosing not to make any improvement at a hazardous location is not 
considered; (2) it is assumed that only one project can be chosen for each 
site; (3) simple rank-ordering of projects will not necessarily achieve the 
best rate  of return or benefitlcost ratio unless funds are unlimited; and 
(4) present worth, benefitlcost ratio, and rate  of return methods would 
choose d i f f e ren t  pr ior i t ies  unless funds were unlimited, Dynamic 
programming does not display these weaknesses. 
Dynamic programming chooses an optimal set of decisions over time. 
Examples are given and compared with cost-benefit analysis. Dynamic 
programming is shown to  produce a higher economic return than 
cost-benefit analysis when applied to the same set of data. Computer 
programming flowcharts are provided in the report, and an agency with 
computer facilities and a programmer could use dynamic programming to 
allocate funds. 
Roy Jorgensen Associates, Inc. 197 8. Cost and safety effectiveness of 
highway design elements. National Cooperat ive Highway Research 
Program Report 197. 
This repor t  describes a research project carried out to meet the 
following objectives: (1) identify key geometric characteristics of road 
designs tha t  a f fec t  accident experience; ( 2 )  quantify the effects of 
varying those design characteristics; and (3) develop a methodology that 
can be used by engineers in measuring the cost effectiveness of the 
various levels of each design element. A user's manual is presented in 
Appendix I. The focus of the  manual is on "tailoring designs for 
individual projects rather than developing designs through the application 
of fixed design standards." The design process uses a cost-effectiveness 
methodology to select designs for sites. The process is: (1) determine 
construction costs; (2)  determine accident costs; (3) determine candidate 
designs; and (4) select the final design. Design elements studies were: 
pavement width, shoulder width, and shoulder surface type, all for 
two-lane rural highways. Thus, this manual could be used to maximize a 
s a f e t y  objec t ive  when new construction occurs in rural areas. Old 
two-lane, rural roads could be tested as to their safety effectiveness, and 
improved based on the research provided there. 
Laughland, J.C.; Haefner, L.E.; Hall, J.; Clough, D.R.; and Roy Jorgensen 
~ s s o c i a t e s ,  Inc. 1975. Methods for evaluating highway s a f e t y  
improvements. National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 
162. 
Although the title refers only to evaluation methods, all aspects of the 
highway safety process are discussed. The objective of this report is "to 
provide a detailed technique in the form of guidelines . . , that will allow 
officials to judge the effectiveness of highway improvements in terms not 
only of reduced accidents  but also of the cost-benefits of such 
improvements." 
The concept of a llhighway safety evaluation systemn is proposed, 
consisting of six phases: (1) identifying hazardous locations; ( 2 )  selecting 
alternative improvements; (3)  evaluating alternative improvements; (4) 
programming and implementing improvements; (5) evaluating implemented 
improvements; and (6)  evaluating the highway safety program. Each of 
these phases is discussed in detail. Benefit/cost ratio is recommended as 
a basis for establishing priorities for program selection, with some 
reservations. Dynamic programming is discussed in phase three. In 
appendices, detai led information on the many methodologies in the 
highway safety process is given. Overall, this report is comprehensive, 
well-organized, and understandable, 
Norden, M.; Orlansky, J.; and Jacobs, H. 1956. Application of statistical 
quality control techniques to analysis of highway accident data. High way 
Research Board Bulletin ll7:17-31. 
A "control chart" is established for road intervals, determining whether 
or not an accident rate is above or below an upper and lower bound to a 
mean accident rate for intervals of similar characteristics. The Poisson 
distribution is used to establish these upper and lower bounds, This 
article was the basis for current efforts at setting critical rates and using 
the rate-quality control method that is now very commonly used. Since 
the writing (19561, its statistical parameters have been revised, but the 
concept of statistical significance of accident rates is the same. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operat ion and Development. 1976. 
Hazardous road location: ~dentification and counter measures. Paris. 
This study identifies and categorizes various methods of identifying 
hazardous locations. The categories are: statistical and numerical 
techniques; on-si t e observations; locat ion sampling; conflict studies; and 
monitoring of physical characteristics. Drawbacks and advantages of each 
approach are discussed. Then, discussion turns to a categorization of 
remedial procedures, including: geometric design; road surfacing; road 
marking and delineation systems; road signs and furniture; and traffic 
m anagem ent. 
G u i d e l i n e s  f o r  t h e  c h o i c e  of a proper remedial  t r e a t m e n t  
(countermeasure) are given. This is done through checklists, flowcharts 
and tables com paring likely benefits from alternative countermeasures for 
each type of problem. An excellent bibliography is included. This is a 
very comprehensive, thorough approach, with recommendations of many 
possible treatments noted and evaluated based on empirical findings. 
Pigman, J.G.; Agent, K.R.; Mayes, J.G.; and Zegeer, C.U. 1976. Optimal 
highway safety improvement investments by Dynamic Programming. In 
~'ansdortation ~ e s e a r c h  Record no. 585, pp.49-59. Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy of Sciences; National Research Council. 
Dynamic programming is a method for selecting a safety program from 
a set of alternate highway safety projects, It produces an optimum list 
of projects  and arranges their sequence of implementation so as to 
maximize economic return. This paper demonst ra tes  how dynamic 
programming can achieve a greater return than costlbenefit analysis by 
testing a common set of data using both methods. 
How is dynamic programming better than cost-benefit analysis? Under 
a limited budget selecting projects in order of cost-benefit score does not 
necessari ly  provide the  g r e a t e s t  economic gain possible. A more 
economical set of projects, one that has been compared with all other 
possible sets by a computer program, emerges from dynamic programming. 
The logic of this is that money might be spent on one large project with 
a high benefit/cost ratio and on no other projects, while there may be 
enough money to afford several smaller projects with individually lower 
benefitlcost ratios that in the aggregate may make better use of the 
budgetary funds and provide a greater economic return. Therefore, when 
dealing with complex programs where many alternatives are available at 
many locations, dynamic programming is useful. 
Sarrazin, T.; Spreer, F.; and Tietzel, M. 1976. Logical decision-making 
techniques to evaluate public investment projects: Cost-benefit analysis, 
cost-effectiveness analysis, utility-analysis--a c r i t ica l  comparative 
approach. International journal of Transport Economics l(2). 
A discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of three forms of economic 
analysis. No approach is deemed "better," but only more applicable to 
certain situations. The point is make that all of the techniques are (or 
claimable) objective and claim to "safeguard economic rationality in 
allocative decisions." 
The strategy of cost-benefit analysis is to quantify public and private 
benefits, costs, and opportunity costs in terms of money; decisions are 
made on the basis of pure numerical superiority. The strategy of 
cost-effectiveness analysis is to select the optimum course of action from 
several options based on the realization of objectives that each option 
allows. Utility-analysis rank-orders a l t e r n a t i v e s  i n  t h e  s a m e  
objective-achievement method as cost-effectiveness analysis, except that 
it rank-orders alternatives instead of selecting the best one. Potential 
applications of these methods to highway decisions are discussed. 
Snyder, J.C. 1974. Environmental determinants of traffic accidents: An  
alternative model. In Transportation Research Record no. 486, pp.11-18. 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences; National Research 
Council. 
This research attempts to build an causal model of traffic accidents 
based on environmental characteristics. It was hypothesized by the author 
that these characteristics (such as amount of developed road frontage, 
value of homes, and age of population) could be used to predict the  
frequency of accidents on roadways. A test was made on a stratified 
random sample of 135 road segments in Oakland County, Michigan 
A regression analysis and several other statistical techniques were 
applied to the data. The regression analysis indicated that nearly all of 
the variance in the accident rate was explained by regional-environmental 
variables. 
Unexpected results were obtained, showing that accident phenomena 
are not as well understood as was believed. Type of road was found to 
be the  best predictor  of accident  rate, followed by road frontage 
characteristics and percentage of the population within a three-mile radius 
from the road sample between sixteen and twenty-four years old. Other 
variables had effects depending on the type of road tested. For example, 
population density was the only reliable predictor of accidents on freeways. 
These results, if reliable, could have an important effect on policy. 
For example, the percentage of developed roadside frontage was found to 
be a significant prediction of accident rates, but not because it caused an 
increase  in t r a f f i c  volumes. How, then does roadside development 
contribute to accidents? Is it because of distractions to drivers? Does 
frontage development contribute to stop and go driving, and does this 
then cause more acccidents? Is it because people are pulling out of 
driveways onto roads more of ten?  Is it a result of a speed limit 
difference? Engineers might test these  possibili t ies,  look for the  
relationship between design frontage and accidents, and decide what 
design should be used when building or improving in developed areas. In 
a larger sense, planners may want to restrict development along roadsides 
to a level associated with a tolerable accident rate,  unless engineers or 
researchers can find a design solution to this problem. This study raises 
some very important questions, and the search for answers to them could 
lead to innovations in highway safety programming and design. 
Taylor, J.1, and Thompson, H.T. 1977.  Identification of hazardous 
locations final report. Federal Highway Administration unclassified report 
FHWA-RD-77-83. 
This report describes the creation of a hazardousness index, devised in 
a ser ies  of workshops held a t  t h e  University of P e n n s y l v a n i a .  
Participating in the workshops were nationally known experts in the field 
of highway safety. Opinions of the experts were used in forming the 
index, and recommendations for its proper use are given. 
The report describes the wide variety of procedures currently used by 
the states in identifying and ranking hazardous locations. It is shown that 
these procedures, when applied to a common s e t  of da ta ,  lead to  
different assessments of hazardousness. To address this problem, the 
experts were asked to rank llindicators" (measures of hazardousness of 
some road segment of intersection) with regard to four qualities: 1) 
meri t ,  2 )  definition and form, 3 )  ease of da ta  acqu i s i t ion  and 
implementation and 4) an overall recommendation. From the rankings, 
nine indicators were chosen as most useful, and were then combined into 
a single index. Reasons for use of an index as opposed to a series of 
filters (locations ranked on each indicator separately, then re-ranked on 
another after some have been dropped) are given. 
Taylor, J.I., and Thompson, H.T. 1977. Identification of hazardous 
locations.  A user's manual. Washington, D.C.: Federal Highway 
Administration, unclassified report FHWA-RD-77-82. 
The User's Manual describes a hazardousness index and each indicator 
in it. This includes a description of the previous usage of the indicator, 
its mathematical formulation, and critical values with which the user can 
rate locations based on this indicator. Graphs are provided showing how 
the  indicator varies with ADT (Average Daily Traffic). The manual 
concludes with a chapter describing the combining of the indicators into 
an index and the weights assigned to each particular indicator. A case 
study is presented, showing the use of the index in a real-world situation. 
Traffic and Safety, Local Government, and Maintenance Divisions, h d  the 
Railroad Contact &tion, Bureau of ~ighways. 1978. Fifth annual report 
Five sections outline the State of Michigan's current and planned 
highway safety activities. Included are reviews of the various federal 
highway safety programs carried out in Michigan. Particularly relevant 
are the discussions of the Michigan Accident Location Identification 
System (MALI)  and the Michigan Dimensional Accident Surveillance model 
(MIDAS). The two are used together to identify hazardous locations based 
on s tate  averages for similar locations with similar types of accidents. 
Types of locations differentiated by geometry, environment, cross-section, 
volume and accident characteristics are combined with a set  of twenty 
possible accident codes (right-angle, rear-end, left turn, right turn, etc.). 
This combination establishes the data base for what is known as llaccident 
pattern analysis." Frequencies of these accident patterns are available 
from computer printouts for all locations in the file throughout the state.  
The system can also run benefit cost analyses of improvements, based on 
previous before-and-after studies of these improvements in the state.  
National Safety Council values for accident costs are used. The MIDAS 
model currently is being expanded to be useful for all roads in Michigan. 
From the Traffic Improvement Association (TIA) literature made available, 
it appears that the state system has two advantages: 1) road locations 
can be compared with other locations in the s ta te  to determine their 
relative hazard, and thus what effects improvements will likely have, and 
2 )  t he  MIDAS model includes a method of economic analysis of the 
effects of various types of improvement.  TIA1s system has the  
advantages of 1) computer-drawn collision diagrams and 2) more accessible 
and up-to-date accident data. 
Traffic Improvement Association of Oakland County. Directory of traffic 
data services for Oakland County, Michigan. Bloomfield Hills, Michigan. 
A summary of the computer techniques available to highway safety 
data users, for Oakland County, Michigan. The report presents sample 
outputs of some of these analyses run on the TIA data base. Techniques 
include: 1) a matrix combining accident frequency and accident rate  to 
identify hazardous locations, 2) a roadway segment hazard report showing 
individual segments with figures on accident frequency, rate  and severity, 
and rankings on these criteria, 3 )  total accidents by location (a printout 
describing characteristics of every accident that occurred over some time 
period),  4 )  computer-drawn collision diagrams, portraying paths and 
collision points of vehicles involved in accidents, and 5) a comparison 
printout of accident occurrences and enforcement activity, and other 
accident summaries designed for police to aid in traffic law enforcement 
and record keeping. 
Winfrey, R. 1978. Concepts, principles and objectives of economic 
analysis applicable to traffic accidents. In Transportation Research 
Record no. 680, pp.40-53. 
Winfrey distinguishes between "making an analysis of the transportation 
economy of alternative investments in highway improvementsr' and "pricing 
traffic accidents for other purposes or for viewpoints other than that of 
the economic community as a ~hole .~ '  He argues that economic decisions 
(decisions about investments) must be made based on the principles of 
economic analysis, including I) evaluating all  factors in market dollars, 2) 
including only those consequences of the investment that can be market 
priced, 3) expressing price factors in economic, not value dollars, and 4 )  
including only factors related to the conservation of resources. In his 
opinion, economic factors are to be separated from human and social 
factors (pain, suffering, grief, value of a human life, etc.) by using cost 
benefit analysis on the former and cost-effectiveness analysis on the 
latter,  Winfrey then outlines all of the factors that determine a person's 
economic productivity within the social system, and that determine his 
role as a consumer. He explains the wide range in determining the cost 
of an accident fatality as due to a lack of separation of economic and 
social  costs.  Treatment  of the  analysis of involvement from the 
viewpoint of the deceased's family, or from social aspects of society, is 
wrong, he says. The correct viewpoint is from that of the highway-user 
population, and the total economic costs occurring to them. 
Winfrey does not address the questions of how the analyst is to 
compare the two different analyses-m arket and social (cost benefit and 
cost-effectiveness), How are they to be weighted? How is the final 
decision ultimately made? In the discussion section at the end of the 
report, William F, McFarland and J.B. Rollins of the Texas Transportation 
Institute, Texas A&M University attempt to attach a dollar value to the 
social and human factors, rather than separate them from market factors. 
For them, an economic analysis should include: 1) value of lost resources, 
2 )  value of a person's life to others (future production less consumption) 
and 3) value of a person's life to himself. They estimate "about $257,000 
in 1975 U.S. dollars . . . as the value the average motorist places on the 
value of his or her own life to himself or herself." Their discussion 
suggests that people who are not motorists (i.e., pedestrians) attribute 
different values to their own life. For example, the authors report "a 
study of choices between crossing a road directly or using a safer but 
slower subway crossingn showed the value of a human life to the person 
in this situation as $340,000 (1975 dollars). The authors do not discuss 
whether the perception of risk is different from actual risk. 
Winfrey, R., and Zellner, C. 1971. Summary and evaluation of economic 
consequences of highway improvements. National Cooperative Highway 
Research Program Report 122. 
This research brings together ten previous projects on various forms of 
economic analyses of highway improvements. The purpose is "to supply 
theory, methodology, and discussion of the analysis of the economics and 
consequences of highway improvements . . . in a way t h a t  will aid 
analysts in making studies and the decision makers in selecting highway 
improvement projects . . . 11 
Topics of discussion include: 1) systems analysis, 2 )  cost-benefit 
analysis, 3) road-user costs and benefits, 4) nonuser costs and benefits, 5) 
cost-effectiveness analysis, 6 )  engineering economy analysis, 7) program 
planning and budgeting systems,  8 )  management decisions and 9 )  
evaluations. The reports are organized so that each topic builds on the 
preceding discussions. Thus, economic analysis, a form of systems 
analysis, is in chapter 3, while systems analysis is in chapter 2. Chapters 
4 and 5 then present forms of economic analysis. These chapters are 
ordered "from concept  and theory through analysis procedures to 
evaluation and the management decision." This is a very thorough 
discussion of the economics of highway improvements. 
Zegeer, C.V. 1975. Identification of hazardous locations on city streets. 
Frankfort: Kentucky Bureau of Highways unclassified report no. 436. 
A new procedure for identifying hazardous city streets in the state of 
Kentucky is proposed, This is a complement to  an ear l ie r  r epor t ,  
co-edi t ed by Zegeer, proposing a new procedure for identifying hazardous 
rural locations in Kentucky. Like the  previous study, i t  uses a 
combination of measures of accident experience in arriving at the most 
hazardous locations. 
The first cut at  defining hazardous locations is made through use of 
the "number of accidentsw measure. The second ranking is given by the 
"rate-quality control method," an accident-rate measure with critical 
values based on a statewide average of similar types of roads (arterial 
collectors or freeways) with similar volumes. Severity is not used in 
ranking locations because "severity in urban areas is usually determined by 
circumstances of the accident or particular traffic conditions." 

